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This study examines what methods there are for a Finnish startup to enter Silicon Valley in 
pursuit of the American Dream. The primary goal is to determine which concrete and ac-
cessible alternatives are available in pursuing business in the Silicon Valley for Witrafi Oy, 
a smart parking startup from Finland. Thus, the aim is to provide information on methods 
available for the case-company to enter Silicon Valley with varying degrees of resource 
commitment. 
 
The thesis work consists of a theory review, data collection and subsequent analysis with 
recommendations made on how market entry could be pursued by the case company. The 
theory discusses funding options for a startup in addition to internationalization theories ap-
plicable to an early-stage company. The empirical part focuses on providing viable interna-
tionalization options for the case company, finishing with recommendations for Witrafi for 
various levels of resource commitment. The study involved both quantitative and qualita-
tive methods. A qualitative exploratory research approach was used because the aim of 
the study was to provide additional information for decision making. Thus, no hypotheses 
were set in the beginning, rendering the research inductive. Expert interviews (including 
the case company CEO’s) were carried out to determine various aspects of business for a 
startup in Silicon Valley. The interviews were used to support and augment the theoretical 
framework. Literature on the topic was scarcely available, which is why expert interviews 
were highly useful in determining the viable options for startups to enter Silicon Valley. 
 
The research identified five viable options for internationalization, each with different levels 
of resource commitment required. Interestingly, for many options, incorporation was not 
seen to be required according to the interviews. It is clear that funding for internationaliza-
tion is highly available from public funding sources in Finland. There is a clear quantifiable 
benefit of raising funding in Silicon Valley, as funding rounds there (Series A) were 23.2 % 
larger than in the Nordics.  
 
As suggested by the interviews and field research, the competitive environment in Silicon 
Valley is difficult for any company. However, Silicon Valley is full of opportunities, likewise 
confirmed by the research: the funding and knowledge concentrated in the area is phe-
nomenal. According to the availability of mainly time and capital resources, Witrafi may 
choose to pursue one of several market entry options, each with varying benefits and suc-
cess factors. Nevertheless, the case company should carefully consider if it has the re-
sources and whether there is a chance to succeed due to extreme competition. It should 
also be noted that market entry could also be done through another US city at first, or gen-
erally regarding internationalization, another country might be chosen to pursue a blue 
ocean market. 
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1 Introduction 
How can a dream factory, in other words a startup, most efficiently pursue the American 
Dream? How can a startup access the potentially highly lucrative U.S. market, and just ex-
actly what are the benefits of such resource-draining endeavor? This research was made 
in order to answer to these questions, in the context of pursuing market entry to the Sili-
con Valley by the case company, Witrafi Oy. The United States is the leading market for 
any vehicle-related industry and the same is true for innovative parking companies. 
 
Witrafi is a Finnish startup in the smart parking sector, providing products and services for 
parking operators to be used by their end users, the driving consumers. Witrafi’s industry 
is Intelligent Transport Systems and Services and they are looking for internationalization 
in several regions of the world. Silicon Valley is just one of many regions they are inter-
ested in or have under study. These studies are conducted because Witrafi has realized 
that to truly succeed, they must quickly search for international markets as Finnish domes-
tic market is small. The case company anticipates insights into how this extremely intri-
guing market could be entered through Silicon Valley. 
 
The aim is to provide the case company with useful alternatives for entering Silicon Valley. 
These are to be discussed in a form of options for internationalization into Silicon Valley 
and based on; how much resources, especially time- and capital-wise there are available. 
Hence, these options are to vary according to the desired level of intensity, of course, in 
addition to other deciding factors. Interestingly, as this researches case company is a 
startup, it must indeed be defined what a startup actually is in the first place.  
 
The theory framework assesses various funding and internationalization theories which 
have been considered only if they are relevant to the case company.  Of internationaliza-
tion, relevant theories such as; born-global companies and network approach are consid-
ered. Furthermore, different market entry modes are introduced. The second part of the 
theoretical framework deals with international financial management, mainly budgeting 
and sources of funding. Possible risks factors are likewise discussed. 
 
This thesis is a research-oriented singe unit case study and uses a qualitative research 
approach. Case study involves the unit of analysis, herein the commissioning company 
Witrafi Oy, and a real world context or phenomena. Qualitative exploratory research ap-
proach was chosen because it is suitable when the objective of research is to describe 
and gain a deeper understanding of issues, rather than draw conclusions from a larger 
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sample or to give definite answers. The research approach is also inductive, because no 
hypotheses are presented in the beginning of the research.  
 
The main outcomes of this study introduce the operating environment of Silicon Valley in 
several ways. The ecosystem of that market is introduced together with possible competi-
tion etc. PESTEL is used as a tool to determine the operating environment’s characteris-
tics. It is also necessary to determine the possible partners in this internationalization pro-
cess. These have been identified through the expert interviews and literature review, in 
addition to theoretical models. Their offered collaboration arrangements are hence exam-
ined, each closely related with the possible partner. Naturally, for startups everything 
comes down to the amount of funding, or lack thereof. Therefore, it is finally important to 
assess what these possible partnerships and their pursuit may cost for the company. 
 
The study is limited in multiple ways, firstly by determining that the study only considers 
funding and collaboration. It will only geographically consider Silicon Valley, not the whole 
country of the United States. This is also a case study made for the case company, there-
fore the results may not be applicable to others. Funding is a scarce resource for startups, 
therefore options requiring large investments or expenditures are not considered. The fact 
that the case company is a startup poses limitations as well. Startups rarely have person-
nel resources to immediately and exhaustively pursue internationalization. It is only after 
careful consideration that such operations should be done. Likewise it should be carefully 
planned exactly whom to send on the required trips to Silicon Valley. 
1.1 Case background 
The following research is a case study commissioned by Witrafi Oy, an ambitious start-up 
company working in Intelligent Transport Systems and Services sector. The company is 
constantly looking for growth opportunities and is seeking additional funding to expedite 
growth and research and development efforts. In Witrafi’s industry the Finnish market is 
not sufficient to satisfy the company’s needs for growth. The company is therefore looking 
for international markets and opportunities. Entry into foreign market would not only in-
crease the total addressable market size for Witrafi, but could provide new funding oppor-
tunities and means to strengthen the organization’s competences.  
 
The United States of America is one potential location for Witrafi’s expansion. It has the 
most passenger vehicles driving on the roads. Consequently there is a large addressable 
market for parking solutions. When it comes to funding opportunities, the U.S. has the 
greatest amount of venture capital in the world. The country additionally home to some of 
the best universities and offers an attractive employee market for businesses. 
  
3 
 
 
Figure 1. Case introduction (idea for the figure from Yin 2012, 8). 
 
The wider real life phenomenon, the context of this case study, is start-up internationaliza-
tion as illustrated in figure 1. The following sub-chapters give further information on the 
purpose, demarcation and structure of this research. Furthermore, chapter four familiar-
izes the reader with the case company and chapter five discusses the choice of research 
methods. 
1.2 Research purpose and research question 
The purpose of this study is to examine what are the realistic options for case company 
Witrafi in potential market entry to the United States of America. More specifically, when 
the point of entry is San Francisco Bay Area in the state of California. The finished re-
search is a study of different collaborative and funding opportunities available in interna-
tionalization for a Finnish start-up company. The research question of this thesis is:  
 
What are the best partnering opportunities and market entry strategies for a 
Finnish start-up venturing into Silicon Valley? 
 
Need for this research is real. There is a lack of similar studies and the topic is important 
and timely for the case company, which although constrained by resources, has already 
gained some experience from international markets. The research question of this study 
incorporates the essential elements to be researched. Investigative questions are intro-
duced in chapter five and further divide the research into more researchable components. 
The following sub-chapters discuss what exactly is researched and why and additionally 
introduce the anticipated benefits of this research. 
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1.3 Delimitations and scope 
International expansion is a large-scale business phenomenon which could be studied 
from many different points of view. The context of this case is clearly defined as start-up 
internationalization, but the research is further demarcated by different dimensions. After 
negotiating with the commissioning company, which is also the single unit of the analysis, 
it was decided that this research is geographically limited to Silicon Valley – San Fran-
cisco Bay Area, but takes into account relevant opportunities from home market Finland. 
The research is demarcated to present time, but in some parts also longer-term outcomes 
are discussed to give the reader more in-depth understanding of the issue.  
 
The biggest single demarcating aspect of this research is the case company Witrafi Oy. 
The authors strongly emphasize that the case company is a start-up constrained by re-
sources. In fact, the authors decided to demarcate a closer examination of Witrafi’s cur-
rent financial position out of this research and approach the research question from a 
point of view that Witrafi has little to no own money to be used in internationalization. Fur-
thermore, Witrafi’s industry and product are taken into account in this research. 
 
Considering the already introduced dimensions of demarcation the authors decided, to-
gether with the case company, that the research should be exploratory rather than give 
definite answers. That is, the research focuses on collaborative opportunities that could 
realistically increase the case company’s access to the target market (figure 2) or be oth-
erwise useful in case company’s internationalization. 
 
 
Figure 2. Witrafi’s current development stage and the research demarcation of this thesis 
(Idea adapted from Coppola, A. 2014, presentation).  
 
Realistic collaborative opportunities are those opportunities that: 
- Are located within geographical demarcation of this research 
- Provide needed resources for Witrafi 
- Increase Witrafi’s capabilities 
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- Are free or cost little to Witrafi 
- Are known to have previously worked with either start-ups or SMEs 
 
Theoretical framework in parts deviates from the above mentioned demarcation, but only 
to give the reader an adequate understanding of case context.  
1.4 Anticipated benefits 
This research has many stakeholders whom will benefit from it. The two clear beneficiar-
ies are the commissioning company and the students conducting the research. For other 
companies, especially startups, the finished research may prove to be a valuable resource 
when they are looking into similar internationalization efforts. The authors entrust that 
more value is provided to those start-ups that are compatible in the degree of develop-
ment and industry with the commissioning start-up. Also, it is believed that students and 
people with general interest in international entrepreneurship will find this research useful. 
This research will also contribute to the so far rather shallow scientific research conducted 
in studying startups and their operations. 
 
The business need for the commissioning company is clear: Finland in itself is not a suffi-
cient market in many respects, thus Witrafi has for a couple of years searched for favora-
ble markets abroad. The client base in Finland is small and even when exhausted is not 
enough to sustain the goals of the company. The commissioning company plans on grow-
ing exponentially and heavy emphasis is on research and development efforts. In order to 
reach its goals, the organization must expand its total addressable market. Additional 
funding for the growth and R&D efforts is also needed. Finland has a unique, highly edu-
cated workforce, which yields experts to various technological field, however when dealing 
with the newest technologies, even higher expertise is demanded. The research may 
prove useful when Witrafi plans to venture into other similar highly competitive areas of 
the world, as certain occurrences, such the presence of competitors will be highly likely. 
 
When considering these factors, the target for the research was chosen to be the United 
States of America, and Silicon Valley. The U.S.A. has the largest addressable market for 
parking, being the no. 1 auto country of the world. It also has the greatest amount of ven-
ture capital in the world, which is further concentrated into Silicon Valley. The U.S. also at-
tracts the world’s top talent in terms of employees. Another thing to consider is the unique 
talent that Americans possess in consumerism and marketing, which if applied well to a 
company’s marketing, can bring excellent results in the form of increased revenues. 
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1.5 Research structure 
The structure of this research comprises seven chapters and five distinct parts (figure 3). 
The first chapter is introduction where the case background, research purpose and ques-
tion are introduced and demarcation and other elements of this research case discussed. 
The chapters two and three comprise the theoretical framework of this research where the 
authors will focus on the context of this research. First the characteristics of a start-up 
company are introduced together with how the operating environment shapes start-up op-
erations. Then various internationalization theories, related concepts as well as entry 
modes are introduced. The second part of theoretical framework will introduce the essen-
tial financial concepts related to this research, as well as discusses the various funding 
options available and risks related to internationalization. 
 
 
Figure 3. Research structure. 
 
Chapter four introduces the commissioning company of this research. Chapter five will in-
troduce the research methods used, such as how the research is designed and how the 
data collected and analyzed. Also the aspects of research quality are discussed. Chapter 
six will present the outcome and data of this research and the authors will provide an-
swers to the investigative questions. The final part of this thesis is a discussion chapter 
which provides a summary of key findings as well as discusses project management.  
1.6 Key concepts 
In this sub-chapter the authors introduce those concepts and terms that appear in this re-
search or are closely related, but have not been adequately defined elsewhere.  
 
Bridge funding 
Bridge-funding loan is a special type of loan meant to be paid immediately at the time of 
the next Tekes-grant funding. They are meant as intermediary funding for waiting for the 
Chapter 1, 
Introduction
Chapters 2 & 
3, Theoretical 
framework
Chapter 4, 
Case company 
introduction
Chapter 5, 
Research 
methods
Chapter 6, 
Reseach 
outcome
Chapter 7, 
Results & 
discussion
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next Tekes-funding payment, and can be up to 70 % of the estimated payment. (Finnvera 
Oyj 2016). 
 
De minimis 
De minimis is a type of funding which does not taint competition within EU countries. A 
company operating in most industries can receive government funding of up to 200 000 € 
within three financial years without having to approve the funding through the EU before-
hand. (Regulation on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty to de minimis aid 
1998/2006) 
 
Foreign direct investment 
A firm may choose to enter into foreign market by making a foreign direct investment 
(FDI). There are different ways on how to make this type of an investment, for example 
setting up a foreign subsidiary or acquiring an existing entity. Regardless of the method, 
the fundamental objective of FDI is to acquire control and establish a lasting interest in an 
enterprise resident of a foreign country. (OECD 2008, 17) When FDI is discussed on a 
country level, terms ‘outward’ and ‘inward’ are used. These days most governments sup-
port inward FDI as it supports economic growth. 
 
Host country determinants 
Host country determinants are a related concept to foreign direct investment. According to 
UNCTAD World Investment Report (1998, 91) there are three main determinants that at-
tract FDI to certain host country; policy framework for FDI, economic determinants and 
business facilitation. The economic determinants can be further divided into market-seek-
ing, resource/asset-seeking and efficiency-seeking investments.  
 
Industrial clusters 
When several firms from the same industry are located close by each other it is likely that 
related and supporting industries will emerge to satisfy the increased demand of that in-
dustry. This phenomenon, known as clustering, gives additional advantages to the indus-
try because the geographic proximity of multiple entities leads to increased competitive-
ness through cost savings, higher quality and innovation within the cluster. (Griffin & 
Pustay 2015, 191-194) 
 
Internalization 
Internalization is a concept where a firm keeps the control of entire operations to itself by 
creating a monopolistic internal market to produce and distribute products. Internalization 
theory states that because imperfect market fails to price the knowledge and intangible 
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capital, operating a costly internal market to keep that intangible capital within a firm may 
nevertheless be more advantageous than losing it. (Rugman 2013, 11-12) 
 
Internationalization 
Internationalization is the process used to describe firm’s entry to a foreign market. The 
decision as to how exactly internationalization happens is dependent on the circum-
stances such as perceived risk and ability to deal with risk. (Rugman & Collinson 2012, 
41) 
 
Internet of Things 
The concept of connecting any device with power to the internet, each other or another 
type of proprietary network. This can include single machines, such as coffee makers, or 
complex, multi-part machines such as paper machines. It is estimated that by year 2020 
the world will have tens of billions of such connected devices. This gives rise to an exten-
sive amount of business opportunities. (Morgan, J. 2015) 
 
Opportunity cost 
The cost of choosing one alternative over another. By choosing one opportunity, the pos-
sible benefits of the other, unchosen opportunity are forgone; thus becoming the cost of 
the choice. In investments, it is the possible to quantify such a cost by analyzing the re-
turns provided by the two choices of investment. When one investment is chosen, the re-
turns of the other become the opportunity cost. (Investopedia 2016c). 
 
Partnering opportunity 
In this research authors refer to partnering opportunity as an identified; real or perceived 
opportunity for the case company to collaborate with a business partner. Business partner 
is an individual or company who has/could have a degree of involvement in case com-
pany’s business dealings, especially when it comes to internationalization (BusinessDic-
tionary 2016).  
 
Risk-return tradeoff 
According to the Farlex Financial Dictionary (2012) the risk-return tradeoff can be de-
scribed as any rational investor, when provided several opportunities maintaining the 
same level of risk, will only choose the option with the highest reward. This tradeoff is of-
ten used in making investment, but also business decisions. 
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Smart Parking 
A type of parking management, smart parking methods maintain a higher occupancy in 
parking garages. This is done through a more convenient parking experience especially 
through guiding signage showing a available parking spot. Available spots are mainly 
sensed with parking sensors, usually mounted in the ground or ceiling, below or on top of 
a parking space. Smart parking also comprises mobile parking payments, peer-to-peer 
parking sharing platforms and parking analytics platforms (Baruan, N. 2015). 
 
Trade Promotion Organization 
Trade promotion organizations (TPO), also known as export promotion organizations, are 
government funded or sponsored organizations that offer international trade facilitation 
services and other support services to focal firms, often SMEs. Their purpose is to help 
domestic firms to internationalize by reducing market imperfections such as inadequate 
flow of information, by negotiating lower barriers of entry and by creating a favorable envi-
ronment for internationalization. (DMI Associates for WTO 2006, 5) 
 
Value chain 
The term value chain refers to the categorization of firm’s value and profit generating ac-
tivities. The value chain includes primary and support activities and can be further divided 
into upstream value and downstream value activities. Primary activities are; inbound logis-
tics, operations, outbound logistics, marketing and sales and service. The production ori-
ented primary activities are ‘upstream’ activities whereas marketing and sales are ‘down-
stream’ activities. Support activities are those activities that support the primary activities, 
and include procurement, technology development, human resource management and in-
frastructure. (Hollensen 2014, 27-29). 
 
Abbreviations 
 
IoT Internet of Things 
IPR Intellectual Property Rights 
MNC Multinational Corporation 
R&D Research & Development 
SME  Small and Medium Enterprises 
TF Team Finland 
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2 Characteristics of a start-up, internationalization theories and entry 
modes 
This chapter starts by introducing what is a strategic business environment. Then the con-
cept of start-up is discussed together with some of the defining characteristics of start-up 
environment and operations. By introducing the backgrounds of strategic business envi-
ronment and start-ups the authors wish to lay a foundation for discussion about start-up 
internationalization. The chapter next proceeds to introduce some relevant internationali-
zation theories and finally, the chapter concludes with a brief introduction of various mar-
ket entry modes. 
2.1 Strategic environment 
All companies have an organizational purpose, often published in the form of mission, vi-
sion and goals. To achieve the set goals, an organization needs resources and operations 
that utilize those resources. The operations consist of; the internal objectives the company 
has, a strategy how to achieve those objectives and lastly, of the means that are available 
to conduct the operations. The place where companies operate and engage in business is 
called operating environment. It consists of physical, social and competitive factors. (Dan-
iels, Radebaugh & Sullivan 2015, 48) 
 
 
Figure 4. International business operations. (Daniels, Radebaugh & Sullivan 2015, 48) 
 
When companies are formulating strategy they need to be familiar with their operating en-
vironment and understand how the different factors affect their business and vice versa. 
This is especially important in foreign expansion where new physical, social and competi-
tive factors emerge. Also, international trade brings new modes of business. (Daniels, 
Radebaugh & Sullivan 2015, 48) 
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Analysis of the strategic environment is beneficial for a number of reasons. In addition to 
finding out what are the opportunities and threats, an environmental analysis helps in de-
veloping sustainable competitive advantages. It may also help identifying possible co-op-
eration opportunities. That said, to make the most of environmental analysis, management 
should be aware that from a strategic perspective environment is uncertain and ever 
changing. Strategists are divided into two ‘schools of thought’, prescriptive and emergent, 
on how much environmental analysis helps in predicting the future conditions. (Lynch 
2012, 75) Prescriptive strategic approach is sequential and the objectives and the main 
elements of strategy have been defined and developed in advance (Lynch 2015, 31). 
Emergent approach lacks clearly defined final objectives and the elements of strategy are 
developed simultaneously (Lynch 2015, 34). 
 
Environmental analysis often begins by defining the market, how much it is growing and 
how big proportion of the market can be captured (Lynch 2012, 77). Terms total available 
market (TAM), served available market (SAM) and target market are often used to clarify 
different market segments. Target market is the portion of the market that can realistically 
be captured taking into account the available resources and distribution channels. When it 
comes to market growth rates different industry life cycle models are useful. 
 
PESTEL analysis 
When analyzing the general environment surrounding the organization a firm may use a 
tool called PESTEL analysis. The five letters in the name of signify the factors of the envi-
ronment that are analyzed: Political, Economic, Socio-cultural, Technological, Environ-
mental and Legal factors. (Lynch 2012, 82)  
 
PESTEL analysis is useful when it’s well prepared and addresses those issues that are 
most relevant to the organization. Richard Lynch (2012, 83) recommends picking two to 
three most fitting items per factor for more in-depth analysis.  
 
E-S-P paradigm 
Richard Lynch (2015, 74) suggests that although PESTEL analysis includes political as-
pects as one of the items to be studied, the analysis is inadequate when it comes to un-
derstanding the role of government in strategic environment.  E-S-P paradigm can be 
used to identify the influences of government policies. Similarly to PESTEL the letters sig-
nify the item to be studied, additionally each item consists of components and outcomes. 
The letter E stands for Environment and includes the background characteristics of a 
country. The letter S denotes from country’s system of government and the letter P means 
the main government policies. (Lynch 2015, 75) 
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2.2 Definition and characteristics of a start-up company 
This research studies internationalization from the viewpoint of a start-up company. 
Therefore, referring to 2.1 it is necessary to define what is a start-up and discuss what 
kind of internal and external factors affect start-ups’ daily operations. Additionally, other 
start-up concepts and related issues that are present in Silicon Valley, the target market of 
this research, are introduced to increase cohesiveness. 
 
Eric Ries, a former entrepreneur and the author of famous “The Lean Start-up”, defines a 
start-up as:  
A human institution designed to create a new product or service under con-
ditions of extreme uncertainty (Ries 2014, 27).  
 
Steve Blank another well-known Silicon Valley influencer and academician uses the fol-
lowing definition:  
A start-up is an organization formed to search for a repeatable and scalable 
business (Blank 2010). 
 
Other definitions exist, but for purpose of this research Riese’s and Blank’s definitions are 
a good starting point. It is important to pay attention on the distinction between traditional 
small business and a start-up. Traditional small business such as a bakery may generate 
revenue from the day one. There is usually very little uncertainty with the business model. 
Contrary to a traditional small business, a start-up company may have nothing more than 
an idea to work with in the beginning. That idea can however be so “scalable” that the 
start-up achieves growth rates unattainable for traditional small businesses (figure 5). Until 
a start-up can prove it has a working business model, the conditions are in Riese’s words 
“extremely uncertain”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Difference between traditional small business (above) and scalable start-up 
(Blank, S. 2010b). 
Start-up Small busi-
ness 
Scalable 
Start-up 
Transition Large com-
pany 
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Paul Graham (2012) an author, entrepreneur and venture capitalist writes that the most 
essential characteristic of a start-up company is growth. He points out that millions of 
companies are founded each year, but very few can actually be called start-ups. Graham 
uses examples to describe the importance of growth for start-ups. Already from ideation 
stage the differences between traditional small businesses and start-ups are apparent, 
even within the same industry. Graham suggests that a start-up would not develop a soft-
ware to teach Tibetan to Hungarians but rather write a software to teach English to Chi-
nese. Graham also points out that growth is an important indicator of future value of a 
start-up. A firm that grows 1% per week and starts with $1000 a month is four years later 
making $7900 a month whereas a start-up growing at a rate of 5% a week will four years 
later be making $25 million per month. (Graham 2012)  
 
Contrary to Graham’s thoughts, Sipola (2015, 31) refers to a study of Henrekson & Jo-
hansson (2010) and writes that there is no consensus on how to identify and define high-
growth firms. Sipola suggests that in research more attention ought to also be directed to 
growth processes, rather than measurement of growth (2015, 31). Nevertheless, Gra-
ham’s points about growth certainly apply to many start-up success stories e.g. Google 
and Facebook. However, it is difficult for a start-up to grow rapidly until it has at least 
some sort of concrete product. Therefore, a rapid growth aspect should perhaps be seen 
as an objective start-ups have, at least until a product is formally launched.  
 
The transition from a scalable start-up to an established company does not happen over-
night. Different start-up stages are introduced in 2.2.2 where various start-up developmen-
tal models are introduced. There is often ambiguity in the question: “When a start-up is no 
longer a start-up but rather an established company?” The different developmental mod-
els propose that start-ups evolve in stages. Once they reach the final stage they either exit 
the market or “graduate” from the startuphood. The developmental models fail to address 
the organizational traits of start-ups. Finnish mobile-gaming success story Supercell far 
surpasses the financial characteristics of established company but it has maintained its 
small size and to an extent, its start-up culture. 
 
One important characteristic of start-ups is entrepreneurship, which is the process of cre-
ating something new (of value) while coping with financial, psychic and social risks. An en-
trepreneur is a person who is willing carry all that risk, takes an initiative and creates 
something new with the resources available. (Hisrich, Peters & Shepherd 2010, 6) In this 
research when start-ups are referred to, it is implied that the management team or person 
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behind that start-up possess an entrepreneurial mind-set. That is, he or she has the capa-
bility to sense, act and mobilize in uncertain conditions (Hisrich & al. 2010, 13). What 
makes an entrepreneur has been extensively researched from perspectives of culture, en-
vironmental, psychological and cognitive factors (Burns 2014, 27). For the purpose of this 
research it is enough to understand that entrepreneurial mind-set guides and affects start-
ups’ decision making processes, and has an effect on their organizational cultures. 
 
It is commonly accepted that entrepreneurial start-ups have an important role in economic 
growth and job creation. Hence it is natural that governments and policy makers are in-
centivized to support high-growth firms with favorable policies. According to Sipola (2015, 
50) policymakers both in the U.S. and Europe have given more attention on high-technol-
ogy firms due to belief that they have the most potential for high-growth. Sipola dismisses 
this belief by referring to research of Acs (2008) which found that there is no evidence of 
such thing and that high-growth firms can be found from all industries. They are actually 
likelier in service industries (2015, 50). Thus it is important to recognize that high-growth 
start-ups can be found from various industries.  
 
Authors of this research would like to point out, referring to Compasses Startup Index 
(2015, 12), that many of the most well-known start-up success stories have come from in-
dustries where digitalization and information technologies have disrupted the older prod-
ucts and services. In some industries the new has entirely replaced the older, while in oth-
ers the new has at least become noteworthy competitor as Table 1 illustrates. 
 
Table 1. Traditional products and services compared to new disruptive innovations intro-
duced by start-ups. (Adopted from a list of Compass Startup Index 2015, 12) 
Traditional New 
Kodak Instagram 
Book stores eBooks (Amazon) 
Music stores, CDs iTunes, Spotify 
Hotel chains AirBnB 
Taxis Uber 
Resumes, HR scouts LinkedIn 
Newspapers Social media (Twitter) 
Retail eCommerce (AliBaba, Zalando) 
 
Although start-ups are not limited to certain industries, they can be categorized in other 
ways. Blank (2006, 10) uses the ‘type of market served’ to differentiate start-ups. Accord-
ing to Blank there are four types of markets for start-ups; new product to existing market, 
  
15 
new product to new market, re-segmented market with low-cost product, re-segmented 
market with a niche product (Blank 2006, 10). Blank points out that the type of market 
start-up is serving affects customer acquisition, financing and other important indicators. 
Another way to differentiate start-ups is, as proposed by Druilhe & Garnsey (2006, 164), 
by business activity. Druilhe & Garnsey studied university spin-out start-ups and found five 
types of business activities categorized based on; needs for resources, skills, financing, 
technology and infrastructure. 1) Contract R&D, technical services, consultancy, 2) license 
IP (service provision), 3) software start-ups, 4) product companies and 5) creation of infra-
structure (2006, 166-168). 
 
It is worth pointing out that Druilhe & Garnsey’s research concentrated on start-ups that 
were university spin-outs. Universities are a major source of start-ups because of their 
ready infrastructure. They also provide start-up founders with other support measures for 
example help in research and development. According to Kauffman Index (2015, 8) in 
2014 eight out of ten start-ups in the United States were started by an entrepreneur com-
ing out of an employment or studies, while only two out of ten were founded by entrepre-
neur coming out of unemployment. 
 
Some of the characteristics of start-ups have now been introduced. For this research it is 
a starting point to first of all, understand what a start-up is and secondly, how the limita-
tions faced by start-ups affect internationalization. However, it has also been established 
that start-ups are different in many ways. A mobile-gaming start-ups such as Supercell or 
Rovio can utilize different entry modes in internationalization not available for product ori-
ented start-ups. Nevertheless, many of the limitations all start-ups face are similar and for 
that reason a more detailed introduction of selected aspects of start-up operations follows.  
 
In conclusion of this sub-chapter, the focus of this research are start-ups that have entre-
preneurial founder(s) and an objective of achieving high growth rates by transforming un-
certain yet scalable business idea into a working business model. 
2.2.1 Uncertainty and trust 
Julien and Marchesnay have identified uncertainty as being one of the conditions for en-
trepreneurship. According to them, an uncertain context is open for new innovations and 
ideas (in Bernasconi, Harris & Moensted 2006, 4). The concept of uncertainty can be ex-
plained by comparing it to risk. Frank Knight (1921, 233) wrote in “Risk, Uncertainty, and 
Profit” that when uncertainty is measurable in one way or another, it can be categorized 
as “risk”, whereas in case of true uncertainty there is no way of measuring probabilities or 
calculating the outcome(s) in advance.  
  
16 
 
According to Dibiaggio uncertainty has two forms; strategic and environmental. Strategic 
uncertainty occurs when decision-makers are unable to predict reactions of others’. Envi-
ronmental uncertainties on the other hand, occur when it is impossible to predict future 
events. Dibiaggio states that both types of uncertainties have significant effect on co-ordi-
nation requirements in innovation processes. (Dibiaggio 2006, 35) 
 
Moensted writes that for a high-tech start-up uncertainty arises from many different 
sources. The fact that a start-up may have a preliminary product, but no proven market 
causes uncertainty. On the other hand, how can a start-up persuade potential investors 
and customers when it has no proof that it can actually deliver? There is a paradox of 
communication, a start-up has to somehow communicate uncertainty as an opportunity 
with low uncertainty (Moensted 2006, 17).  
 
Secondly, lack of control causes uncertainty. High-tech start-ups often rely on specific 
skills and other resources that are outside of management’s control. How can the man-
agement make good business decisions when “not-yet-known” is the standard factor of 
knowledge basis? (Moensted 2006, 15) Hisrich, Peters & Shepherd (2010, 72) introduce 
the concepts of error of commission and error of omission that are closely related to un-
certainty and also, to new entry decisions based on the information available. Error of 
commission occurs when an entrepreneur decides to pursue something based on the in-
formation available only to find out that not acting would have been better. Error of omis-
sion on the other hand is the opposite scenario and happens when the entrepreneur un-
derestimates an opportunity and his/her own capabilities and as a consequence loses due 
to inactivity. (Hisrich & al. 2010, 72) 
 
To further complicate things, start-ups’ strategic decision making processes suffer from 
the challenge of conceptualization. Research has indicated that because established anal-
ysis tools and developmental models are based on previously observed patterns, they fit 
poorly with the needs of entrepreneurial start-ups. (Moensted 2006, 4-5) The uncertainty 
is regardless of its source, an integral part of start-up operations. Moensted points out that 
decisions will always have to be made. Because the importance of decisions tend to be 
highest in the beginning when there is least information available, many start-ups end up 
making poor decisions and fail. (2006, 19)  
 
According to Moensted the concept of trust is closely linked to uncertainty and is central to 
understanding the network relations of start-ups. As was previously mentioned, high-tech 
start-ups face a challenge of having to persuade potential partners with their project when 
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there is little concrete to show. Without trust, persuasion is difficult if not entirely impossi-
ble. However, as trust is built on past experiences, the credibility of start-up relies mostly 
on the trustworthiness of those people who recommend start-up’s product or service. 
(2006, 29-31) 
 
Start-ups are challenged by the fact that good business relationships are based on trust 
and trust is based on past success. Table 2 shows the contradictions faced by many start-
ups. On one hand, start-ups need trust to form business relationships, but on the other, 
they don’t themselves fulfil the factors favoring trust. (Moensted 2006, 29-31) 
 
Table 2. Conditions and need for trust. (Moensted 2006, 30) 
Factors favoring trust Need for trust 
Credibility of project High uncertainty/ambiguity 
Trustworthy person No documented history 
Good record of experience Early innovation 
Competence of team No relevant people contacts 
Good reputation New area of work 
Predictability Rapid change 
Certainty Uncertain market 
 
For a start-up trust building is not only important in persuasion of partners. Fukuyama 
(1995) has suggested that it can also be used to limit costs and to create commitment (in 
Moensted 2006, 31). According to Latour (1987) trust is built gradually step-by-step and 
using outside experts in validation is advisable (in Moensted 2006, 31). Moensted points 
out that start-ups should not forget that trust works both ways. They need to carefully as-
sess to whom they themselves trust, misjudgment can be costly. Also, it is worth a men-
tion that investors are, among other things, looking for people to whom they can trust. 
(2006, 31) 
2.2.2 Start-up development models 
According to Moreau (2006, 144) start-up development process has been a subject of 
multiple academic studies from both prescriptive and descriptive approaches. Moreau 
suggests that previously proposed models have had some serious disadvantages. Until 
recently there existed no model specifically designed to high-tech start-ups (2006, 145). 
Moreau’s own study was based on three previous case-studies, ‘temporal’ and ‘integra-
tion’ criteria and 20 case companies. Temporal criteria means the process of conception 
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and launch of new products and can be either sequential or simultaneous. Integration cri-
teria refers to the level of coordination when technological, market and financial processes 
are developed. (2006, 145-146) 
 
Moreau’s study found out that high-tech start-ups could be categorized based on four 
types of developmental models; Type 1 was named simple, Type 2 traditional, Type 3 
complex and Type 4 chaotic model. Simple and traditional models are depicted in figure 6 
below. (2006, 147-150) 
 
 
Figure 6. Simple and traditional operational models of start-up development as identified 
by Moreau (2006, 147-150). 
 
The simple model is consistent with the results of previous studies and five stages can be 
identified: conception, development, prototype/testing, launch and market development. 
The stages follow each other in sequence, each requiring increased funding. The source 
of funding depends on the developmental stage. Simple model has a number of weak-
nesses. First, it is technology focused and ignores customers, in Moreau’s words; “compa-
nies sell whatever they develop”. Secondly, the fact that the model requires proceeding 
step-by-step slows down the process and is risky. In case of failures, the firm has to return 
to previous stage(s) and seek additional funding (Moreau 2006, 147-148).  
 
The traditional model was developed in Silicon Valley and is common amongst start-ups. 
It is similar to simple model, but has some key differences. Although the stages are same 
as in simple model and follow each other chronologically, in traditional model they can 
overlap. Additionally, in traditional model the business model plays a key role and strategy 
and activities are clearly defined. Another key difference is the use of risk capital. In tradi-
tional model risk capital is more widely used as a result of clearly articulated ambitions. 
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The weakness of traditional model is that it is dependent on risk capital. Although the 
start-up may return to previous stage, it is often at mercy of investor(s) who may not be 
willing to re-invest as any draw-back can be seen as proof of failure of the entire business 
model. Moreau notes that some start-ups fail because the traditional model lets them to 
operate outside of the economic climate leading to unrealistic ambitions. (Moreau 2006, 
149). 
 
The complex model has the same activities as traditional model, but they are managed 
simultaneously by the firm and are inter-related. Technological, marketing and financial 
activities are developed in parallel. The firms using complex model seek financing more 
rapidly than the firms following other models. Moreau uses analogy of: “the company de-
velops, or will develop what it sells”. The dynamicity of complex model leads to differences 
between original concept and project results, but Moreau does not see this as a weak-
ness. (Moreau 2006, 151-152)  
 
Chaotic model is the fourth type Moreau identified. He compares it to mismanaged com-
plex model and to simple model where everything is attempted at the same time without 
even defining what the project is. Moreau found that “chaotic” firms lack coordination, mis-
sion, vision and goals. The firms rely on self-financing although they seek external financ-
ing. However because such firms will not achieve high-performance, external financing is 
out of reach. (Moreau 2006, 153-154) 
 
Moreau’s suggestions for start-up developmental models, although more suitable to repre-
sent start-up stages than generalist models, those that depict the growth of regular small 
companies, are not widely referred in the start-up ecosystem. Instead the authors of pre-
sent research found two alternative models often cited in various start-up publications; 
Startup Commons’ startup development phases and “Marmer Stages” suggested in 
Startup Genome report (2012a). The latter is derived from Steve Blank’s customer devel-
opment model and consists of six stages: 1) Discovery, 2) Validation, 3) Efficiency, 4) 
Scale, 5) Profit maximization and 6) Renewal (Startup Genome 2012a, 6). Marmer Stages 
are product and stage based and Startup Genome’s own research shows that the stages 
are consistent with traditional indicators of success. Additionally, Startup Genome found 
that a start-up doesn’t move through stages unless it meets certain milestones or condi-
tions. (Startup Genome 2012a, 6) 
 
Startup Commons’ model likewise consists of six phases: 1) Ideation, 2) Concepting, 3) 
Commitment, 4) Validation, 5) Scaling and 6) Establishment. The model also incorporates 
several sub-categories that clarify the different phases. The first two phases consist of 
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identifying problem and finding a solution (problem/solution fit). Next comes start-up’s vi-
sion and finding founders fit, then finding product-market fit, which concurs with fourth 
phase, ‘validation’ . The scaling and establishment phases are comprised of finding work-
ing business model and market fit. (Startupcommons.org 2016) 
 
The problem with Marmer Stages and Startup Commons’ models is that they are not aca-
demically cited, suggesting that they perhaps haven’t been properly tested. On the other 
hand, the fact that they are so often used in start-up publications would suggest that they 
are commonly accepted. Whichever model is used to depict start-up development, it can 
be argued that in order to assess the progression of a start-up, it is important to know 
where in its life-cycle it currently is (Startup Genome 2012a, 6). Nevertheless, Druilhe & 
Garnsey (2006, 172) point out that it is now widely accepted that innovation process is 
non-linear and that sequential models have lack of clarity in their phases. Start-ups often 
have to adapt to challenges when they occur. In addition, Moreau too, started his sugges-
tion for start-up development models by writing that constructing a model for an uncertain 
universe of innovation is difficult (Moreau 2006, 145). 
2.2.3 Start-up exit strategies 
Hisrich & al. (2010, 442) write that every entrepreneur should have an exit strategy well 
before one is needed. Exit strategy is defined simply as a planned way to get out of an in-
vestment or “cash out” (Investopedia 2016d). Exit may be caused by natural reasons such 
as retirement, illness or urge to do something else. Exit may also be motivated by need to 
secure resources or it can result from pressure of stakeholders, namely venture investors. 
(Barrow, Burke, Molian & Brown 2005, 254) Additionally, sometimes a bigger market 
player makes an acquisition offer that is too good to be refused. Chaston (2010, 218) uses 
Google’s acquisition of Youtube in 2006 as an example. At the time of acquisition Youtube 
was merely 12 months old yet Google offered $1.65 billion leading to the acquisition. 
 
There are several exit options available for start-ups and the most common ones are intro-
duced here for the reason that they occur relatively often in start-up ecosystem(s). The 
most common exit for a start-up is failure. Some estimations (Startup Genome 2012b, 4) 
give figure as high as 90%, while others such as Harvard Business School Professor Shi-
khar Gosh say that 30-40% of start-ups end up liquidating all assets. Gosh however points 
out that the rate depends on how one defines failure. (in Nobel 2011) Some exit strategies 
such as private sale, passing the business to family or selling it to employees are not com-
mon occurrence among start-ups, but a trade sale is one popular exit route (Barrow & al. 
2005, 255-257). 
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In trade sale, also known as direct sale and in certain conditions corporate venturing, a 
company is sold to or acquired by (often) a larger company for strategic purposes. The 
larger company may use acquisition to diversify its portfolio, access skills and people or to 
take out competitor. For a start-up being acquired may provide access to resources or 
present a tempting way to realize value. Barrow & al. suggest that for a start-up it is worth-
while to actively approach potential candidates by using an adviser (Barrow &al. 2005, 
255-256). 
 
Hisrich & al. (2010, 445) point out that direct sale has multiple aspects that need to be 
considered. First of all, the business needs to be in sellable condition when it comes to 
costs, financial statements and projections. The larger companies are also more likely to 
be interested if the start-up has a clear niche and some competitive advantages. Sec-
ondly, the entrepreneur’s (and founding team’s) position after the acquisition needs to be 
discussed. Does he/she continue working, for how long and under what type of arrange-
ment? The type of payment used in sale is also important. According to Hisrich & al. notes 
based on future profit expectations are often used. Thus, the seller does not have a guar-
anteed pay-out. (Hisrich & al. 2005, 445-446) 
 
The determination of sale price or in other words, the valuation of the start-up, is its own 
subject. The overvaluation of start-ups has been criticized in recent times and it has been 
a cause for concern in certain locations (most notably in Silicon Valley). In general, pub-
licly listed larger companies prefer to acquire unquoted companies due to perception that 
they offer better value than identical firms that are quoted. According to Barrow & al. this 
is because the shares of unquoted firm are valued at lower price/earnings ratio. (Barrow & 
al. 2005, 256)  
 
The most demanding and resource intensive exit for a start-up is going public, which hap-
pens when the shares are made publicly available. For the case company initial public of-
fering (IPO), the first public sale of stock, is not a timely issue. The costs alone amount for 
hundreds-of-thousands. Hisrich & al. give a figure of $700,000 in the U.S. but note that the 
costs may be a lot higher too. (2010, 360-362)  That figure does not even include the re-
quirements such as market capitalization set by the stock-markets i.e. New York’s 
NASDAQ. Those are measured in millions of dollars. (Barrow & al. 2005, 259)  
 
Going public is nevertheless often seen as a way to obtain capital with most favourable 
terms (Hisrich & al. 2015, 361). It also makes borrowing easier, increases the liquidation 
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of investments and helps with the valuation of the start-up. The added ease of raising cap-
ital helps in increasing growth which is, as has previously been discussed, an objective 
start-ups have. In addition to costs, going public has other disadvantages; the time the 
process takes, the loss of control, increased liability, pressure, reporting and disclosure 
requirements etc. (Hisrich & al. 2010, 360-361) 
 
Although case company’s exit per se, is not seen as an objective of this research, it is one 
potential longer-term outcome of internationalization and something the case company 
should keep in mind already before the internationalization. Exit is not only one possible 
way to achieve growth otherwise beyond start-up’s own resources and capabilities, but 
also a common occurrence. Start-up exits are used as an indicator of start-up ecosystem 
performance by various publications such as Compass Global Ecosystem ranking (2015). 
Various exit related issues will be further discussed in later chapters of this research. 
2.2.4 Start-up cash-flow and premature scaling 
Ian Chaston (2010, 58) writes that several academic studies have pointed out that the pri-
mary cause for a small business failure is running out of cash. He gives several explana-
tions as to why it happens, the first simply being; no market demand or poor product-mar-
ket fit. The second and third reasons Chaston gives are higher than expected costs and 
not recognizing the level of cash needed for the first sale. (Chaston 2010, 58)  
 
The higher than expected cash needed for the first sale can be partly explained with tech-
nology life cycle adoption curve developed by Everett Rogers and popularized by Geoffrey 
Moore. According to that model, technology is adopted in five phases by the market; 1) 
technology enthusiasts or early adopters, 2) visionaries, 3) pragmatists, 4) conservatives 
and 5) sceptics. The first two groups form ‘the early market’ for new technology, whereas 
pragmatists and conservatives represent the mainstream market that follows. (Blank 
2006, 11) 
 
Before each market segment there is “chasm” that needs to be overcome by the start-up 
to win the customers. The early adopters are easier to persuade, and the biggest chasm 
lies between second and third groups. (Blank 2006, 11) Crossing chasm requires market-
ing, time and resources. Chaston has pointed out that many start-ups fail to understand 
how much cash is needed. Steve Blank on the other hand does not see technology life cy-
cle curve as particularly useful for start-ups. He points out that while it is true that there 
are different types of customers, the curve can lead start-ups to false conclusions and por-
trays too positive model of growth. (Blank 2006, 12) 
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Chaston’s remarks about small business failure are valid whether linked to technology life 
cycle curve or not. Blank (2006, 8) uses the term “death spiral” to describe a start-up run-
ning out of cash. He connects this to premature scaling, which simply put, means that the 
start-up has grown too fast. Fixed costs are higher than revenues and the start-up finds it 
difficult to sustain “accelerated cash burn rate”. Premature scaling may occur if a start-up 
relies too much on predictions and hypotheses, forgets customers and the chasm be-
tween customer segments proves to be more than expected. For this research, and to the 
case company, it is important to keep costs in mind and understand the root causes of 
failure in order to not give inappropriate recommendations or conclusions that could lead 
to involuntary exit. 
2.2.5 Entrepreneurial ecosystem 
Hirsirch, Peters & Shepherd (2010, 40-41) write that entrepreneurs are influenced and 
helped by their role models and by moral – and professional support networks. While role 
models and moral support, in form of encouragement, can come from almost any source, 
professional-support comes from those who can give advice and counselling on entrepre-
neurial business activities. For a start-up access to professional-support networks such as 
mentors and business associates provides means to discover and exploit new opportuni-
ties and helps in acquiring valuable resources such as knowledge and funding. (Hisrich & 
al. 2010, 41-43) 
 
It can be argued that for a start-up the most natural moral- and professional support net-
work is an entrepreneurial ecosystem. According to Cohen (2006, 3) entrepreneurial eco-
systems are a diverse set of inter-dependent actors located in a certain same geographic 
area. Van de Ven (1993) has suggested that entrepreneurial ecosystems are built on in-
frastructure that includes; 1) institutional arrangement that legitimize and regulate new 
technology, 2) public resource endowments such as scientific knowledge, financing and 
competent labor and 3) research & development and other value chain activities of those 
private entrepreneurial firms that want to commercialize their products.  
 
Daniel Isenberg from Babson College’s Entrepreneurial Ecosystem Project (BEEP) has 
studied the characteristics of strong entrepreneurial ecosystems. He has identified thirteen 
factors that can be found in healthy ecosystem; leadership, government, culture, success 
stories, human capital, financial capital, entrepreneurship organizations, education, infra-
structure, economic clusters, networks, support services and early customers. (Isenberg 
2010)  
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Isenberg’s categorization has been used by Suresh & Ramraj (2012, 98-99) as well as by 
World Economic Forum (2014) as an inspiration for conceptual framework of entrepre-
neurial ecosystem. The frameworks of both studies have eight categories with some minor 
differences. Figure 7 below shows WEF’s framework with a short description of what each 
“pillar” comprises. 
 
 
Figure 7. Eight pillars and components of entrepreneurial ecosystem. (World Economic 
Forum 2014, 7) 
 
Professor Erkko Autio (2015a) has pointed out that entrepreneurial ecosystems are prob-
lematic from public policy point of view. He writes in somewhat critical tone that entrepre-
neurial ecosystems are ambiguously defined, mostly by consultants. According to him, 
public entrepreneurial policies have traditionally fallen into two categories: 1) market fail-
ure policies and 2) structural failure policies. He points out that those approaches do not 
address entrepreneurial ecosystems adequately. Autio writes that entrepreneurial ecosys-
tems are dynamic and complex and that no one is in charge. Spotting failures from such 
ecosystem is difficult and for that reason public policies should be directed towards facili-
tating the ecosystem momentum and increasing the engagement between various stake-
holders. (Autio 2015a) 
 
Prahalad (2005, 64 - 66) on the other hand, has argued that academic research should 
not focus too much on only one form of private sector (e.g. start-up ecosystems), but ra-
ther look at market-based ecosystems. According to Prahalad market-based ecosystem is 
Eight	pillars	of	
Entrepreneurial	
ecosystem
Accessible	markets Large	companies	as	customers,	 SMEs	as	customers,	governments	as	customers
Human	capital Management	talent,	technical	talent,	entrepreneurial	experience,	outsourcing
Funding	&	Finance Friends/family,	angel	investors,	private	equity,	venture	capital,	access	to	debt
Support	systems Mentors,	professional	services,	 incubators/accelerators,	network	of	entrepreneurial	peers
Government,	regulatory	framework Ease	of	doing	business,	 incentives,	 	business	friendliness,	access	to	infrastructure	&	transportation
Education,	training Availability	of	pre	&	post	University	workforce,	entrepreneur	 specific	training
Universities Promoting	entrepreneurship,	 idea	formation,	graduates	for	companies
Cultural	support Tolerance	for	failure,	preference	 for	self-employment,	role	models,	research	culture
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a framework of different private and social actors creating wealth in a symbiotic relation-
ship. Those actors complement each other and have their own roles and motivations for 
being part of the ecosystem. Prahalad writes that market-based ecosystems have the fol-
lowing components; extralegal NGO enterprises, micro enterprises, SMEs, co-operatives, 
large local and MNCs and NGOs. The relative importance of each component varies be-
tween countries and also changes over time. Prahalad argues that both from wealth crea-
tion and public policy point of views the focus should be on all, not just one component. 
(Prahalad 2005, 66) 
2.2.1 Lean start-up 
In recent years a start-up management methodology called “lean start-up” has been gain-
ing popularity in Universities and start-up ecosystems. Lean start-up approach was devel-
oped by Eric Ries, who on his part, was influenced by lean manufacturing theories, his 
own personal experience as a start-up founder and by Steve Blank an author, academi-
cian and investor (Ries 2014, 5). Lean start-up approach challenges many of the conven-
tional business development models. The conventional wisdom has been that a start-up 
prepares a business plan with five year forecast for profits, cash-flow et cetera, and then 
proceeds to raise funding and develop a product. 
 
Steve Blank writes in Harvard Business Review (2013) that conventional approach has of-
ten led to failures. He argues that it has been found out that; 1) business plans rarely sur-
vive first customer contact, 2) no one besides venture capitalists is actually interested in 
hearing five year predictions and 3) start-ups are unlike big companies, they are not exe-
cuting business models, they are searching for one. (Blank 2013) 
 
According to Blank lean methodology has three principles. First is to accept uncertainty 
and the fact that a start-up is based on hypotheses and assumptions. Blank suggests that 
instead of writing a business plan, a business model canvas should be used to begin with. 
Secondly, a lean start-up engages in customer development to test its hypotheses. Em-
phasis is on speed and learning from the feedback. Smaller changes to the product are 
called ‘iterations’ and bigger adjustments are ‘pivots’. Thirdly, lean start-ups follow agile 
development. Agile development is linked to customer development and is meant to re-
duce time and resource waste in product development. The start-up should create a mini-
mum viable product, a product with only critical features, ask for customer feedback and 
then learn from that feedback to create a new minimum viable product. (Blank 2013)  
 
Lean start-up methodology, although important to understand by anyone wanting to un-
derstand start-up environment in Silicon Valley, has not been spared from criticism. Ted 
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Ladd writes in Harvard Business Review (2016) that his empirical research of 250 start-
ups does not support the idea; “the more validation, the better outcome”. Ladd found that 
too much feedback can actually be negative for start-ups and lead to confusion and loss 
of confidence. Furthermore, Jon Burgstone (2012) has criticized the origin of lean method-
ology by writing that “the Toyota way”, is not suitable for most start-ups. Burgstone also 
questioned the concept of minimum viable product by writing that although customer feed-
back is important, introducing products with minimal features is not smart. He pointed out 
that companies such as Apple learned from the mistakes of others when introducing new 
products such as iPod. Additionally, Michael Sharkey (2013) has criticized that concentrat-
ing on minimum viable product gives the impression that the start-up is only looking to be 
acquired, thus limiting its exit options and acting unfairly towards employees and stake-
holders. 
2.3 Internationalization theories 
Internationalization has been studied from many different perspectives over the years. 
One of the commonly referred internationalization theory is Uppsala model, a study of in-
ternationalization processes of selected Swedish firms conducted by Johanson and Wei-
dersheim-Paul in 1975 (Johnson & Turner 2003, 113). Although Uppsala model does not 
explain the timing of internationalization, it does argue that often internationalization is a 
gradual process in which distinct steps can be identified. The theory states that firms from 
smaller countries tend to start internationalization when they are still relatively small, any-
way earlier than their counterparts in bigger economies. The model also argues that the 
reason for gradual internationalization can be attributed to lack of knowledge and re-
sources. Also, the Uppsala model incorporates a concept of psychic distance to explain 
why firms regularly start internationalization by exporting to countries that are culturally 
similar to their home market. (Johnson & Turner 2003, 113-114) 
 
Another earlier internationalization theory is ‘Eclectic paradigm’, also known as OLI para-
digm, an economic theory developed by John H. Dunning in 1979. The eclectic theory is 
Dunning’s attempt to address why a firm may choose FDI over other modes of entry (Dun-
ning 1980, 11-12). The eclectic paradigm consists of three factors; owner-specific ad-
vantages, location-specific advantages and internalization advantages. According to Dun-
ning these external and internal factors determine whether a firm will use FDI or some 
other growth strategy. (in Griffin & Pustay 2014, 200) Dunning’s theory stresses that firms 
tend to internalize the ownership-specific advantages when the market is imperfect (Dun-
ning 1980, 11). Alan M. Rugman however writes in his book “New theories of multinational 
enterprise” (2013, 13) that Dunning’s theory is in fact not so different from internalization 
theory; instead he has just used different approach to model multinational corporations. 
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Alan C. Shapiro writes in his book Multinational Financial Management (2010, 578-579) 
that the existence of multinational corporations (MNC) can be explained with factor and 
product market imperfections. According to Shapiro a firm will not invest overseas unless 
it can expect positive returns. In order to determine which projects are profitable, the firm 
needs to identify what are the market imperfections. Investopedia (2015) defines imperfect 
market simply as a market suffering from an inadequate information flow, a scenario 
where buyers and sellers don’t match.  
 
Shapiro uses theory of industrial organization to discuss imperfect product and factor mar-
kets. The theory presents an idea that trademarks, patents and other organizational com-
petences are intangible capital for MNCs. If that intangible capital is easily convertible, a 
firm can use exporting in foreign market expansion. When the intangible capital is in form 
of knowledge that can be transferred as such, licensing is possible. However, the intangi-
ble capital is sometimes in a form that makes it difficult or impossible to separate from the 
firm itself. This is a type of market imperfection where internalizing the control may be the 
only viable strategy. (Shapiro 2010, 579-580) 
 
The international business environment has evolved considerably since the development 
of the early internationalization theories. Different collaborative arrangements between 
firms are now commonplace, and clustering and agglomeration phenomenon have intensi-
fied. This transformation of market place has also shifted the focus of academic research 
towards network based theories of internationalization. (Johnson & Turner 2003, 112) Ad-
ditionally, as a result of academic studies of SME internationalization conducted by Oviatt 
& McDougall (1994), McKinsey & Co., (1993) and Knight & Cavusgil (1996) among others, 
it has been noted that many firms engage in international business activities from incep-
tion. The older internationalization theories might not be able to provide an adequate ex-
planation as to why that happens. (in Rasmussen & Madsen 2002, 3)  
2.3.1 Born-global companies 
Contrary to Uppsala model’s incremental internationalization, a newer approach has 
gained traction in academic research. Born-global companies are firms that expand inter-
nationally right after founding or latest within a couple of years from founding. (Daniels, 
Radebaugh & Sullivan 2015, 572) There is no exact definition of what makes a born-
global company. Instead, many similar concepts such as; leapfrogging, international new 
ventures, high technology start-ups, high potential firms and international entrepreneurs 
have been used by academicians studying the subject (Rasmussen & Madsen 2002, 13). 
Some common features however set “born-global companies” apart from the traditional 
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small and medium sized enterprises. Their founder, or more typically a founding team, of-
ten has previous international experience and a strong international orientation. Born-
global companies tend to treat their home country’s market just as a one market among 
many others. (Daniels, Radebaugh & Sullivan 2015, 572)  
 
Mika Gabrielsson (DSc.) writes that the ever increasing number of born global companies 
can be explained in many ways. Most often the reasons align directly with those of globali-
zation. With the reduced barriers and technological advances international travel and 
communication have eased considerably. Also, many industries have gone through struc-
tural changes and competing in today’s environment requires global mind-set. (Gabriels-
son 2007, 204-205)  
 
According to Gabrielsson it is common for born-global companies to pursue rapid interna-
tional growth despite such strategy being at odds with the limited resources and organiza-
tional abilities possessed by born-globals. Consequently, many run into difficulties and 
end up failing. He suggests that to overcome those limitations born-global companies 
need to rely on external support and resources. Gabrielsson names business angels and 
advisory boards as two particularly helpful groups in advising and networking roles. Addi-
tionally, he underlines the importance of hiring new talent only when it brings complemen-
tary skills to the organization. (Gabrielsson 2007, 207) 
 
It has been argued that born-global concept is too vague and loosely defined. Rasmussen 
& Madsen (2002, 5) use the analogy of “old wine in a new bottle” to question whether 
born-globals are truly separate from existing international firms. They also reflect that 
maybe the only difference is after all, the change in management’s thinking as a result of 
the changing environment (2012, 5). Previous studies of Madsen & Servais (1997) and 
Knudsen & al. (2002) have also argued that born-global activities may be explained using 
existing theories (Rasmussen & Madsen 2002, 4). Thus, it could be argued that “born-
global” is in fact a concept and not a theory of internationalization.  
2.3.1 Network approach to internationalization 
Previously mentioned eclectic paradigm and market imperfections both have to do with 
the concept of internalization. Contrary to internalization, the term externalization is used 
when business is conducted through or with external partners. It has been suggested that 
SMEs’ lack of resources and knowledge forces them to externalize internationalization ac-
tivities. Even in externalization SMEs often have to rely on alternative methods and are 
highly dependent on co-operative environment. (Hollensen 2014, 85-86) 
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In 1988 Johanson and Mattson introduced a network approach of internationalization. The 
model argues that firms should be analyzed based on their position relative to other actors 
in the international environment, i.e. network (Hollensen 2014, 78). The network approach 
claims that internationalization happens by firm (1) establishing and developing positions 
relative to domestic networks that are new to the firm, this is called international exten-
sion. By (2) developing positions and increasing resources relative to those networks that 
the firm already has abroad, i.e. penetration. Also, (3) by increasing coordination between 
positions in various domestic networks, i.e. international integration. (Holm, Forsgren & 
Johanson 2015, 118) 
 
What network approach suggests is that firms are connected to each other through rela-
tionships and various degrees of resource dependencies. Not by market price mecha-
nisms. (Hollensen 2014, 86) The interactions in network relationships are both stable and 
changing and depend on each actor’s willingness to engage with other actors in networks 
(Holm, Forsgren & Johanson 2015, 117; Hollensen 2014, 86). Thus, entry into an existing 
network requires that the actors already in the network are motivated to engage in interac-
tion with the new actor (Hollensen 2014, 86). 
 
According to Ojala (2009, 53) the network relationships can be formal, informal and inter-
mediary in type. Formal relationships are between business partners, informal relation-
ships refer to social contacts and intermediary relationships refer to third parties used in 
business transactions. Hollensen (2014, 87) writes that personal ties have the strongest 
influence early on in the relationships. Later on routines and other systems increase in im-
portance. Research by Ellis (2000) and Ellis & Wong (2002) has confirmed that for entre-
preneurs personal relationships are critical in foreign market entry and help them in finding 
partners (in Harris 2006, 114-115). 
 
Figure 8 (below) attempts to depict how a focal firm could use network relationships in in-
ternationalization. The simplified figure shows how the focal firm is positioned within a net-
work in its home country and how some of the same actors it has relationship with, also 
operate in country B, where the focal firm has set up a sales subsidiary. The figure does 
not show how the network has developed, but the idea is that it could have happened as 
introduced in network model. The figure is adopted from Hollensen’s (2014, 87) more de-
tailed figure modelling international networks. 
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Figure 8. International network (adopted from Hollensen 2014, 87). 
 
As stated by Ruzza (54-55, 2014) network structure is important, even crucial, for born-
globals in mitigating lack of resources in internationalization. Nevertheless, it also has sev-
eral limitations needed to be discussed. Ruzza refers to research of Coviello and Munro 
(1995) when stating that a notable disadvantage is that network structure leads to at least 
some loss of operative control in internationalization. He argues that the company should 
be careful in what activities it can rely on partners and points out that at least core activi-
ties should be internalized. Additionally, Ruzza points out that multinational corporations 
and born-globals enter into international networks for very different reasons and that the 
relationships are also based on different factors. As has been mentioned previously in this 
research, start-ups (including born-globals) rely on trust in relationship building whereas 
MNCs can better leverage their size in relationships. (Ruzza 2014, 55) 
 
Furthermore, Ruzza believes that network structure is most useful in earlier stages of in-
ternationalization and accessing the new market(s) but later on it can hinder the growth. 
Ruzza sees the positive aspects of network approach, such as sharing the costs of market 
entry and increased access to market information and knowledge. Nevertheless, he points 
out that in a relationship with foreign partner the born-global also needs to overcome the 
cultural differences and difficulties of integration without forgetting the organizational de-
mands and boundaries. (Ruzza 2014, 56-57) 
2.3.2 Integrated theory perspective 
Cavusgil and Knight have proposed that the different internationalizing theories are inade-
quate independently to describe born global companies’ behavior, and that the different 
theories should be integrated to have a better understanding (in Falahat, Migin, Chuan & 
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Kong 2015, 614). Falahat & al. (2015, 614) use conceptual model (figure 9) to show the 
elements in rapid internationalization of born global companies. 
 
 
Figure 9. Conceptual model of born global firm’s internationalization as suggested by 
Falahat, Migin, Chuan & Kong (2015, 614). 
 
Falahat & al. (2015, 614) base their model into studies of other authors and propose that 
network and capability approaches should be seen as network capability because born-
globals rely heavily on entrepreneurial orientation in developing both networks and capa-
bilities. Additionally, Falahat & al (2015, 615) propose that because network capabilities 
allow born-globals to acquire knowledge and develop strategies, it is positively linked to 
rapid internationalization. Falahat & al. point that research of Awuah has proven that born-
globals benefit from network relationships in making market based strategic decisions and 
hence marketing competencies and network capabilities are also linked (2015, 615). Fi-
nally, Falahat & al. cite the research of Johansen & Knight, Knight & Cavusgil, Kotabe, 
Duhan, Smith & Wilson and note that because marketing competencies are the most influ-
ential factors in firm’s international performance, marketing competencies and rapid inter-
nationalization are also connected. 
2.4 Market entry modes 
Market entry modes refer to the means of operations that firms have available to conduct 
international business. Market entry modes can be divided into three categories and multi-
ple sub-categories (Figure 10) based on needed level of engagement with the foreign 
market (Johnson & Turner 2003, 114).  
 
The selection of mode of entry depends on many factors, some of which have been dis-
cussed previously; competitive forces, organizational abilities and resources (intangible 
capital), objectives and strategies of the organization, risk aversion, availability of partner-
ship opportunities, characteristics of product etc. One of the biggest factors is the degree 
of control the firm wants to keep to itself. (Cavusgil, Knight & Riesenberger 2014, 389) 
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Each mode has advantages and disadvantages but sometimes it is easy to rule out some 
modes altogether. For example franchising and turn-key operations are unsuitable in 
many industries. Statistically, exporting and importing are the most commonly used 
modes in international business, and even more so in SME sector (Daniels, Radebaugh & 
Sullivan 2015, 565).  
 
 
Figure 10. Selected market entry modes (Johnson & Turner 2003, 116) and levels of con-
trol, resource commitment, flexibility and risk (Cavusgil, Knight & Riesenberger 2014, 
390). 
2.4.1 Exporting 
Exporting is a common entry mode used in internationalization. In exporting a focal firm 
produces goods or services in one country and then distributes them to other countries 
with the help of intermediaries and facilitators. On one hand the use of middlemen in ex-
porting requires giving away most of the control in foreign market operations. On the 
other, exporting offers more flexibilities, requires fewer resources and has the least risk 
compared to other modes of entry. (Cavusgil, Knight & Riesenberger 2014, 393) 
 
There are two different types of exporting, direct and indirect. In indirect exporting the ex-
porting firm uses the services of intermediaries, such as export management firms, lo-
cated in the firm’s home country. The local intermediaries handle all the necessary work 
related to exporting (finding buyers, shipping, documentation etc.), on behalf of the export-
ing firm. (Cavusgil, Knight & Riesenberger 2014, 396-397) Indirect exporting is favored by 
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smaller companies and by those that are new to international trade. In some cases export 
management firms can, for a fee, also represent the focal firm in foreign market offering 
marketing and other support services (Hisrich, Peters & Shepherd 2010, 148). Although 
indirect exporting is favored by small and inexperienced firms, its downsides are that it 
does not enhance market development or increase organizational learning. Additionally, 
the intermediaries often have multiple clients they prioritize based on their own metrics. 
(Irwin 2012) 
 
Direct exporting uses independent foreign distributors or focal firm’s own foreign sales of-
fice. Direct exporting allows for more control and involvement than indirect exporting, but 
still relies on the foreign intermediary in the target market. (Hisrich & al. 2010, 148) Con-
trary to indirect exporting, the focal firm needs to interact with foreign buyers and market-
place, which can be an advantage as firm gets a chance to learn about the customers and 
market. However, direct exporting requires more resources and commitment and is thus 
more expensive. The most resource intensive option is to establish a sales office to a for-
eign location. Sales office is typically established only to the most important markets and 
in later stages of exporting. Sales office lets the focal firm to directly manage the down-
stream activities of value chain in the foreign market. (Cavusgil, Knight & Riesenberger 
2014, 397)  
2.4.2 Contractual & non-equity 
Some entry strategies are based on contractual agreements between a focal firm wanting 
to internationalize and its foreign partner(s). Depending on the nature of relationship and 
the contractual agreement, the strategies can be categorized as; licensing, franchising, 
turnkey contracting, non-equity joint ventures and management contracts (Johnson & 
Turner 2003, 117-120). Keeping in mind the context of this research; franchising, manage-
ment contracts and turnkey contracting are not applicable in the industry of commissioning 
company nor are they realistic options, considering the available resources, thus they are 
not introduced here.  
 
Licensing is an arrangement where owner of an intellectual property or “licensor” lets an-
other firm i.e. “licensee” to use that property in exchange for royalty, or some other form of 
payment. The parties have a formal contract, typically exclusive, for a certain number of 
years at a time. Licensing can be used as a passive entry strategy to foreign market and it 
requires no physical presence on foreign location, thus requiring less capital. The licensed 
intellectual property can be in a form of patent, know-how, design, trademark or copyright. 
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Often the licensor will also provide the licensee with supporting products or services. (Ca-
vusgil & al. 2014, 446-449) Authors would like to point that considering the thesis commis-
sioning company’s objectives, at least initially, licensing is not a suitable entry strategy. 
 
Non-equity joint venture and strategic alliances are arrangements where two focal firms 
enter into a contractual agreement, typically with an objective of entering into a new mar-
ket or to share costs, risks and long-term profits (Hollensen 2014, 379-380). The collabo-
ration between firms can be upstream based where firms collaborate for example in re-
search & development and in production, or it can be downstream, in which case collabo-
ration happens in marketing, distribution, sales and service. Additionally the collaboration 
can be a mixture of both up- and downstream. (Hollensen 2014, 380) These type of busi-
ness arrangements require trust, close coordination and management. The parties have 
to agree on bargaining positions and profit sharing among other areas (Hollensen 2014, 
387). 
2.4.3 Equity based entry modes 
Equity based entry modes include foreign direct investment (introduced in key concepts), 
mergers/acquisitions and equity based joint ventures. Mergers & acquisitions are not dis-
cussed here because the case company is not financially fit to enter the target market by 
acquiring another company. However, the case company being acquired is one potential 
outcome of the internationalization and hence acquisition has been previously introduced 
and will be further discussed in later chapters. 
 
Equity based joint ventures are similar to non-equity joint ventures and strategic alliances 
(2.4.2.), the major difference being that the two collaborative firms establish a jointly con-
trolled third venture through which the collaboration happens (Hollensen 2014, 380). For-
eign direct investment is the most resource intensive entry mode and has the most risk 
due to the permanent commitment to a new business environment and culture. However, 
FDI enables the focal firm to have more control over the market entry and provides certain 
flexibilities and benefits that other entry modes can’t provide.  
 
FDI can be vertical or horizontal in nature. Vertical integration is an arrangement where a 
firm wishes to own or control multiple stages of its value chain. It can be either forward 
vertical integration where firm invests in downstream parts of value chain (marketing, 
sales), or backward vertical integration, where upstream parts of value chain are strength-
ened with investment. Horizontal integration happens when a firm invests in activities that 
are in same stage of value chain as its own operations, for examples acquisitions to 
achieve economies of scale. (Cavusgil & al. 2014, 430) 
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To small and medium sized enterprises equity joint ventures and acquisitions are often not 
possible and FDI can simply be establishment of wholly owned subsidiary in foreign loca-
tion to have greater control over exports. This type of FDI is an example of forward vertical 
integration, and is an example of hierarchical entry mode. Depending on the needs of 
the firm, hierarchical entry modes do not necessarily qualify as FDI per se but can be 
seen as a form of direct exporting. Sometimes a firm may use domestic-based sales rep-
resentatives to travel abroad to perform sales or to increase commitment the firm may use 
foreign based sales representatives. (Hollensen 2014, 399) Formal sales office can be es-
tablished either by setting up a foreign branch, which is a legal extension of the domestic 
firm, or by establishing a foreign subsidiary, which is its own legal entity and tax liable in 
the foreign location (Hollensen 2014, 401). The obvious advantage of hierarchical entry 
modes is that they allow for maximum control but on the other hand require higher re-
source commitment and access to market knowledge and information.   
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3 International financial management 
The general goal of all management, as it is with companies as well, is to maximize share-
holder wealth. Hence, the same applies to financial management. (Brigham, E. & 
Ehrhardt, M. 2014, 9.) Financial managers’ tasks are to make capital budgeting decisions, 
manage funding and decide upon which investments to take. (Titman, Keown & Martin 
2011, 9). Therefore, it is easily understood that international financial management takes 
these decisions into the international perspective. It does however bring additional consid-
erations in to the table, such as new kinds of risks as well as a vastly greater amount of 
opportunities than with domestic trade. (Pike, R. & Neale, B. 2009, 613) 
 
The following chapters will discuss various methods of financial management, such as 
budgeting and funding. The chapters are limited into methods generally available to a 
startup, as well as ones applicable to this possible internationalization effort, a project-
based approach into internationalization for a small, growing company. 
3.1 Managerial accounting 
In contrast to financial accounting, which deals with what has happened (the past), mana-
gerial accounting deals with the future and its planning. As the name suggests, it is not 
necessarily a group of tools for accountants (i.e. financial statements), but rather one of a 
business managers most useful sets of tools as they plan their operations throughout a 
period of time. (Braun & Tietz 2013, 4.). 
 
There are some similarities between the two. One accounting method, cost accounting, is 
that which deals with calculating costs of various operations, and for example costs di-
rectly related in manufacturing a product. Here lies the similarity: to provide detailed man-
agerial accounting information into the future, a manager must look at the past to find out 
what the costs have been. Cost accounting is not regulated, like financial accounting is, 
nor is it in all cases predictive as managerial accounting is. While cost accounting could 
be entirely separated from the two, it can also be said to act as a unifying accounting type. 
(Drury, C. 2007, 7). Other similarities between the accounting principles are clear, both 
deal with numerically measurable metrics about the company’s operations. They are also 
both tools for management and shareholders to follow the company’s financial situation. 
 
A manager must be able to plan their operations well. Managerial accounting needs to be 
applied in order to take care of the financial planning, and it is one of the main purposes of 
managerial accounting. Secondly, a manager must control and communicate with their 
subordinates, and financial planning is an effective tool to use for this in business, where 
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the importance of an operation can be easily figured out through the sheer amount of fi-
nancing directed towards it. During all these operations, a manager must also review 
where they are by comparison to previous plans and estimates, as well as competitors 
and other rivals. These form some of the main tasks of a manager, but also managerial 
accounting in general (Braun & Tietz 2013, 4). 
3.1.1 Budgeting 
A very commonly used tool for managerial accounting, even in uses where the term man-
agerial accounting is not what its user has in mind. Even individual people and families 
use budgeting to evaluate and plan their expenditures of the future. Naturally, every suc-
cessful business has to keep a plan for the future as well, and this is where budgeting 
comes in. The three main benefits of budgeting are; Benchmarking, Communication and 
Planning. In this context, benchmarking describes using the ready-made budget as a 
comparison to the current situation, for example expenditure- or sales revenue-wise. It 
makes possible comparing the estimate with what has actually commenced through the 
operations of the business. (Braun & Tietz 2013, 518). There are two main schools of 
thought in budgeting. They are to form the budget as a rolling budget, or a static budget. 
The difference is to either once a year set a budget to follow for the next 12 months (static 
budget) and in rolling budgets the budget is updated more continuously, for example once 
a month. (Raye 2016).  
 
The rolling budgets scope into the future is always the same, the whole 12 months (or 
other length of fiscal year). This is because it is updated periodically. It could be thus ar-
gued, that this type of budgeting is more current and fits in many modern business mod-
els, and more financially accurate as the fiscal year commences. It also distributes a lot of 
the work for along the year, instead of at the end of each year. Many companies however 
continue to use static budgets, which have to be extensively prepared once a year. The 
main benefit is the clarity of the plan the budget entails; it does not change during the 
year, but the companies objectives can be followed step by step, and everyone knows 
how the year should commence. (Raye 2016). As the economy becomes increasingly vol-
atile however, fast changes are needed, and these static budgets may become outdated. 
The rolling budget therefore suits companies that need to be adaptable to the business 
environment.  
 
The entire organization can be covered by a master budget, which consists of every other 
smaller-scale budget of the company. Usually the master budget is divided into an operat-
ing and financial budget. (Braun & Tietz 2013, 519). A budget is an extremely valuable 
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tool for a manager, as through it the entirety of the operations of the company can be fi-
nancially communicated. Any employee can research their companies’ budget and find 
out what the company emphasizes and even be of help when streamlining the operations 
further. (Braun & Tietz 2013, 518-520). This only works if there is financial transparency in 
the company, that is, the employees can freely examine financing activities. 
 
However the main function of a budget is to plan the future of the companies’ financial op-
erations, or of any entities for that matter. It can be argued that planning the companies’ 
operations financially are one of the most important in order to keep it liquid and to retain 
enough operating capital, as well as figure out when to seek for financing, a very im-
portant context in the startup world. (Braun & Tietz 2013, 518). It can also be argued that 
equally important is the goal setting and resulting communication purpose of budgeting; 
given the power of resource allocation in a company, budgeting activities serve the pur-
pose very well. (Berzezniak 2016) 
3.1.2 Project budgeting 
In addition to regular budgeting activities of a company, there might arise a need for spe-
cialized budgets. These might not be describing the regular financial occurrences of a 
company, but rather they might be of a project-based nature. Therefore project budgeting 
has emerged as a method of describing these financial activities.  
 
Projects gain approval from the upper management of a company. This is done via a pro-
ject estimate, stating the preliminary financial estimate for the project. A project manager 
runs the financial planning of a project, and is in charge of the execution of the estimate 
and budget, among other financial statements regarding the project (Kimmons 1990, 85). 
This is the prediction of the final cost of the project. (Kimmons 1990, 87). While this may 
be a traditional means of project budgeting, in startups this may become too laborious, or 
the hierarchy of the company does not permit such practices. In small companies, budget-
ing and project budgeting is still done by the CEO or other manager, while other team 
members contribute to the budgeting process. 
 
Indeed, startups should carefully consider where to allocate their funding, in which pro-
jects, at what time and the like, so they can maximize their valuation for the next funding 
round and to bolster their traction, something extremely valuable to startup, as it gives 
them credibility in all their stakeholders’ eyes. (Matheson 2015). Matheson (2016) sup-
ports the view that startups should prepare a budget in a rolling fashion, in addition to the 
claim that budgeting indeed is a valuable tool for planning and communication, especially 
when capital is such scarce as it is in a startup.   
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Projects may also be budgeted more statically, or in a rolling fashion. As described by 
Raye (2016), rolling budgets have the benefit of adaptability to changing conditions. As 
adaptability and agility are what startups need to succeed (among several other qualities), 
then controlling project budgets in a rolling fashion is not a farfetched option. In fact, 
startups should embrace rolling and iterative methods in all their business practices. It 
should be known at the beginning of a project, that there is always an uncertainty factor, 
for example if a startup chooses to pivot their operations, effectively changing the whole 
operation. 
 
After the project and its estimated financial impact is approved, a project budget is made. 
It may differ from the estimate, or be similar. The change is a result of further research 
into the required activities of the project. The estimate is usually higher than the eventual 
budget. (Kimmons 1990, 101.) The budget cannot be higher than the estimate, as only the 
amount of funds equivalent to the estimate may be appropriated. In simple terms, a pro-
ject estimate is a prediction of the cost made prior to the project, whereas a budget is a 
tool to control the cost throughout the project. (Kimmons 1990, 99). 
 
Project budgeting can be seen as not only a tool for a manager but also for the project 
team. It is general knowledge that money is always the fuel of a company’s operations, 
therefore by reviewing the budget a team member may see where great emphasis is 
taken, and act accordingly; also through this understanding they can understand the goals 
of the project more thoroughly. (Bradley, J. 2016). 
 
While the estimate may be relatively inaccurate, and not contain all work packages or cost 
items, the budget must be as accurate as possible, and detail all work packages and cate-
gories of costs. This is needed in order to prevent costs from spiraling. (Kimmons 1990, 
99). 
3.2 Foreign exchange risk 
A startup company must always be careful and cautious in using their funding. A great 
deal of effort must be taken in order to minimize mistakes, which cost money. In startups, 
it can be stated that the opportunity cost is relatively higher than in more established com-
panies, as there might not be any mechanism to protect the company from mistakes. It is 
however difficult to estimate future events, and therefore risks as well. 
 
In the case under study, as Witrafi wishes to enter the US market for funding and sales, 
the foreign exchange risk is an applicable one. This risk, in essence, can be described as 
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volatility in foreign exchange rates. In essence, either your domestic currency appreciates 
or depreciates against the foreign currency, rendering it stronger (e.g. more Dollars with 
the same amount of Euro) or weaker (e.g. less Dollars with the same amount of Euro) (Tit-
man & al. 2011, 650). 
 
A payment method often encountered in foreign trades is to receive cash in advance as 
the exporter. This is one of the most basic management technique in foreign trade, as the 
trade is then made at the spot-rate, or the exchange rate of the day the sale is made. 
(U.S. Department of Commerce 2008). Such an action could also be applied by convert-
ing euros into US Dollars at a favorable exchange rate prior to the need of the currency. 
3.3 Additional risks 
A major risk is political risk, in which there can arise sudden, unfavorable change in gov-
ernment policy. (Titman 2011 & al, 638). These policy changes may include expropriation 
of company assets (the taking of private property for use in public interest), tax rate 
changes or other politically motivated policy changes. (Titman & al. 2011, 638). As de-
scribed by Culp (2012), despite companies feeling powerless against political risk (there is 
nothing they can do about it) they should seriously consider the ramifications. The easiest 
way to manage this risk is to trade in less risky areas of the world. There is thus a clear 
reason that this risk is included in PESTEL analysis. Political risks should be effectively 
identified, measured and managed in order to operate in any, but especially risk-prone en-
vironments; it may lead to unprecedented benefits (Culp, S. 2012) according to the risk-
reward theory. 
 
The demand risk is the risk of fluctuations in the demand for a companies’ products and 
services. It affects the company incoming cash flow highly when operations are stable, 
however as startups usually have external funding as well, this can be used to hedge 
against the risk. (Titman & al. 2011, 650). Demand risk may expose deep vulnerabilities in 
an organization, because it affects such a large portion of any companies operations. The 
whole supply chain may be affected by demand changes that are difficult to foresee. (Ce-
cere, L. 2014). The current political environment of the world (terrorism and economic 
troubles in various regions of the world), interestingly, is a major influencer of demand as 
well. 
 
Commodity risk on the other hand affects the operational costs of a company. This risk 
can be described as sudden fluctuations in the price of a commodity essential to a com-
pany. Closely related is the operational risk, which is any other cost hike in an essential 
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part of a companies’ operations, such as price of labour. (Titman & al. 2011, 650). Be-
cause commodities are often sourced from the poorest areas by the poorest members of 
society, a troublesome political climate may highly affect commodity prices, such as regu-
lations on e.g. mining, or union activity resulting in more expensive labour. There may also 
be uprisings that escalate and spread into other industries as well. Therefore, sourcing 
must be executed with proper analysis and precision. (Alcorn, J. 2015). 
3.4 Sources of funding  
Startup funding at any stage of its growth is a very peculiar issue. Funding is a discussion 
topic at the heart of any startups decision making, and is one of the most discussed over-
all. Any company at the beginning of their operations will question funding decisions. 
Funding, or the absence of it, is also one factor which makes or breaks a startup com-
pany. Gaining funding from an investor is very often also the first sale a startup makes, 
when they have sold their idea to the investor and they decide to fund the new venture. 
 
Not many funding options are available to a startup. They usually do not have credit from 
debtors, and at the beginning there are no sales yet, or they do not sustain the company. 
Funding is usually first sought from the entrepreneurs themselves, as well as family mem-
bers. This funding usually grows thin, as few founders have relatives with funds available 
to sustain a growing new business. Capital from outside the immediate founders must be 
searched for early on in a startups life. (Pike, R. & Neale, B. 2009, 771). It is indeed the 
fastest way to gain financing to finance a new venture, and also shows that the founders 
have support in addition to believing in the idea themselves (assuming they finance it as 
well). 
3.5 Public Funding 
Finland, despite its petite size among nations, has a world-class public innovation funding 
environment. The Finnish government has recognized the need for funding innovation as 
means of keeping Finland’s competitiveness high. While these public instruments are 
available to companies of all sizes, the majority of funding falls to young companies, so 
faster growth can be obtained despite meager turnovers. The Ministry of Economy and 
Employment is the top-level coordinator of these innovation funding activities, while the 
individual funding agencies have a relatively free hand in what companies and projects 
they fund. (Ahokas, M. 2012, 8-9) These agencies have a specific direction of develop-
ment for Finland which they allocate funds to. This means that certain projects, when fall-
ing into the government’s goals at the time, will more likely get funded. It could be argued 
that since a large portion of young companies funding come from public entities, they can 
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easily guide the efforts of these companies. Whether this drastically changes the direction 
of development, and whether it is a (too strong) form of guiding markets through the public 
hand, is a matter commonly discussed among entrepreneurs. 
3.6 Equity financing 
A long-term financing option, equity financing is a form of financing whereby ownership of 
the corporation changes in favor of the investor supplying this financing.  They gain own-
ership of the company in return. For a small business, the most feasible options to search 
for equity financing is angel investors, venture capital firms, institutional investors and cor-
porate investors (Berk, J. & DeMarzo, P. 2011, 771-774). Startups must pick their inves-
tors wisely, and vice versa. Because about 80 % of startups fail after three years of opera-
tions, the investor and startup must be a good match. A startup will need expert guidance, 
and someone with the relevant networks (which the startup rarely has in the beginning, 
unless the founders are very prolific). (Mehta, J. 2014). 
 
There is a clear distinction in the startup world about funding rounds. They start from seed 
or pre-seed funding and continue into Series A, Series B and so on. The main difference 
between these rounds is their size in monetary terms. They are also raised consecutively, 
as can be seen from the following discussion. (Metrick, A. & Yasuda, A. 2011, 16).  
 
Angel investors are usually wealthy private individuals, who likely invest in a startups first 
or second funding round. These rounds are called “seed” and “series A” rounds. Some-
times, a startup may have a pre-seed round, possibly from an idea contest win, or two 
seed rounds. The distinction between these rounds is related to the order the startup 
raises them and also the size of the rounds. (Pike, R. & Neale, B. 2009, 771). Angel inves-
tors usually come onboard in the pre-seed and seed phases, many times as the first major 
investor. (Hudson, M. 2015). These investments are made to validate the business for the 
first time. 
 
These individuals may form syndicates to participate in a larger investment round, but 
they also decide on funding alone. They are an important part of a startups life for several 
reasons. They may be the first outside investor, they usually receive a large amount of eq-
uity in the company in reward for their high risk and they also usually bring a lot of exper-
tise into the startup and will generally exercise that expertise through a board seat and an 
advisory role (Pike, R. & Neale, B. 2009, 771.). These investors are likely to have one or 
several industries they concentrate on, and make investments to companies in these in-
dustries. They will also usually take part in supporting the company, especially through 
their knowledge and network, in addition to the monetary support. (Hudson, M. 2015). 
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Next come Venture Capital firms, limited partnerships which take high risk for a possible 
high return, by financing and gaining equity of growing startup companies. They raise 
funds to invest in these startup companies, and their goal is to satisfy the investors of the 
fund. These investors are usually called limited partners, while the venture capital firm is 
operated by general partners, who make the investments into startups. The VC firm will 
want to take care of their investment, and they will join the board of the startup. They will 
also very likely take a sizable portion of equity of the company itself, and may become the 
largest individual shareholder in some cases. (Pike, R. & Neale, B. 2009, 772.) These 
firms typically invest from a series A round onwards, but some companies have special-
ized funds for earlier stage seed rounds as well. Investment sizes for venture capitalists 
start from 250 000 USD to 1 million USD (Investopedia 2016.). 
 
One of the key issues a startup runs into during its course of operations and before its 
possible exit from startuphood, is gaining funding. This research has examined options to 
seek funding for the internationalization itself, but gaining more funding can be an end in 
itself while abroad. One reason as to why Witrafi is looking at the U.S. for funding is the 
sheer amount of venture capitalist money flowing to startups, which in 2014 was 49.3 
BUSD over 4361 deals (National Venture Capitalist Association 2015, 31.). 
Institutional investors are typically firms that handle large amounts of capital, for example 
pension funds and insurance companies. They have become increasingly interested in 
startups, in search for high returns. The case used to be that they financed VC funds and 
acted as limited partners, but they are beginning to invest directly as well, because in this 
way they gain higher returns, albeit their investments may be less diversified (Berk, J. & 
DeMarzo 2011, 773.). They typically invest anywhere from a series A onwards. 
 
Corporate investors on the other hand are larger corporations that are willing to invest in a 
smaller private company, usually somehow connected to their industry. These are usually 
a form of strategic partner for a startup, leveraging the larger corporation’s contacts and 
expertise worldwide. The investor itself is usually looking for something new to bolster 
their product portfolio, but they might also be looking for probing deeper into the startup to 
know if it is acquisition-worthy. An example of such collaboration is the 2009 funding 
round by Tesla, in which Daimler invested 50 million dollars to start a strategic alliance be-
tween the two automakers (Berk, J. & DeMarzo, P. 2011, 774.). 
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3.7 Cost-benefit analysis 
When a startup makes decisions, it is important to understand the repercussions of these 
decisions. A startup usually has an extremely short supply of resources, and especially 
funding may be scarce. Therefore, all financial decisions must be scrutinized through cost-
benefit analysis, which is most often performed prior to a use of resources. It is one of the 
most basic types of business decision analysis. (Investopedia 2016g). 
 
The natural first step is identifying the costs and benefits. Not only that, but their financial 
value must be figured out so that they are comparable on equal terms. (Berk, J. And De-
marzo, P. 2011, 53). However, some intangible items may be difficult to describe in mone-
tary terms. 
 
The valuation principle is a central concept in cost-benefit analysis. According to Berk and 
DeMarzo (2011, 53) this can be described as “the value of an asset to the firm or its inves-
tors is determined by its competitive market price. The benefits and costs of a decision 
should be evaluated using these market prices, and when the value of the benefits ex-
ceeds the value of its costs, the decision will increase the market value of the firm.” 
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4 Introduction of case company Witrafi Oy 
Witrafi Oy was founded in 2013 (PRH 2013.) by partners seeking to reduce congestion 
and pollution through providing intelligent parking system. Original founders were current 
CEO Sampsa Siitonen, CINO Tuukka Korhonen, Business Angel Mikael Seppälä and 
Chairman Stefan Storgård. The first three founders got to know each other through 
Haaga-Helia University of Applied Sciences, where they attended the same business 
courses. Mr. Storgård on the other hand, was introduced through the search for an inves-
tor and advisor for the founders. Progress started through market- and other feasibility 
studies, after which development efforts were initiated. Witrafi is currently located in Hel-
sinki, Finland. They also have an address in Ylihärmä, located in Ostrobothnia. (PRH 
2013.) 
 
The company provides a parking service where emphasis is on finding available parking, 
handling the customers’ permits and offering ‘pay-once’ services. Witrafi’s intelligent park-
ing management system caters to large employers, parking operators and end users. It 
can be used anywhere where there is a need to be able to park as swiftly as possible. The 
system streamlines parking access control, and for example barriers can open automati-
cally when approached, provided the vehicle approaching has access to that area.  
 
Currently Witrafi has 10 employees, each with a different, complementary skillset. The 
team members have broad experience from: business & entrepreneurship, traffic & park-
ing systems, embedded systems, software design and web-development. The board and 
advisors consist of seasoned entrepreneurs and industry experts who possess decades of 
experience. Witrafi is a very diverse company when considering the employee base, ages 
range from early 20’s to middle 40’s. Internationally speaking, current employees repre-
sent four continents and five countries. For a young startup, this is exceptionally diverse. 
 
The current market for Witrafi’s products is limited in Finland. Therefore they are actively 
looking for internationalization options. Previously Witrafi has commissioned studies relat-
ing to favorable internationalization locations to France, Germany, Singapore and Hel-
sinki. They are still searching for the best place to start the internationalization process, 
and the emphasis is on doing it in the most efficient manner possible. Witrafi has been to 
several international trade fairs and expos throughout its operations: ITS World Congress 
2013, Intertraffic Amsterdam 2014, ITS European Congress 2014, Web Summit 2014, 
Smart City Expo and Congress 2014, Svepark 2015, Slush 2015 and next, in April 2016 
they will visit Intertraffic Amsterdam 2016. 
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They are interested in the United States because it is the prime automotive country in the 
world, and the U.S. has a lot of wealthy investors. Additional financing is essential for the 
growth of the company. There are also other potential benefits the location can offer and 
the company would like us to research further. The U.S. is not a completely new country 
to Witrafi, the company was nominated to be a top 10 Finalist in the ‘Verizon Powerful An-
swers Award 2014’ held in San Francisco.   
 
Witrafi has been able to attract various types of funding throughout its life. First fundings 
were from the shareholders themselves and Haaga-Helia UAS through its Startup School, 
where Witrafi hails from. These minor fundings amounted to about 15 000 €. Startup 
School is Haaga-Helia’s program that supports students wanting to become entrepreneurs 
(Startup School 2016), and Witrafi has received a lot of help from them throughout their 
continued success. Because of Witrafi’s close cooperation with Startup School and suc-
cess in entrepreneurship, Sampsa Siitonen, the CEO of Witrafi, was awarded Startup 
School Student of the Year 2015.  
 
Witrafi has attracted a total of 150 000 € in outside investments, 250 000 € in Tekes fund-
ing, 100 000 € from Helsinki City Innovation Fund, 50 000 € from Finnvera. Last year 
Witrafi gained its first revenues, some tens of thousands of Euros (books for 2015 have 
not been closed yet). From Finnvera, Witrafi has also received two small bridge-funding 
loans for purposes of burning Tekes-funding at a faster pace and maintaining a healthy 
cash flow. Out of these fundings, Witrafi has fulfilled the acceptable amount of de minimis-
type funding (200 000 € during 3 years).  
 
Witrafi’s path and its current situation compared to other startups could be described us-
ing Startupcommons’ tool for describing startup development phases, seen below: 
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Figure 11. Startup development phases (adopted from startupcommons.org 2016).  
 
In reference to the phases outlined in the figure, Witrafi is currently located in point two. 
This is the scaling stage, loosely described as a stage of pursuing high growth, obtaining 
funding and building a larger team (Startupcommons.org 2016). They have already sur-
passed great obstacles like team building and gaining funding, while also having a grip on 
their first customers. Point two is an excellent stage to start internationalization, when 
even more financial resources and growth is pursued.  
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5 Research methods 
This chapter introduces the selected research methods and gives justification for research 
approach and design. The chapter also introduces the investigative questions of this re-
search, as well as describes how the data was collected and analyzed. Furthermore, the 
reliability and validity of this research are evaluated. 
5.1 Research approach 
This thesis is a research-oriented singe unit case study and uses a qualitative research 
approach. Case study involves the unit of analysis, herein the commissioning company 
Witrafi Oy, and a real world context or phenomena. For the reader it is important to under-
stand that case study sets its own requirements and limitations on the available research 
methods and design. It is often difficult to construct a theoretical framework for a case 
study because the situation is unique and theoretical perspective in the beginning could 
limit the authors’ ability to make discoveries (Yin 2012, 9). Also, because case is often a 
study of unique situation the results may not be easily replicated or generalized. On the 
other hand, case study allows for a wider range of issues to be discussed. (Yin 2012, 3-6) 
Both the case context and commissioning company of this research have been previously 
introduced in chapters one and four.  
 
Qualitative exploratory research approach was chosen because it is suitable when the ob-
jective of research is to describe and gain a deeper understanding of issues rather than 
draw conclusions from a larger sample or to give definite answers (Haaga-Helia 2014; 
Hollensen 2014, 182; Research-Methodology 2016a). This fits well with the research pur-
pose of exploring the different options and allows for holistic approach to be used, but on 
the other hand, also limits the usefulness of this study in decision making as such. 
 
The research approach is also inductive, because no hypotheses were presented in the 
beginning of the research project. The authors focus on researching the underlying issues 
of the case before constructing any theories or conclusions. Inductive research aims to 
build patterns and relationships between the issues under study and provides a more flex-
ible structure for the research. (Research-Methodology 2016b) 
 
The selected research approach should be visible for the reader in the research design. 
The lack of hypotheses and exploratory approach guide the discussion, and those oppor-
tunities that authors identify, are introduced to the reader in a detailed way without forget-
ting the case company. 
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5.2 Research design 
The research is designed so that it adequately addresses the needs of the commissioning 
company and provides needed insights to justify authors’ approach. The research starts 
with an introduction and moves on from a general level to more specific issues. Authors 
have approached the research in a holistic way, in other words the authors see that the 
characteristics of start-ups and their operational environment, together with case-com-
pany’s resources, are likely to affect the partnering opportunities Witrafi has in internation-
alization. Thus, research progresses in stages and only once the various theoretical and 
environmental factors have been introduced, the focus moves on the collaborative op-
tions.  
 
The research is divided into five investigative questions used by the authors to answer to 
the research question, introduced in introduction chapter. Likewise research structure has 
previously been introduced. Table 3 below lists the investigative questions together with 
the purpose of each question. Data collection and analysis methods are discussed sepa-
rately in the following sub-chapters.  
 
Table 3. Research design. 
Investigative  
question 
Purpose Data           
collection 
Data analysis 
1. What is the 
competitive land-
scape in the Bay 
area like? 
 
To examine and 
understand the pre-
conditions set by 
environment for the 
Bay Area market 
entry 
Secondary re-
search, 
Klyszeiko &   
Suomela inter-
views 
Qualitative, PESTEL, 
case-oriented  
2. Who are the 
partners for inter-
nationalization? 
 
To describe where 
the most likely part-
nering opportunities 
for Witrafi come 
from and why 
Secondary re-
search, to the 
lesser extent in-
terviews 
Qualitative, some 
quantitative, case-ori-
ented 
3. What kind of 
collaboration ar-
rangement they 
can offer? 
 
To investigate what 
can the previously 
identified actors po-
tentially offer for 
Witrafi before and 
after the market en-
try process 
Secondary re-
search, Siitonen, 
Suomela & 
Klyszeiko inter-
views 
Qualitative, some 
quantitative, case-ori-
ented 
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4. What are the 
costs attached to 
the best collabo-
ration options? 
To identify costs of 
market entry in us-
ing scenarios con-
structed as a result 
of prior research 
Secondary re-
search 
Qualitative, scenarios 
5. What recom-
mendations can 
be made about 
market entry to 
the U.S. to 
Witrafi? 
To present the re-
search findings and 
suggest what are 
the sensible op-
tions available 
  
 
5.3 Data collection 
Data collection for this research consisted of expert interviews and extensive secondary 
research of secondary sources. In some parts the authors also relied on personal experi-
ence and observation. One of the authors visited Silicon Valley in the beginning of this re-
search project, but due to the research having just started the visit could not be used to its 
full potential. 
 
The data collection was challenged by the fact that the research is a case study about 
start-up internationalization, both being ambiguous concepts, especially so when intercon-
nected. Furthermore, literature available on start-up internationalization is limited and of-
ten written from the point-of-view of Americans. However, finding information and data 
was not the biggest issue, especially from the Internet, but judgment calls had to be made 
about the credibility, applicability and trustworthiness of the collected data.  
 
The authors decided to limit the number of interviews because it was determined that the 
case sets its own limitations on the usefulness of data collected from other entrepreneurs. 
Authors are aware that an in-depth interview of someone who has experienced start-up 
internationalization first-handed could have provided valuable information. However, ac-
cessing and locating trustworthy people to be interviewed was challenged by the fact that 
the target market’s location is on another continent and that case company’s industry sec-
tor is different from that of many other Finnish start-ups that have previously international-
ized. Several interviewees also declined from being interviewed or didn’t respond to in-
quiries. One candidate pointed out that he was open to coming to the authors’ school and 
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give a presentation/seminar about an issue related to this study, but otherwise he was 
busy.  
5.4 Primary data 
Primary data was collected from phone/Skype interviews of Suomela and Klyszeiko, one 
email interview (Kriman) and face-to-face interviews with Siitonen. Kriman’s email inter-
view was conducted in the early stages of the project and guided the research, but was 
not heavily referenced in-text. Siitonen (also an author of this research) was interviewed 
thoroughly before the start of this research and also prior to the empirical part to demar-
cate the case and make use of Siitonen’s personal experiences of managing the case 
company. 
 
Authors wanted to interview someone who could give insights about start-up international-
ization and the target market. Finpro’s senior consultant Suomela agreed to be inter-
viewed. Amcham’s Klyszeiko on the other hand, was interviewed because he was known 
by both of the authors as a knowledgeable person, and could present an American per-
spective to many of the same topics covered in Suomela’s interview. To avoid interview-
ees’ confusion about the motivation of interviews the case company was kept anonymous. 
This was fine with both of interviewees. Both interviews were semi-structured and once 
the interviewees had answered to the questions prepared beforehand, the interviewer 
took an active listener’s role to cover a wider range of topics. Shortened interview tran-
scripts can be found from appendices. 
5.4.1 Hartti Suomela, Senior Consultant, Finpro Oy, Palo Alto 
Mr. Hartti Suomela who works as a senior consultant in Finpro’s Silicon Valley office was 
interviewed in 26th of January 2016. The authors first approached Suomela by email and 
then arranged for a proper mobile-phone conversation. Mr. Suomela has over 15 years of 
work experience in Silicon Valley area and in his current position he meets with approxi-
mately 150 clients a year. According to him, his role in Finpro is reactive in nature, mean-
ing that whenever a Finnish company approaches him he gives them advice and counsels 
them forward.  
 
The authors interviewed Mr. Suomela to gain a better understanding of Silicon Valley en-
vironment and the role of Team Finland services in internationalization. Additional interest 
for authors was Mr. Suomela’s personal experience working with Finnish start-ups in Sili-
con Valley and his opinions about different entry methods. The authors had prepared 
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some questions in advance and after those were addressed, a wider range of topics were 
covered in unstructured manner. The interview lasted for approximately 50 minutes. 
5.4.2 Mike Klyszeiko, Founder & Director of LaunchpadUSA, Amcham Finland 
Mr. Mike Klyszeiko was interviewed in 27th of January 2016 using Skype’s video-confer-
ence feature. The authors decided to interview Klyszeiko because both knew about Am-
cham but had a limited understanding of what are Amcham’s core activities.  Over the 
course of the interview it became clear that Mr. Klyszeiko is an expert not only on the U.S. 
business environment but also on the Finnish exporting SME sector. Thus, in addition to 
the questions prepared in advance, many more were discussed in unstructured manner. 
 
In the interview Klyszeiko was able to give insight on the various different services Am-
cham has to offer and additionally he discussed the Finnish-American business relations. 
He also gave some examples how Finnish SMEs have entered the U.S. market previously 
and introduced many more aspects of internationalization. The interview lasted for approx-
imately 45 minutes. 
5.4.3 Sampsa Siitonen, CEO of Witrafi Oy 
Mr. Siitonen is a co-author of this research and also works as a CEO of the commission-
ing company. He was interviewed on several occasions in order to understand what are 
the needs of Witrafi from this research and also to understand what is Witrafi’s current de-
velopmental stage and resources. Mr. Siitonen is also featured in chapter four. 
5.4.4 Alex Kriman 
Mr. Kriman is a US national who studied business in Finland up to the Ph.D level, only to 
discover that his employment opportunities were thin here. He later moved to California, 
and worked in South America as a high level-marketing chief for Kawasaki. Afterwards, he 
moved into working in startups in Silicon Valley. Through his studies in Finland and busi-
ness experience in the Americas, he holds a unique perspective into doing business in the 
US, being also able to look at the situation with the eyes of a Finnish corporation. Mr. 
Kriman was interviewed because he had first-hand knowledge of the startup scene in Sili-
con Valley, in addition to his past in Finland. 
5.5 Secondary data 
Secondary data refers to data that is existing and collected by someone else. It is easier 
to obtain but has limitations such as lack of fit to the research framework and difficulty to 
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evaluate reliability. (Hollensen 2014, 177) In this study the authors use secondary re-
search in many parts, meaning that data that was produced or collected by others is ana-
lyzed and referenced. Secondary data analysis is commonly used method in international 
studies (Harvard University, 13). The secondary data for this research comes mostly from 
secondary sources, but some primary sources such as government documents and re-
searched journals are also used. In some cases the difference between primary and sec-
ondary source is negligible and it is difficult to determine the type of source.  
 
The authors have tried to use only high-quality secondary data sources such as; course 
books, journals, research reports and business publications, but as was previously men-
tioned, the case sets limitations on how useful or accurate some sources are. A report that 
is otherwise of high-quality and focuses on U.S. market entry may not be accurate for this 
research if it concerns a firm that operates in different industry (than the case company) 
and has financial resources unavailable for the case company.  
 
In many parts authors use secondary sources found from the internet because Finnish li-
braries lack entrepreneurial literature. Authors acknowledge that it is problematic that 
much of the published research and data referred to comes from within the start-up eco-
system, making it difficult to analyze the validity of the data as an outsider. Secondary 
data sources such as; CrunchBase, TechCrunch, Startup Genome, Angel,co, FireMatter 
and CB Insights may not tell much to someone who is not familiar with the start-up activi-
ties, but they are nevertheless widely used by entrepreneurs around the world.   
5.6 Analysis methods 
This research uses mostly qualitative data analysis methods, but also incorporates quanti-
tative methods where applicable. Qualitative analysis methods are used where the data is 
non-statistical and quantitative in those parts where the collected data is numerical, col-
lected secondary data. The authors approach each investigative question individually, for 
example in first investigative question PESTEL tool is used in analysis whereas in the 
fourth investigative question authors use different scenarios to analyze the costs of possi-
ble future outcomes. Illustrations such as lists, figures and tables are used selectively to 
visualize the information. Regardless the method used, in each investigative question au-
thors approach the analysis from the perspective of case company which has complicated 
the analysis in many parts. 
 
The interviews and, to limited extent personal observations and experiences, have been 
used as a guiding principle of the analysis. The interview results play a major role in un-
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derstanding the environment of the target market and selecting the prospective collabora-
tion opportunities but secondary research is in many parts used to verify the results. In the 
interviews of Klyszeiko and Suomela many of the questions asked were same, so that au-
thors could compare how the two experts see same issues and whether there is any con-
tradictions.  
5.7 Research validity and reliability 
Start-ups operate almost in a bubble like environment as suggested in theoretical frame-
work. Academic research on entrepreneurship has focused on explaining what makes and 
entrepreneur and what are the conditions for a successful venture. This has been criti-
cized by Van de Ven (in Cohen 2006, 3) and others. It is problematic for the validity of this 
research that so few studies have focused on high-tech start-up internationalization. There 
exists studies about born-global companies, but many of those too, focus on explaining 
the features of a born-global company, not per se, on how they internationalize. The ambi-
guity of start-up concept has posed challenges for the researchers. 
 
The chosen research approach proved to be more difficult than the authors anticipated 
and the research design has been revisited multiple times. Especially finding a fitting theo-
retical perspective was a challenge for the authors. Yin (2012, 10) points out that inexperi-
enced case study researchers often have this difficulty. The fact that this research is a 
case study means that the results should not be generalized and may be difficult to repli-
cate (Harvard University, 11). The authors nevertheless believe that in addition to the 
case company, many of the findings may be of interest to other entrepreneurs.  
 
When it comes to validity and reliability of case studies, researchers’ bias is a big concern 
(Harvard University, 10). Authors would like to point out that one of the authors of this re-
search is also working for the case company and therefore it is likely that some biased 
views existed to begin with. On the other hand, authors see that a person who has first-
hand knowledge about many of the issues also increases the validity of the research. The 
biases affect just as well the other author of this research, but come from other sources, 
e.g. he had limited understanding of entrepreneurial activities before the start of this re-
search and had previously worked for a trade promotion organization. 
 
In this research the authors have attempted to increase the reliability and validity of re-
search by choosing appropriate methods and carefully selecting the interviewees. A lot of 
attention is given to the case context and correct referencing so that the reader can evalu-
ate the use of source materials. Some parts of this research do suffer from the lack of 
other opinions, but in those instances authors have paid extra attention on the evaluation 
  
55 
of relevance and accuracy of the used data. In many parts authors have tried to describe 
why some issues were introduced in the first place, and perhaps why some issues were 
left out of this research. 
 
For the reader it is necessary to understand that the chosen data collection and analysis 
methods set limitations on the usefulness of this research in decision making. The pur-
pose of this research is not to be an internationalization guide, but rather to explore differ-
ent options in a highly uncertain and constrained conditions.  
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6 Research outcomes 
This chapter will illustrate the findings of this research in the context of the investigative 
questions. The theories outlined in chapters two and three will converge with the re-
searched content and gathered material, of which various types of qualitative and quanti-
tative data have been gathered. The data will be presented and followed by immediate 
analysis for its suitability to the case company. The aspects of the investigative questions 
are researched, analyzed and answered successively. The operating environment of Sili-
con Valley will be examined in addition to relevant funding and partnership options to 
Witrafi; as well as what the anticipated benefits might be of this internationalization move. 
6.1 What is the competitive landscape in San Francisco Bay Area? 
This research is geographically demarcated to include Silicon Valley and the broader San 
Francisco Bay Area in the state of California in the United States of America. In theoretical 
framework authors briefly introduced how operating environment affects firm’s strategy 
and it was proposed that in international expansion the effects of operating environment 
are increased. In this section, the selected business environment aspects of the United 
States are introduced by applying E-S-P paradigm items, then some challenges faced by 
foreign start-ups in the U.S. market entry are discussed and an analysis of Silicon Valley 
ecosystem is presented using PESTEL approach. Finally, the section concludes with an 
estimation of Witrafi’s competitive market position. 
 
The purpose is to introduce the U.S. business environment and to investigate what are the 
pre-conditions the U.S. business environment sets for Witrafi in potential market entry. 
The focus is on general level due to the fact that later on Witrafi will be receiving an inde-
pendent market research on industry specific conditions from a third party source (inter-
view with Sampsa Siitonen). Although investors and customers are likely to compare 
Witrafi to existing solutions, authors propose that at least initially, while Witrafi is still in 
start-up stage, competitors consist mostly of other start-ups with whom Witrafi is compet-
ing for investors and other stakeholders’ attention. 
6.1.1 United States as a location for foreign business 
Environment 
The United States of America has a population of 321 million people and by geographical 
size it is the world’s third biggest country. The gross domestic product (nominal) of the 
U.S. is $17.97 trillion which makes it the biggest single economy in the world. The U.S. 
  
57 
economy is composed of 77.6% in services, 20.8% in industry and 1.6% in agriculture. 
The industry sectors are diverse, but the country is world leader in high-technology inno-
vations and among the leaders in following industries: petroleum, steel, motor vehicles, 
aerospace, telecommunications, chemicals and consumer goods. (CIA World Factbook) 
 
The abundance of factor endowments and large size of domestic market mean that trade-
to-GDP ratio of the U.S. is comparably low 30% (2013), when compared to smaller coun-
tries such as Finland 79% (2013) (World Bank). However the U.S. is still the world’s third 
biggest exporter and biggest destination for imports. Main export partners are Canada, 
Mexico, China and Japan and main import countries China, Canada, Mexico, Japan and 
Germany. (CIA World Factbook) 
 
System 
The United States is a federal republic consisting of fifty states. Each state has a level of 
self-governmental autonomy and the federal government has authority only on issues 
specifically declared to it by the U.S. Constitution (Laitinen 2007, 16-19). States have their 
own governmental structures, in most cases identical to the structure of the federal gov-
ernment (figure 12), with the exception of governor replacing the president in state gov-
ernmental structure. Administrative power of states is further delegated to counties, mu-
nicipalities and cities. 
 
 
Figure 12. The branches of U.S. federal government (USA.gov).  
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The year 2016 is an election year in the U.S. and the country is currently in campaign sea-
son. On the federal level there is concurrently Presidential and Congressional elections. 
As of before the elections Republicans control both the House and Senate, but it is pre-
dicted that Democrats will have a chance of winning over Senate in the upcoming elec-
tions. (Ballotpedia.org 2016b) From foreign businesses’ stand point, the Presidential elec-
tions are more influential for the reason that in the United States the president has consid-
erable executive and veto powers, including in foreign policy. According to PewResearch 
(2014) the ideological gap between Republicans and Democrats has widened it recent 
years, and more Americans now see themselves either as conservative or liberal.  
 
Policies 
The United States of America is considered to be a highly stable country (Fragile State In-
dex 2015) and it is ranked 7th easiest country in the world to conduct business in (World 
Bank 2016). The country is the world’s largest recipient of foreign direct investment and 
although the trend has been downward for the past few years, the government is commit-
ted in welcoming FDI as demonstrated by SelectUSA policy. The government is also ac-
tively trying to bring back or “insource” some of the jobs and investments that have been 
outsourced in past decades, this is clearly visible in government programmes such as 
“Make it in America”. (WTO 2015, 10) 
 
The United States has surpassed the recession which started in 2008 from sub-prime 
mortgage crisis and later spread globally. The GDP growth was estimated to be 2.6% in 
2015 (CIA World Factbook). According to WTO (2015, 10) employment levels, personal 
disposable income, and household incomes are all growing and the government policies 
are supportive. The Federal Reserve, which is the central banking system and in charge 
of monetary policy, has in recent years kept interests rates unusually low, but has now 
started to raise the key interest rates as it is confident in the U.S. economy (WSJ, 2015). 
The longer term target for inflation is 2% (FED 2016) and it was estimated be 0.2% in 
2015 (CIA World Factbook). 
 
Trade policy wise the U.S. is a big supporter of free trade and abolishment of trade barri-
ers. In addition to the recently signed Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade agreement the 
U.S. is also currently negotiating with European Union about Trans-Atlantic Trade & In-
vestment Partnership (TTIP), which would be a similar and extensive free trade agree-
ment and would potentially be beneficial for Witrafi and other Finnish companies wanting 
to do business in the U.S. (USTR) 
 
Conclusion 
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The U.S. economy is once again growing and solid compared to Witrafi’s home market. In 
the U.S. market entry Witrafi has to understand that the country has two levels of govern-
ment; federal and state level and that in many ways, they overlap and even contradict. 
The approaching elections cast certain uncertainties when it comes to business, but on 
the other hand the trade negotiations (TTIP) between EU and the U.S. can lead to new 
opportunities for small businesses in both continents. 
6.1.2 Main challenges faced by foreign start-ups in the U.S. market entry 
FireMatter View Report (2015) surveyed over 200 foreign start-ups concerning U.S. mar-
ket entry. One of the questions asked was: “What are the main challenges in U.S. market 
entry?” The results are compressed in figure 13 below. 
 
 
Figure 13. Top challenges foreign start-ups face in U.S. market entry (FireMatter Views 
Survey Report 2015, 14).  
 
The results are not surprising and are in fact consistent with the impressions authors gath-
ered from the expert interviews. Notwithstanding the fact that the interviews conducted for 
this research focused strictly on Silicon Valley. The results are also consistent with the 
points made in the theoretical part of this thesis. First, start-ups face the paradox of high 
ambitions and lack of resources. Secondly as integrated theory of internationalization of 
Falahat & al. pointed out, market knowledge is an integral part in success of internationali-
zation and closely linked to network capability. The respondents of FireMatter survey 
clearly lack both in market knowledge (over 30%) and in network capability as suggested 
by the challenge of finding local partners. 
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6.1.3 Silicon Valley ecosystem 
The Bay Area is a commonly used name for the Northern California region that includes 
nine counties and the metropolitan areas of San Francisco, Oakland and San Jose. Geo-
graphically the Bay area represents 1.22% of the total area of California and population is 
9.9% of California total. The area is perhaps best known for Silicon Valley, the world lead-
ing cluster of innovative high tech companies such as Google, Apple and Facebook. Sili-
con Valley consists of the counties of Santa Clara, San Matteo and of selected cities in Al-
ameda and Santa Cruz counties. The area is home to approximately 3 million people and 
supports some 1.5 million jobs. (Silicon Valley index 2016)  
 
The birth of Silicon Valley, around the mid-20th century, is closely linked to Stanford Uni-
versity, located in Santa Clara. The University together with some other governmental re-
search institutions provided start-ups with seed early on (Nishizawa, in Taplin 2007, 104) 
and the founders of many innovative technology companies such as HP, Google and Ya-
hoo are Stanford alumni (Stanford University). Based on the early success of Silicon Val-
ley the U.S. government changed many of its policies, for example it opened publicly 
funded research results to use of private industries and eased the regulation on Initial 
Public Offering (IPO) and listing. Silicon Valley was also the location where VC investment 
emerged as an early on funding option for start-up companies. (Nishizawa, in Taplin 2007, 
104-105) 
 
Over the years Silicon Valley has evolved into world leading technology cluster and it is 
also considered to be a benchmark for other start-up ecosystems. Kenji Kushida (2015) 
sees Silicon Valley as a dual ecosystem, that is, the ecosystem consists of both large 
firms and start-ups. The concept of start-up ecosystem was introduced in theoretical 
framework but as a reminder, it consists of support infrastructure, which depending on 
model used, includes 6 – 13 supporting factors. Daniel Isenberg’s (2015) circular model 
for example names; markets, policy, finance, culture, supports and human capital as the 
main elements and each element consists of one to three supporting factors. The im-
portance ecosystems have on overall economy and for start-up growth is well docu-
mented. However as Prahalad (2015) suggested, start-ups form only one part of the wider 
market-based ecosystem, for that and some practical reasons the demarcation also in-
cludes the wider California Bay Area.  
 
To compare start-up ecosystems Compass (2015) conducted 200 interviews and sur-
veyed over 11,000 start-ups. Resulting was a comprehensive ranking of global start-up 
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ecosystems, excluding China, Japan and South-Korea. The ranking uses weighted aver-
age of five components as a basis for evaluation. The report found that Silicon Valle & 
Bay area is still in its own league. Figure 14 is a radar chart showing just how complete 
Silicon Valley ecosystem is in nearly all areas compared to second best New York and the 
best ranked European ecosystem London, which was ranked 6th globally. The only com-
ponent where both London and New York scored better was market reach, but that can be 
explained with the factors used in evaluation. Silicon Valley’s metropolitan area GDP 
($535 billion) is significantly smaller than that of New York and London, and additionally 
London can provide better foreign market reach due to its location.  (Compass 2015) 
 
 
Figure 14. Radar chart comparing ecosystem rankings of Silicon Valley, New York and 
London. Based on Compass Top 20 start-up ecosystem ranking in Global start-up ecosys-
tem report 2015.  
 
The figure should not be used for numerical comparison as it is purely based on position 
in ranking. For example in Compass’s report the performance component is based on val-
uation of ecosystem (number of exits and funding) and number of start-ups. The radar 
chart would indicate that London and New York are close to Silicon Valley (SV) when in 
fact the Valley is in league of its own. According to Compass SV has 14-19 thousand 
start-ups and ecosystem is valued at $264-323 billion. For New York the figures are much 
lower 7,1-9,6 thousand and $40,8 – 49,8 billion and for London 3,2 – 5,4 thousand and  
$39,5 – 48,3 billion. (Compass 2015) The actual number of start-ups in Silicon Valley can 
be even higher as Angel.co lists 22,600 companies and some estimates (Coppola 2014) 
give figure as high as 28 – 30,000.  
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The high number of start-ups in Silicon Valley can be seen either as a positive or negative 
factor for Witrafi. On one hand, clustering means that support infrastructure is best in the 
world and easily accessible. Informal and formal networks are also best in the world. On 
the other hand, it means that Witrafi will be competing for attention, and merely sending a 
business plan to venture capitalists and other potential partners by email won’t work. In 
fact, both Finpro’s Hartela and Amcham’s Klyszeiko said in interviews that establishing a 
local presence its absolute necessity.  
 
Aside from ranking, a major force shaping Silicon Valley ecosystem is demographics. The 
Silicon Valley has extraordinarily high number of foreign residents, according to Silicon 
Valley index (2016, 9) 37.4% when compared to national average of 13.3%. Compass re-
port (2015) notes that 45% of start-up employees in Silicon Valley are foreign nationals. 
Estimating the number of Finnish start-ups operating there is difficult, and Finpro does not 
have an exact number (interview, Suomela). Pekka Pärnänen, a well-known Finnish con-
sult in Silicon Valley, estimates that there are around 50 Finnish start-ups in Silicon Valley 
(Kauppalehti 2015). For Witrafi other Finnish start-ups and actors in the area would be 
natural network partners, both formally and informally. The number of Finnish companies 
however fluctuates, exits and failures are regular. According to Tekes report (2010, 24-25) 
written by Rapo & Seulamo-Vargas, Silicon Valley has been a fruitful location for Finnish 
growth companies when it comes to exits, at least a dozen companies found buyers be-
tween 1999 and 2009.  
 
Political aspects 
According to report by Bay Area Council and Booz & Company (2012, 14) the success of 
Bay Area can be attributed to the strength of infrastructure, finance and culture. Surpris-
ingly supportive government policies were not seen as a factor despite Isenberg’s ecosys-
tem model names it as one important factor. Compasses “Global Startup Ecosystem Re-
port” (2015, 36) names cost of living, cost and availability of workspace and immigration 
as the biggest policy issues affecting Silicon Valley area in 2015. Of those, immigration is 
a federal issue and the rest are largely affected by market forces. It can be said that the 
current political climate is supportive of innovative high-tech companies. From Witrafi’s in-
dustry, although not directly related, California was one of the first states to allow road 
testing of self-driving cars and Uber taxi services.  
 
California currently has a Democratic state government trifecta, meaning that the Demo-
crats have majority in House and Senate as well as the governorship (Ballotpedia.org 
2016a). Environmental issues, traffic and rising income gab are all current and recognized 
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issues in Silicon Valley (Silicon Valley index 2016, 9). The current California governor 
Jerry Brown is determined to cut petroleum use in half in the state by 2030 in attempt to 
slow climate change. According to Los Angeles Times (2016) Brown plans to do this by 
allocating state’s funds to public transportation projects and by promoting electric cars and 
other sustainable transportation means. For Witrafi this sends mixed messages as on one 
hand, parking business relies on cars yet on the other, electric cars need to park as well. 
Also, a big portion of the wanted petroleum reductions can be achieved with modern fuels 
and more efficient technologies. 
 
Economic aspects 
The Bay Area and Silicon Valley are economically influenced by what is happening on a 
country level, for example currency fluctuations although important economic aspects are 
affected by what is happening on a federal level. Also, to avoid unnecessary overlaps with 
previously mentioned issues, only selected economic aspects are discussed here. 
 
Overall San Francisco Bay area economy is growing and doing well. This is proven by in-
dicators such as job growth. Recently 150 U.S. metro areas were compared and San Jose 
performed second best and San Francisco was eight in surpassing expectations (Forbes 
2016). In fact, Silicon Valley’s unemployment rate of 3.6% in November 2015 was far 
lower than the country’s average of 4.8%. The income measures have also risen at faster 
phase than inflation. The Bay Areas combined VC investments rose from previous years 
$19.8 billion to $24.5 billion in 2015 (Silicon Valley index 2016, 8).   
 
However, the economic aspects are not all positive. Recently there has been speculation 
that a bubble may be forming in Silicon Valley start-up pre-IPO valuations. This is based 
on so called “unicorn” valuation trend, which refers to those start-ups that are over-valued 
and underperform when listed. Although high valuations concern start-ups in later stages 
than Witrafi, a bubble bursting could be catastrophic, as many venture capital funds would 
suffer. Some have already compared the current situation to so called Dot-Com bubble of 
early internet era. (CNBC 2016) 
 
Additionally, for start-ups Silicon Valley is not only a mecca of resources, but also a highly 
competitive environment to do business in. This shows in high cost of doing business, and 
high cost of housing and other services as mentioned before. The average annual earn-
ings of Silicon Valley are $122,172 as per Silicon Valley index. According to Compass 
(2015) the average time to hire software engineer in SV was 40 days, lower than in other 
ecosystem. Indicator of how dynamic the labor market in Silicon Valley is. 
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Socio-cultural aspects 
Differences in national culture can play an important role in internationalization as sug-
gested by Uppsala model and psychic distance. The differences between Finland and the 
U.S. culture are clear, for example the spoken language is different. The extent of how 
much the cultural differences could impact Witrafi is difficult to estimate. Witrafi has a di-
verse and multi-cultural team and English is the working language, so at least language 
would not be an issue. However the U.S. is more individualistic and masculine culture 
whereas in Finnish culture there is less power distance and more uncertainty avoidance. 
(The Hofstede Centre) 
 
One Swedish entrepreneur also wrote in TechChrunch article (Feb. 2016) that he noticed 
certain differences between Swedish and the U.S. business cultures, for example Sweden 
is much higher trust society. The authors also learned in Amcham Klyszeiko’s interview 
that there are important differences in business culture. He advised that Finnish compa-
nies have a dependable reputation, but the U.S. companies often “talk big”, and it is 
sometimes difficult to tell what is true. Klyszeiko also said that there is no real danger of 
liability of foreignness, but he still thought that in the U.S. it is important to “look local, 
sound local”.  Additional points he made were that it is important to have local presences, 
because short-term face-to-face meetings are expected, and the U.S. culture values being 
“available” more than Finnish culture where for example longer holidays are the norm. 
 
As was previously mentioned, culture has a big role in Bay area’s success. In Silicon Val-
ley “giving back” to community is a big part of the culture and the ecosystem has so differ-
ent culture that there is even a name to it: “Silicon Valley mind-set”. (Rapo & Seulamo-
Vargas 2010, 43) The ecosystem is driven by ambition, urgency, timeliness and constant 
creation (Rapo & Seulamo-Vargas 2010, 43-45). 
 
“In Silicon Valley, it is not what you know; it is whom you know and what 
value you can bring to the table that makes the difference.” (Rapo & 
Seulamo-Vargas 2010, 45) 
 
Daniel Isenberg’s ecosystem model (2015) recognized success stories and tolerance of 
failure as two factors shaping culture of ecosystem. Silicon Valley has plenty of both. Suc-
cess stories are everywhere; Apple, Google, Facebook, Tesla Motors, AirBnB, dropbox 
and Uber to name a few. Tolerance of failure is perhaps best explained by Shikhar Ghosh, 
a senior lecturer of Harvard Business School who has studied start-up failures. According 
to him some 30-40 % of start-ups end up liquidating all assets, 70-80% of start-ups fail in 
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returning the investment and 90-95 % fall short of projections. Despite the high failure 
rates, in Silicon Valley a failure is often viewed as “a badge of honor”. (in Nobel 2011)  
 
Technological aspects 
Silicon Valley is the birth place of many inventions and a site of major public and private 
research centers. As has been mentioned, Stanford University is located in the SV and a 
source of some of the brightest minds. The resources of the area also a natural “pull fac-
tor” for those interested in high-technology and highly skilled workforce is abundant. This 
can be seen for example in number of patent filings, patents filed in SV represent 47.7% 
of all patents filed in California (Silicon Valley index 2016). 
 
One of Silicon Valley’s characteristics is that it adapts new technologies much faster than 
other locations. This is of course possible because of supportive culture such as open-
ness to innovation and impatience but also because methods utilized by Silicon Valley 
companies such as “lean start-up” philosophy. Also, Silicon Valley companies have 
adopted cloud based systems and other technologies faster than competitors elsewhere, 
making the speed of change even faster. (Accenture) The research and development ex-
penditure in Silicon Valley is extremely high, which is natural because start-ups rarely 
have ready made products in tech and IT industries.  
 
Silicon Valley is known for corporate venturing which refers to established corporations’ 
ability and attitude to create new innovations. In Silicon Valley practically all established 
corporations such as Google, Yahoo, Cisco, Apple, HP etc. have Corporate Venturing di-
visions. Corporate venturing can be both internal and external. Internal means that a com-
pany attempts to create new business activities inside the organization but outside core 
activities, often by creating a separate division such as Google X. External corporate ven-
turing describes existing corporations’ investments on early startups with promising new 
technologies and innovations. For start-ups external corporate venturing is a potential 
source of funding but also one way to achieve exit. (Barrow, Burke, Molian & Brown 2005, 
222) 
 
Environmental aspects 
As was discussed in “political aspects”, environmental issues are taken seriously on politi-
cal level in California. In recent years California has suffered from drought which has af-
fected water usage in stage, but that is a lesser concern in Witrafi’s industry. Silicon Valley 
and California in general can be described as more environmental conscious state and for 
example investments on renewable energy sources, especially solar power, are sizeable. 
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Electric vehicles are increasingly common in the region. Silicon Valley cities have encour-
aged citizens to change into more environmentally friendly vehicles by investing in charg-
ing outlets, and there are now over 1000 public outlets. (Silicon Valley index 2016) 
 
On longer term Silicon Valley and California are likely to be among first adopters if self-
driving cars ever gain popularity. This would of course reduce parking needs in cities and 
be negative for Witrafi, but such developments are still years away. In fact the current situ-
ation in the Bay area, like other metropolitan areas in California, is that the region is suf-
fering from inadequate public transportation and traffic congestions. This can prove to be 
lucrative opportunity for Witrafi, if the product can be marketed as a solution. According to 
a report by National Transportation Research Group (2014) average person in San Fran-
cisco-Oakland area lost 61 hours and $1,266 due to congestion and in wasted time and 
fuel. The same report estimates that vehicle travel in California will increase by 20% by 
2030.  
 
Legal aspects 
Legal aspects are likely to have a major role in Witrafi’s U.S. market entry. Sari Laitinen 
(2007, 39) the author of “Doing business in the USA” writes that although many assump-
tions about U.S. legal system are myths, there are some differences compared to the 
Finnish system. It is advisable for Witrafi to get acquainted with the U.S. legal system be-
fore considering of signing any agreements or selling to the U.S. market. Due to demarca-
tion limitation of this research, only chosen few legal aspects of U.S. market entry can be 
discussed here. 
 
One of the first and biggest barriers of entry is a federally regulated legal issue. Compass 
report (2015) named the immigration and visa issues as one of the main hindrances in Sil-
icon Valley market entry. Finnish citizens can enter into the U.S. under Visa waiver –pro-
gram for up to 90 days if the purpose is to meet or consult with business partners, travel 
for a convention or conference or negotiate a contract (State Department). However that 
sets strict limitations on business for example length of stay and is not a sustainable solu-
tion on long term. Mr. Suomela and Mr. Klyszeiko both told the authors in interview that 
there are visa options that are easy to acquire for longer business visits such as B1 visa 
which costs $160, but even that option has limitations and must be extended after 6 
months as it does not allow permanent residency. Rapo & Seulamo-Vargas (2010, 96) 
write that E-1 category “treaty trader” visas are popular among Finnish businesses, but 
that SMEs have faced difficulties in obtaining one. Basically “Green card” would be the 
best option as it is most flexible option, but the cost and difficulty of acquiring one is likely 
too much for a start-up.  
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The immigration issue entrepreneurs face has been federally recognized and there has 
been some unsuccessful initiatives in the U.S. congress to develop a new visa category 
known as “start-up visa”, but currently the initiative is frozen. The investor visas categories 
(H) are out of question for a start-ups as they require investment up to $500,000 – 1 mil-
lion. The Visa question should not be taken lightly as Jeff Bussgang, an investors, points 
out in Bloomberg article (Feb. 2016) “VCs don’t want to invest on entrepreneurs who are 
at risk of being sent away”.  
 
Another major legal aspect in U.S. market entry is the establishment of subsidiary. Au-
thors learned from expert interviews that establishment of U.S. based subsidiary is a re-
quirement at some point in time, of course depending on what Witrafi wants to achieve in 
the U.S. For example longer term local presence and acquiring funding from VCs gener-
ally require that the start-up is/has subsidiary that is a U.S. C-corporation (which corre-
sponds to Finnish osakeyhtiö), also S Corp and LLC are possible (SBA 2015 & Mashable 
2012). According to Laitinen (2007, 91-94) incorporation is a state regulated issue, and 
foreign companies often favor incorporating in Delaware as it is known for being advanta-
geous location. Incorporation is not difficult, it can even be done via internet, but it does 
complicate operations and add costs. Klyszeiko (interview) stressed that incorporation 
should not be done too early on and the use of legal help is recommended. 
 
Some other legal aspects Witrafi should be aware of in the beginning are that in the U.S. 
non-disclosure agreements are not as common as in Finland (Rapo & Seulamo-Vargas 
2010, 46) and that legal contracts in the U.S. are generally far more comprehensive, also 
misunderstandings can happen because of the differences in legal systems (Rapo & 
Seulamo-Vargas 2010, 87). 
6.1.4 Witrafi’s competitive market position 
Witrafi is not the only player in the parking management market. There are longer-stand-
ing players and new entrants, other startups, all fighting for the piece of the parking man-
agement pie. Making parking sensors, there is Streetline and Fybr, for example. Making 
apps, there are Passport parking, Parking Panda and Pango, among others. Smarking 
and others offer parking data analytics too. Witrafi operates under the same mantle of 
Smart Parking Systems, so differentiating themselves from the others is difficult. 
 
On the other hand, Witrafi’s customers, parking operators, are a slowly evolving breed of 
customers. In the USA in particular, a lot of the local parking operators utilize obsolete 
technology in their parking locations. This includes using people for collecting payments 
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instead of ticket machines, and when machines are present, they are usually rather simple 
ones. As described in interviews made by the researchers, parking is viewed as an almost 
“Mafia” business in the US. As Silicon Valley is the one place that can be described as the 
home of innovation, it is likely that many business models and ideas have already been 
tried and tested there. Smart parking ideas are no different. It is likely that all of Witrafis 
potential customers (parking operators) in Silicon Valley have already been bombarded by 
partnership proposals and sales of many different systems. A clear differentiator is 
needed. 
 
Witrafi’s competitive advantage arises from their high potential in scaling to different appli-
cations (other than parking), in addition to their chosen strategy of pursuing operators and 
their cases giving hundreds or thousands of end users instantaneously: contract parking, 
such as residential or paid employee parking. The other use cases in question come from 
utilizing the required network for other applications, such as smart metering and lighting 
controls. Witrafi believes it has cracked a fundamental problem in deploying Internet of 
Things applications: an application meaningful enough to get a customer to deploy one, 
which can later be used for other applications as well. Through working with RFID, Witrafi 
has obtained a particular set of skills, skills obtained through beating an incredible learn-
ing curve, when no other company was working on the same technology to the point they 
would be on par with Witrafi. In short, Witrafi has multiple directions it can move to through 
IoT applications, and also conquering more of the parking market. Witrafis end user ac-
quiring model, gaining them through operators, is also a major change in an otherwise 
heavy B2C parking market. 
 
In essence, Witrafi can be said to bring a new product to an old market, however, per their 
approach to sales and end user acquisition, it could be said they are also entering the 
market as a niche entrant: trying to only pursue specific kinds of customer cases. Witrafi is 
also consistently unbeatable in many respects: for example, to use their service, no 
smartphone is needed (leading to the possibility of adoption by any customer group) and a 
peculiar feature in the technology they use: indoor positioning, in addition to outdoor posi-
tioning. Parking has also rarely seen recurring card payments for these contract custom-
ers. The benchmark is still sending paper invoices. 
 
One of the greatest points of conducting this research is to figure out Witrafis competitive 
market position in the Silicon Valley, therefore this topic will be revisited multiple times 
during this research. Witrafi is also able to utilize material supplied by FinPro and Tekes 
Future Watch, as they frequently conduct research into various market areas. 
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6.2 Who are the partners (for Witrafi) in internationalization?  
The following will outline the various possible partners for Witrafi’s internationalization. 
There are several public and private entities discovered. They are related to consultancy 
or funding, mainly concerning themselves with such operations for trade, development 
(business and technology) and other types of support. Witrafi will need funding to pursue 
internationalization, and as they do not possess all the required knowledge, various types 
of partners will be needed to enter the US market. The partners are both domestic and in-
ternational, and the researched partners or partnership options will be analyzed in con-
junction with the gathered data itself. 
6.2.1 Preconditions for collaborative opportunities 
Cavusgil, Knight and Riesenberger (2014, 90) name four types of participants in interna-
tional business; focal firms, distribution channel intermediaries, facilitators and govern-
ments. A focal firm is a firm that initiates the international business transaction, the one 
with a product or service intended to be offered in a foreign market. Distribution channel 
intermediaries are firms that offer specialist services for focal firms, often in the fields of 
logistics and marketing. Facilitators on the other hand are firms or individuals who assist 
focal firms in internationalization process by making international transactions happen 
more efficiently. Finally, governments make and enforce regulations, handle multilateral 
trade relations and maintain fiscal and monetary policies. However they can also own and 
operate state owned enterprises and be significant buyers in certain industries. (Cavusgil 
& al. 2014, 90) 
 
Each group consists of countless number of actors and because discussing all potential 
partnering opportunities would be difficult, eliminating the less likely ones and concentrat-
ing on selected few opportunities is used. In discussing what partnering opportunities 
there are for Witrafi in internationalization, it is important to remember Witrafi’s basis for 
the process. Witrafi sees itself as a born-global start-up and its motivation for internation-
alization differs from the traditional SME internationalization (Uppsala model) where incre-
mental growth or even ‘chance’ is often the main motivation. Witrafi per se, sees interna-
tionalization as a way to sustain itself. However, because Witrafi is still a start-up with an 
unproven business model searching for distribution channel intermediaries would be 
premature. Foreign intermediaries expect exporters to provide them with a good, reliable 
product with a proven market (Cavusgil, S. & al. 2014, 405).  
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Witrafi is constrained by limited financial resources. Authors have previously mentioned 
that a decision to demarcate closer analysis of Witrafi’s financial resources out of this re-
search was made. It was clear that there is currently little income being generated from 
sales, and such analysis would thus be inaccurate at best (Siitonen interview). It is how-
ever worth noting that firm’s financial abilities also influence partnering opportunities. The 
authors also want to emphasize that premature scaling, introduced in theoretical frame-
work, is a real factor and is to be taken seriously. Some partnering opportunities and entry 
strategies available for larger companies are not feasible for Witrafi. On the other hand, 
although internationalization can be a costly exercise, for an ambitious start-up ignoring 
Silicon Valley based funding and growth opportunities is a lost opportunity in itself. 
 
Theoretical framework suggests that ideal entry mode for SME with limited resources is 
exporting, due to other modes of entry requiring more resources and commitment and 
having a higher risk associated in them. That said, as was concluded in discussing the 
previous investigative question, the environment of chosen target market requires local-
presence. This would suggest an intermediate, hierarchical entry mode, which although 
costlier, would give Witrafi more control over internationalization.  
 
The theoretical framework also introduced various internationalization theories. Although it 
has been stated that Witrafi sees itself as a born-global, understanding internationalization 
from wider perspective is important. The older theories present related concepts and form 
the context of newer theories. Additionally, as integrated theory suggests, any one theory 
alone might not be adequate to explain born-global internationalization. Points made 
about internalization and imperfect market conditions are related to integrated theory’s 
point about network capability. Market imperfections and failures are also closely linked to 
the government policies, trade facilitation and promotion. Born-global companies need to 
acquire knowledge about the target market before internationalization, and due to market 
being imperfect, they rely heavily on existing relationships and networks. 
 
Networking theory of internationalization suggests that there are three type of relation-
ships; informal, formal and intermediary. Informal relationships have been found to be im-
portant in born-global internationalization, but due to the nature of such relationships, they 
are difficult to address in this research. The theory also suggests that a firm can only join 
and benefit from a network if the existing actors have a reason to collaborate with the new 
firm. This is an important point, and a reason why in-depth analysis of certain partnering 
opportunities is difficult in this research. It is clear for the authors what Witrafi’s value 
proposition is, but it should not be forgotten that most business relationships have to be 
mutually beneficial. 
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To understand what are the prospective partnering and collaborative opportunities for a 
start-up in internationalization authors rely on expert interviews, findings of theoretical 
framework and the data gathered from secondary sources. The interviewees were asked 
what their respective organizations could provide for a Finnish start-up in internationaliza-
tion and also what kind of partnering opportunities they see there exists for start-up to uti-
lize. Based on the aforementioned, it was determined that the likeliest partnering candi-
dates are: 1) the different organizations in start-up ecosystem and 2) trade promotion or-
ganizations.  
 
The concept of start-up ecosystem was introduced in theoretical framework and then re-
visited when the competitive landscape was introduced. In the interview with Mr. Suomela 
different ecosystem participants such as; co-working spaces, incubators & accelerators 
and virtual offices were discussed. Mr. Suomela confirmed that Finnish start-ups have 
previously used those services in Silicon Valley market entry. When it comes to trade pro-
motion organizations, the authors relied on their own experience working for, and with 
one. Witrafi benefits from the fact that the relationship with trade promotion organization is 
not based on a traditional client-customer relationship, but rather on future growth expec-
tations. In addition, TPOs can provide compelling funding schemes and Witrafi has an ex-
isting relationship with the Finnish TPO. 
 
6.2.2 How other foreign start-ups have addressed the challenges of U.S. market 
entry? 
In 6.1.2 FireMatter View Survey (2015) results were referred to when some of the chal-
lenges faced by foreign start-ups in the U.S. market entry were introduced. The second 
portion of the research, which was not discussed, is how the surveyed foreign start-ups 
had responded to the challenges or how they planned to respond. Figure 15 shows the 
most popular actions (to be) taken.   
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Figure 15. Actions taken/planned to counter expansion challenges (FireMatter Views Sur-
very Report, April 2015, 15).  
 
The most popular action was to seek funding from the U.S. investors, a major theme of 
this research. The authors will discuss the various funding options available for Witrafi 
both in the U.S. and in Finland. Distribution partners are not discussed in detail, for the 
reason introduced previously, although indirectly they are taken into account when dis-
cussing other partnering opportunities. The establishment of U.S. subsidiary was already 
mentioned when discussing the legal aspects of Bay Area business environment and is 
revisited in later chapters. Authors find it interesting that transferring permanent team to 
the U.S. has been seen as a solution rather than a challenge. This confirms the im-
portance of local presence in the target market and is a sign that hierarchical entry modes 
are popular among start-ups. For Witrafi sending a bigger team to the Valley is not feasi-
ble at the moment, but it is an open option in the future. Likewise, hiring of a U.S. sales 
team is expensive and out of Witrafi’s financial capabilities as of now, but the issue will be 
touched upon when discussing some partnering arrangements. The hiring of American 
employees is important in the longer term or right after market entry, but the authors see 
that the hiring process would likely happen outside the demarcated time period of this re-
search. 
 
Based on the expert interviews, authors got the impression that finding a U.S. based advi-
sor is one of the most important aspects for start-up in internationalization. Thus it is sur-
prising that only 30% of survey respondents were planning to address the issue. It may be 
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that the respondents see the prior options addressing the issue. The entrepreneurial na-
ture may also play a part in the relatively low figure. Entrepreneurs tend to rely on advice 
from informal social networks. Significant portion of this research concentrates on finding 
what kind of role incubator & accelerator programs play in start-up ecosystems and what 
they could offer to Witrafi in internationalization.  
6.2.3 Domestic funding options 
As has been outlined, Finland is a small nation with a small market. Some companies 
even find it difficult to find any market for their products in Finland, even though the skills 
and knowledge exist here and are ready to be used. Such situations arise especially when 
a subcontractor loses their main client due to shifting paradigms in the economy. Many 
such companies are left without a primary client. This has been a trend in Finland espe-
cially after the downfall of Nokia. 
 
This has led to many companies finding their clients abroad, where the skills they possess 
or products they manufacture are still desperately needed. Others find the Finnish market 
saturated for them, or them being unable to compete with cheaper alternatives from 
abroad. Some may just want to grow their company through internationalization. This has 
been noted also by the Finnish government. They have realized that in order to keep a 
sustainable economy, the Finnish companies need to start exporting their goods and ser-
vices. The Finnish government expenditure is 58 % of the GDP (Veronmaksajat 2015), 
which does not give the perfect environment for business for all companies. The market 
for many thus lies abroad, and exporting is the way to go. 
 
The government has created many helpful tools and instruments to support the efforts of 
those companies that are willing to export. In essence, there are two main types of sup-
port available: financial- and knowledge-based support. The financial help takes the form 
of subsidies, loans or guarantees. Mostly they all require financial effort from the company 
itself as well, typically somewhere between 20-50 % of their own equity. The knowledge-
based assistance encompasses consultation services and ready-made reporting to sev-
eral markets and specific industries. 
 
The services are conveniently gathered under one roof, Team Finland. There, a mind set 
on internationalization may find all the resources available from the government itself. Of 
course, it has to be noted that consultancy services on the topic may be purchased from a 
vast amount of commercial players as well. Sometimes, the government services them-
selves come as subsidized services performed by a commercial consultancy firm and not 
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the state-controlled FinPro, for example. Financial aids are given out by Tekes, Finnvera, 
Ely-keskus, Työ ja Elinkeinoministeriö.  
 
In order to be applicable to the funding, a certain process must be followed. This process 
is very similar across different funding bodies, and it can be said to follow the path pre-
sented in figure 16. 
 
 
Figure 16. Team Finland funding process. 
 
Initially the idea has to be proposed to the funding agency to gain some feedback; next, a 
plan is prepared and an application is made for the funding. The agency processes the 
application and decides whether or not to fund it. There may be several demands for the 
project set by the agency. Then the receiver of the funding starts executing the project. In 
most cases, they spend their own money at first, then report this spending to gain the 
funding. This happens after the final report or one of possibly several mid-term reports. 
The payment decision is made, and the company is ready to spend again. The process 
cycles again from project execution. In the end, results are reported and the final payment 
is made. 
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6.2.4 Foreign funding options  
One of the key issues a startup runs into during its course of operations and before its 
possible exit from startuphood, is gaining funding. This research has examined options to 
seek funding for the internationalization itself, but gaining more funding can be an end in 
itself while abroad. One reason as to Why Witrafi is looking at the US for funding is the 
sheer amount of venture capitalist money flowing to startups, which in 2014 was 49.3 
BUSD over 4361 deals, of which 24.2 Billion and 1406 deals were allocated to Sili-
con Valley-based companies (NVCA 2015, 16, 36, 37.). During the same year, venture 
capital deals in the Nordics amounted to only 846.4 million USD across 181 deals (Nordic 
Web 2015.).  
Next the round sizes themselves should be looked at, as can be seen below in figure 17, 
where the phenomenon of growing funding round sizes is also clearly seen in the 2 re-
gions, as seen from data gathered from Nordic Web (2015), Brasoveanu (2015) and CB 
Insights (2015a). 
 
 
Figure 17. Startup funding round sizes in 2014. 
 
Some differences can be clearly seen. The difference however is substantial especially in 
the Series A and B rounds. As Witrafi is currently searching for a possible A round, and a 
B to follow in the future, it should be examined what the benefit of the region is for the 
rounds. Data for the later rounds, C and D start to become unreliable, as for example the 
Nordic region experienced only one C-round and no D-rounds. 
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Table 4. Start-up seed round comparison. 
Round Nordic round 
size (million $) 
US round 
size (million 
$) 
Difference to 
US (million $) 
Percentage 
larger 
Seed 1,16 1,36 0,2 17,2 % 
Series A 5,6 6,9 1,3 23,2 % 
Series B 6,6 14,7 8,1 122,7 % 
 
In table 4 the round sizes of different levels of startup investment are evaluated. Firstly, 
the size of the given funding round, A or B, is shown for the Nordic region and next the 
same round size in the U.S. The following column shows the difference in size between 
the two regions. Lastly, the final column shows the percentage at which the U.S. round 
size is larger than the Nordic equivalent. It can be clearly seen that in the seed, A and B 
rounds it is beneficial to raise them in the U.S. This is a clearly quantifiable benefit the US 
funding market offers. 
 
Several parking companies have gathered interest from VCs’. The most high-profile cases 
to date are for so-called on-demand valet apps, which are used to summon a mobile valet, 
usually moving around with a scooter. They come and pick up a customer’s car at a user-
designated spot, and park their car. It is also returned to where the customer wishes. One 
of these, ZIRX, has raised 36.4 million dollars, while another company, Luxe has raised 
25.5 million from the U.S. (Crunchbase 2016.) Pango and Passport parking, two parking 
payment apps have raised 6.5 million and 7.54 million, respectively. (Crunchbase 2016.) 
 
Yet another type of parking app, parking reservation apps, have also done well. Their ser-
vice concentrates on applying the principles of the sharing economy into parking; with the 
service, one may either lease out their own space while not using it, or buy someone 
else’s.  ParkWhiz has raised 36 million dollars and SpotHero 27.5 million (Crunchbase 
2016). One parking hardware company, developer of parking sensors and software 
Streetline, raised 50 million before getting acquired by Kapsch Trafficom. (Thinking High-
ways, 2015.) 
 
These parking companies have been attractive to investors because the services they of-
fer are easy to grasp by anyone. They are extremely scalable and help in the mundane 
task of parking. They have also all concentrated on one core business area, be it on-de-
mand valet parking or parking payments on-streets. Witrafi has to figure out which angle 
to take in their U.S. expansion. Offering solutions in multiple business areas, even within 
  
77 
the relatively narrow parking service portfolio, may hinder Witrafi’s competitiveness in all 
the areas. It may also drain resources while trying to compete with the fierce competition. 
This could have disastrous results, and therefore concentrating on one core business 
within the parking sector is required. The best course of action would be to firstly study the 
U.S. market, probe the different angles and business models with VC:s, consultants and 
those who have seen startups rise and fall. Only then would Witrafi be ready to take the 
plunge to try and take on the highly competitive U.S. market. This process has its own 
costs, and it takes time, but it may prevent Witrafi from crashing and burning if they try to 
embark on multiple business areas. Careful consideration and focusing on the best busi-
ness area for Witrafi on the other hand may yield a very lucrative funding option through 
VC financing. 
 
6.3 What can different partnering arrangements offer to Witrafi in U.S. market en-
try? 
The partners are equally diverse as are the benefits they offer through their provided ser-
vices. The following will further illustrate what kinds of funding options there are to pursue 
internationalization, but also what kinds of services there are available. The following sub-
chapters contain options available from the Finnish government, its supported organiza-
tions and those start-up ecosystem participants that the authors of this research have 
identified as a potential partnering opportunities. The authors wish to first examine what 
exactly do the different organizations do, and then what could they provide for the case 
company. 
6.4 Team Finland 
Team Finland is a Finnish government network of trade promotion organizations. The net-
work promotes Finnish companies and country-brand abroad, works to maintain good 
trade relations with other countries, helps Finnish companies to internationalize and vice 
versa aims to attract foreign direct investments inward, into Finland. (Team Finland 2014) 
 
The objective of establishing this network was to improve coordination of government re-
sources and to increase accessibility to services. As of 2016 the Team Finland network 
consists of; Ministry of Employment and Economy (TEM), Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA), Ministry of Education and Culture, Finpro, Finnvera, Tekes, Finnish Industry In-
vestment, Finnfund, Finnpartnership, The Finnish Cultural and Academic Institutes, VTT, 
Centres for Economic Development, Transport and Environment (ELY centres) and Finn-
ish-Russian and Finnish-Swedish Chambers of Commerce. In the network the different 
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ministries have mostly a supporting role and the various organizations are responsible for 
providing the services. Ministry of Foreign Affairs works with companies in public affairs 
related issues through its network of embassies and consulates. (Team Finland 2014) 
 
Even though the organizations and services existed before the foundation of network, the 
services were scattered and companies found them difficult to use. With the renewed 
structure companies can simply call to a national service phone number to get things 
started. Currently there is 15 TF offices in Finland and in the autumn of 2016 Team Fin-
land House will be opened in Ruoholahti, Helsinki, further centralizing the service portfolio. 
Worldwide TF has teams in 70 locations. In the U.S.A. services are offered by the Em-
bassy in Washington D.C., by consulates in Los Angeles and New York and by Finpro and 
Tekes offices in multiple locations including Silicon Valley. (Team Finland 2014) 
 
Team Finland offers internationalization services to all Finnish companies regardless of 
their size and industry, but due to practical reasons the network has invested more capa-
bilities and organizational competencies in selected key sectors referred as ‘thematic pri-
orities’. In 2015 there were seven such sectors; cleantech, bioeconomy, ICT and digitali-
sation, healthcare, arctic competences, creative industries and education. Team Finland 
stresses different sectors in different locations depending on the business opportunities of 
the environment. In the United States TF focuses on; cleantech, healthcare and ICT/digi-
talization. This is potentially beneficial for Witrafi due to digitalization being a feature of 
their product. (Team Finland, 7/2014) 
 
Team Finland’s internationalization services are divided into six service categories (listed 
below). Selected services together with those TF organizations that provide the services 
are discussed more in-depth in following sub-chapters. 
 
- Advice 
- Helping companies to develop their internationalization strategy, offering of 
guidance and training on practical issues 
 
- Opportunities 
- Providing market information and helping companies to identify market op-
portunities 
 
- Networks 
- Helping companies to find key business partners and providing information 
on target market suppliers, service providers and buyers  
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- Visibility 
- Organizing trade missions abroad, renting premises for the purpose of 
trade promotion, supporting communication 
 
- Financing 
- Offering financing in the form of aid, grants, loans and guarantees 
 
- Public Affairs 
- Helping companies to communicate with foreign governments and officials, 
lobbying against trade barriers 
 
Because Team Finland organizations are government funded most of the services are 
free of charge to Finnish companies. In practice however, companies pay for the services 
indirectly by paying corporate taxes. In some instances the customer companies need to 
cover the costs of participation to certain growth-programs and pay for example rent of 
premises if such services are used. (Team Finland 2014) 
6.4.1 Centres for Economic Development, Transport and Environment  
The Centres for Economic Development, Transport and Environment (hereafter ELY cen-
tres) are regional administrative bodies operating under the Finnish Ministry of Employ-
ment and Economy (TEM). These centers, 15 of them, provide several services and han-
dle several governmental tasks which are grouped into 3 categories:  
 
• Business, industry, labor force, competence and cultural activities 
• Transport and infrastructure 
• Environment and natural resources 
 
(Centre for Economic Development 2015) 
 
ELY Services 
The ELY centres have different responsibility areas including supporting growth, develop-
ment and internationalization of Finnish SMEs. ELY centres are a part of Team Finland 
network and this sub-chapter introduces those TF services that fall under ELY centres’ re-
sponsibility.  
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ELY centres are in a way, the first contact point for TF services but their role as adminis-
trative body of TEM means that Witrafi is likely to collaborate with ELY in other areas of 
business as well. ELY counsels firms about different internationalization funding and mar-
ket opportunities. Before the start of internationalization process ELY can help a firm to 
determine which organizational areas are ready for internationalization and on the other 
hand, in which areas the organization needs further strengthening.  
 
In the theoretical framework where born-global companies were introduced, it was noted 
that many of them face challenges in managing the disparity between fast growth and in-
adequate resources, including human resources. ELY centres organize different manage-
rial and employee training events, courses and seminars that Witrafi could take an ad-
vantage of. Some of the training events are related to internationalization and occasionally 
ELY also organizes market specific courses. Even if the event is not directly related to in-
ternationalization, it can be beneficial to participate for the sake of organizational develop-
ment. ELY centre website has a calendar from where information about coming events 
can be found. Many of the events are free of charge but require prior enrolment.  
 
ELY funding 
Ely centers encompass the Employment and Economic Development Offices (TE Offices) 
as well, which deal with keeping employment high in Finland. They operate as a part of 
the Ministry of Employment and Economy. (TEM 2016) These centers are very important 
in keeping industrial activities booming in many parts of Finland, as they provide various 
incentives and subsidies to companies in order to make them interested in setting up busi-
ness within their jurisdiction. (ELY-keskus 2016b). 
 
While they are mainly concerned in keeping business in their respective jurisdictions, they 
have realized that to keep it there the companies must have a larger market than is locally 
available. Therefore the centers also promote going international. Their main international-
ization aid product is a Business Development subsidy, which is mainly aimed starting up, 
developing operations and growing the business. Great emphasis is taken in projects aim-
ing at internationalization. (Ely-Keskus 2016a). Witrafi has also applied for this funding op-
tion last year, but the project was deemed too small and the company to be in a too early 
stage to pursue the project further. It also has to be noted that these centres are given a 
yearly budget, each regional one with their own, so your funding decision will be highly de-
pendent on which region your company is situated in. Certain areas are more highly sub-
sidized than others in order to keep jobs in more rural areas of Finland. 
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This product is aimed at growing already existing business or starting to a grow com-
pletely new business area. There are 4 main ways proposed by ELY (2016a) to pursue 
such a goal in this funding product: 
• Internationalizing  
• Pursuing other new markets or business areas 
• Developing a new product or service 
• Developing production methods 
 
To receive this funding, certain steps must be taken. Since the funding is not aimed at 
funding existing operations, the project must be distinctly different from normal operations 
of the company and it must increase the corporation’s competitiveness. The applying 
company must provide a project plan (prior to starting the project) which includes planned 
activities with their schedule & budget in addition to the goals that the project in question 
would pursue; ELY officials can provide assistance in the planning phase. The funding 
may be used for project-related expenses only; these may include for example salaries of 
project workers and travel expense. The percentage of the project that ELY can fund is 50 
%, the other 50 % has to be provided by the company. (Ely-Keskus 2016a). 
6.4.2 Finpro Oy 
Finpro Oy is a government owned trade promotion organization and a member in Team 
Finland network. Finpro has three functions: Export Finland, Invest in Finland and Visit 
Finland, each specializing in different business sectors. Only Export Finland services are 
presented here as the other two functions are not relevant for Witrafi in internationaliza-
tion. 
 
Finpro has gone through major restructuring in recent years. First in 2002 the marketing 
related services were separated into a subsidiary and later in 2007 the marketing function 
was sold entirely. Finpro then focused on internationalization consultancy services that 
were partly funded by the government and partly by fees charged from customer compa-
nies. Finpro’s Navigator service concept, as it was called, included firm specific interna-
tionalization consulting that helped in every step of the internationalization. (Tukiainen, 
Mattila & Koria 2014) In 2014 Finpro however sold the commercial consulting service to 
Fintra, a subsidiary of Soprano which is the biggest private internationalization consul-
tancy service provider in Finland. Ever since the sale of consulting division Finpro services 
have been free of charge. Finpro now concentrates on the following TF service areas; 
market opportunities, advice, networks and visibility.   
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The authors interviewed Finpro’s senior consultant Hartti Suomela about Finpro’s role in 
the internationalization. It is clear that in Silicon Valley Finpro has a wide network of con-
tacts and a good sense of the local business environment, but limited resources to give 
guidance to individual firms. At the moment, Finpro’s Finland based services can offer 
more value to Witrafi. 
 
Finpro, together with ministries, organizes Team Finland business delegations to different 
locations around the world. The purpose is to promote Finnish companies and provide 
networking opportunities. Participation to the delegations is subject to a fee, and the au-
thors learned from Klyszeiko interview that such delegations are not necessarily very ef-
fective in the U.S. business environment. 
 
The interview with Siitonen revealed that company has been involved in Finpro’s Mobility 
as a Service –growth program (MaaS) since autumn of 2015. MaaS is a growth program 
for ICT-sector firms offering comprehensive internationalization related services. For 
Witrafi the program has offered only limited benefits so far, but according to Mr. Suomela 
the growth programs offer most of the Finpro and TF services in one package. Participa-
tion in MaaS can be encouraged as it simplifies Witrafi’s relationship with TF service pro-
viders’ considerably. Additionally one of the target markets of the program happens to be 
the U.S. which can prove to be a source of opportunities in the future. 
 
In addition to Finpro’s own services, it represents Enterprise Europe Network (EEN) in 
Finland. EEN is European Union’s key instrument to improve SME growth in EU and it is 
based on the co-operation of different trade supporting institutions in EU countries. EEN 
maintains a large business cooperation database which helps companies to find partner-
ship opportunities for internationalization. EEN also organizes business matchmaking 
events across Europe. (EEN 2016) 
 
A state-owned specialized financing company, Finnvera is geared to give loans to Finnish 
companies in order for them to grow faster and achieve international customers. As Finn-
vera (2016a) describes themselves, they are a specialized financing company owned by 
the State of Finland, providing its clients with loans, guarantees (Finnvera is the official 
Export Credit Agency of Finland), venture capital investments and export credit guaran-
tees. 
 
Finnvera exists as a government financier to support Finnish firms. They are less special-
ized on innovation activities, and are concentrated on funding any company with high 
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growth potential. (Finnvera 2016b). Finnvera has also been of great help to the case com-
pany, as Witrafi has been granted 3 loans by them of which 2 have already been paid off, 
however none of them have been targeted at internationalization efforts.  
 
Finnvera has a diverse palette of internationalization aids, including loans and guarantees. 
The basic loan and guarantee are for purposes of financing permanent activities abroad 
which are not equivalent to opening a normal sales office, but rather manufacturing or de-
veloping products and services. 
 
6.4.3 Finnish Industry Investment 
As their name suggests, Finnish Industry Investment (later referred to as FII) is a govern-
ment investment firm which invests in Finnish companies through private equity funds or 
directly. They describe themselves as “a government-owned investment company promot-
ing Finnish business, employment and economic growth through venture capital and pri-
vate equity investments. (Finnish Industry Investment 2016a). 
 
The consensus of the previously introduced governmental organizations has been to in-
vest in internationalization efforts as they help business grow. Naturally FII is also invest-
ing in firms with growth potential, and they have also recognized that internationalizing is 
the way to achieve high growth rates. 
 
Their investment focus, when speaking about individual companies, is on “in companies in 
growth and internationalisation phases. We increase the availability of risk financing for 
innovative growth companies and boost their chances of succeeding in international mar-
kets.” (Finnish Industry investment 2016b) 
 
Their investment size is typically 0.5 to 10 million euros. This amount is quite large on the 
Finnish scale, therefore it is clear that in order for a company to secure funding from them, 
they have been established for some time and have high growth potential. They do not 
fund early-stage startups, but rather more stable businesses. (Finnish Industry investment 
2016b). 
6.4.4 The Ministry of Employment and Economy 
TEM, as it is abbreviated (per the Finnish name Työ ja Elinkeinoministeriö), also promotes 
internationalization through services and funding for small- and medium-sized companies. 
As there are already various governmental institutions for funding individual companies’ 
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projects, TEM promotes projects that have multiple participants; at least four are required. 
The funding can be up to 50 % of the total costs associated with a project. In contrast to 
ELY-projects, as this funding is aimed at funding efforts of multiple companies, you may 
mainly pay outside consultants to coordinate e.g. exports or make market analyses. It is 
also possible to plan and execute mutually beneficial trade fair excursions or the like. 
(TEM 2016). 
6.4.5 Tekes 
The Finnish Funding Agency for Innovation (Tekes) is a government agency that provides 
funding to many public and private sector research and development institutions. Tekes 
has also an important role as internationalization funding source. As a member of Team 
Finland it collaborates closely with the other TF organizations and has an office in Silicon 
Valley. Furthermore Tekes runs internationalization related programs and campaigns that 
could benefit Witrafi in the future. (Tekes 2016a) 
 
Future Watch - program researches future market opportunities in different industries and 
locations, including in the U.S. The program publishes location specific research reports 
about future trends and developments in different sectors. The results help Finnish com-
panies to adjust their operations accordingly. (Tekes 2016j) 
 
Global Access Program (GAP) provides Finnish SMEs custom made business plans for 
the U.S. market entry. The business plans are prepared by UCLA Anderson MBA-degree 
students over the course of the six month program. The business plan includes compre-
hensive feasibility analyses and market studies. Once the program concludes the MBA-
students give their recommendations to the companies. Currently Witrafi does not fulfil the 
financial requirements of participation, but the program is something that Witrafi should be 
aware of. (Tekes 2016j) 
 
Tekes funding 
Tekes funds companies in various stages of development, concentrating especially on in-
novation as per the name of organization. Tekes describe themselves as being the most 
important publicly funded expert organization for financing research, development and in-
novation in Finland, boosting wide-ranging innovation activities in research communities, 
industry and service sectors. (Tekes 2016a). Tekes divides their funding (Tekes 2016b) 
for startups into three main categories, which can be completed in order (from one to 
three) or not: 
 
1. Planning for global growth 
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• Customer need 
• Target market 
• Concept testing 
• Team building 
 
2. R&D funding 
• Developing the product 
 
3. Young innovative companies funding 
• Rapid global growth and business development 
 
The government has recognized the Finnish companies’ ability to provide the world with 
innovative solutions and their employment potential. Tekes is naturally a prime source of 
funding for startups. For the case company Tekes has given financial support in two pro-
jects, over a period of nearly three years. This has amounted to about 45 % of Witrafi’s 
external funding. This Tekes is a natural choice to start the examination of the internation-
alization funding opportunities. 
 
Tekes has two funding schemes which are partially, or completely aimed at internationali-
zation; “Planning for global growth” and “Funding for young innovative companies”. One 
typical decision factor for Tekes is whether a company can internationalize (Tekes 2016c). 
Therefore the option to use Tekes funding towards that aim is built-in to their funding 
schemes. To harness the full economic potential of the innovation, it must be also sold 
abroad to reach a larger market. 
Planning for global growth is a type of funding that is very beneficial for the company, as it 
carries a high-percentage grant, meaning a large portion of the project is funded by a 
grant. The grant is of the de minimis-type.  This funding is divided by Tekes (2016d) into 
two types according to the size of the company: 
1. If the company is “small in size”, (under five years old) and if the company’s busi-
ness idea is novel, carrying a believable chance of international success. These 
type of companies can receive up to 50 000 € in a form of a grant (maximum pro-
ject size thus 66 600 €). While the grant may entitle the company to pay only 25 % 
of the project with its own money, to protect the company’s survival they must 
prove that they have their own funding for at least 50 % of the project size. 
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2. Small and medium-sized companies which have internationalization aspirations 
and have formulated a preliminary plan for internationalization. They may get 50 % 
of the project as a grant, and up to 60 % of this amount may be paid up front, after 
the funding decision. The maximum funding is 100 000 € (thus maximum project 
size is 200 000 €). 
The “funding for young innovative companies”, or YIC funding, is a highly selective Tekes-
program meant for startups that have already succeeded to a certain extent. Since the in-
ception of the program in 2008, 270 companies have been take into the program, but only 
75 have gone through it completely. (Tekes 2016e) 
General requirements for the funding are similar to the “Planning for global growth” fund-
ing option. The company has to be under five years of age, it has to have less than 50 
employees, less than 10 million € turnover or less than 10 million € final balance. At least 
10 % of all current business costs must be geared towards R&D, and the resulting or used 
IPR must be under the ownership of the company. The company also has to be independ-
ent, and e.g. not formed through a merger. The company also cannot have distributed 
profits. (Tekes 2016f). 
It is also extensive in many respects, as the Tekes material (Tekes 2016g) describes: 
firstly, it is divided into three steps of funding. In each of which you need to satisfy certain 
requirements (set individually for each case) to qualify for the next. The total funding may 
amount to 1.25 Million €, of which 500 000 € is grant money and 750 000 € loaned. Tekes 
funding may only amount to 75 % of the total project cost, therefore the company must 
also supply around 417 000 € on its own or through outside investments. This brings the 
total project size to 1.67 million €. The following is a description of the three individual 
phases, their funding amounts and durations, along with broad themes/purposes for each 
phase (Tekes 2016g): 
1. 250 000 € grant, 6-12 months duration 
a. High growth and showing competitiveness in the global market 
b. Emphasis on global marketing and sales 
c. Strengthening organization with necessary talent 
2. 250 000 € grant, similar duration 
a. Speeding growth and internationalization 
b. Gain outside investment 
c. Develop growth strategy, processes and the organization to support scala-
bility 
3. 750 000 € loan, similar duration 
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a. Show the sustainability of the business 
b. Increasing growth through private & public funding 
The requirements in qualifying for each successive phase are generally based on busi-
ness development, opening new markets, securing more funding and bolstering re-
sources. Tekes sets these limits through their analysis of the company and its business.  
6.4.6 Team Finland network as a partnering opportunity for Witrafi (services) 
The starting point for assessment of TF as a service provider partnering opportunity is that 
Witrafi has limited financial resources and Team Finland (TF) services are mostly free. 
Witrafi therefore cannot afford to rule out using TF services. Also, the interview with Witrafi 
CEO Sampsa Siitonen revealed that Witrafi has already collaborated with a number of TF 
organizations and Witrafi is also participating in Mobility as a Service (MaaS) program. 
 
The question is to what extent the services can be utilized and how to use them wisely, so 
that the collaboration creates value for Witrafi. Also, research of Rasmussen & Madsen 
(2002, 17) which although refers to a Danish study, raises alarming questions about trade 
promotion agencies willingness and capability to work with “born-globals” such as Witrafi. 
Rasmussen & Madsen write that in a study concerning Danish born-global firms’ interna-
tionalization, not a single firm received monetary or any other type of help from Danish 
trade promotion agency. According to Rasmussen & Madsen: “the reason was clearly that 
the Born Global did not fit the mental picture of the persons responsible for helping firms 
to internationalize”. (2002, 17) Authors of this research did not find any evidence of such 
occurring in Finland, in fact at least Suomela seemed more than eager to work with firms 
that identify as born-globals. The work of Rasmussen & Madsen is already quite old, so it 
may be that the attitude towards born-globals has since changed. 
 
It is worth remembering that Team Finland services are government funded. This can be 
seen as an advantage or a disadvantage. On one hand, the services are safe to use and 
there is a low risk of scams, disputes and misunderstandings. On the other, government 
policies change, and so does the funding and quality of such services. When it comes to 
Witrafi, public entrepreneurial and internationalization policies are of interest. In theoretical 
framework it was stated that Autio (2015a) sees that traditional public policy view on en-
trepreneurship does not mix well with entrepreneurial ecosystems (e.g. Silicon Valley), 
and that public actors have difficulties spotting market failures in such environments. Au-
thors of this research understand that Autio referred to each country’s policies toward their 
own entrepreneurial ecosystems, but the point is still valid from the part that entrepreneur-
ial policies lack clarity and that TF too, probably suffers from uncertain environment. 
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Nevertheless research of Autio (2015b) and his colleague has presented evidence that at 
least Finnish “Young Innovative Firms” –program, introduced previously, has generated 
real value. According to Autio for every one euro invested, the program has generated 
1.11 euros of value. Confirming that such programs can be profitable from public policy 
view. When it comes to Finnish government’s policies on internationalization, Mr. Suomela 
(interview) said that he sees the current position as stable, even favorable towards Team 
Finland. However, he was a bit skeptical about the current “hype” of export promotion be-
ing one of the key projects (kärkihanke in Finnish) of current government, and called it pol-
iticians’ language.  
 
Networking theory of internationalization introduced three “ways” how internationalization 
happens using networks; international extension, penetration and integration. Witrafi can 
use TF services in “extension”, in developing relationships relative to Silicon Valley. Team 
Finland has a presence on location and an excellent local market knowledge. Suomela 
told that his years of experience in Silicon Valley have increased his understanding of 
“best practices” in the U.S. market entry. He can help in “connecting the dots”, which is 
obviously very important aspect of building new network relationships and potentially a 
time saving measure for Witrafi. From network theory’s perspective it seems that the rela-
tionship between Team Finland and Witrafi is more useful and formal in market extension, 
but in international penetration the relationship would be more informal due to Team Fin-
land’s limited resources in the U.S.  
 
Suomela’s interview confirmed that in Silicon Valley Finpro can offer only limited consult-
ing to individual firms. Thus, Finpro services are perhaps most useful before internationali-
zation has begun, after which the funding continues to be a factor but the services less so. 
Finpro is in a process of hiring a second consultant to Silicon Valley, but it is likely that the 
hiring will not change the fact that Finpro does not offer firm specific business model con-
sultation. Regardless, publicly funded organizations are a big collaborative opportunity for 
Witrafi because their sole purpose of existence is to advance Finnish economy and busi-
ness. It is in their interest that Witrafi succeeds and creates jobs.  
 
Authors asked from Suomela about his (and Team Finland’s) experience working with 
Finnish start-ups and other SMEs, and he said that he has worked with many start-ups. In 
fact, majority of TF clients are actually SMEs. The stage of start-up doesn’t determine 
whether it can use TF services and receive funding, although certain programs have con-
ditions that have to be met. Suomela pointed out that in some cases the amount of guid-
ance he has given to a start-up has been minimal. This would suggest that some start-ups 
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have previously deemed Finpro as unsuitable partnering opportunity, or that there are per-
haps other better opportunities available. When asked, Suomela could not provide an ex-
act number of Finnish start-ups currently doing business in Silicon Valley. He said that a 
number of them have virtual offices there and shuttle between Finland and Silicon Valley 
regularly.  
 
Although Team Finland services are nominally “free”, they are paid indirectly via taxes and 
are of more limited in scope versus paid consultancy services. In using the services 
Witrafi would have to take into account the opportunity cost, at least when it comes to time 
management and focus. Concentrating too much on Team Finland and ignoring other col-
laboration opportunities would be a mistake. Additionally, it has to be said that the U.S. 
business environment is very different from that of India or China. For example participa-
tion in a government trade delegation is not an effective way to conduct business in the 
U.S. (Klyszeiko interview).  
 
It can be said that Team Finland from the part of services is a noteworthy partner for 
Witrafi in internationalization, as long as Witrafi understands the limitations of relationship. 
It is advisable to continue being active member of MaaS program, which can prove to be 
valuable source of market knowledge and insight for Witrafi. Mr. Suomela stressed that 
reactiveness is important, Witrafi is “competing” with other Finnish companies for his and 
his colleagues’ time. He is always open to advice Finnish companies in the U.S. as much 
as he can, and as has been mentioned, he knows a lot about practical issues affecting 
Finnish businesses. It is advisable for Witrafi to contact Mr. Suomela about potential part-
ners in Silicon Valley and ask if he knows something or can refer to someone who can 
give their expert opinion. In theoretical framework it was mentioned that for start-ups ‘trust’ 
is important and that to fulfil the conditions of trust in relationship building, an intermediary 
can be used. In Silicon Valley Witrafi could potentially utilize TF as an intermediary. While 
working for the U.S. Commercial Service Matilainen experienced how some U.S. busi-
nesses used USCS as an intermediary when entering the Finnish market. This would sug-
gest that the use of government services is not entirely foreign in the U.S. business envi-
ronment, and can in fact increase the trust between foreign business parties. 
 
Having a trade facilitator network that can give guidance on internationalization and has 
an extensive service portfolio is not a given. Many Finnish companies still remain unaware 
of Team Finland services as experienced first handed by author (Matilainen) while work-
ing in the U.S. Embassy. Inquiries from Finnish SMEs were regular and often concerned 
issues that are the core of Team Finland services. Knowing who to contact saves every-
one’s time. 
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6.4.7 Assessment of Team Finland funding options 
Firstly, there are clearly unsuitable choices in the domestically available government-
backed funding options. These are mainly Finnpartnership, Finnfund and Finnish Industry 
Investment. The first two cannot be considered as they deal only with projects that are tar-
geted at developing markets, not developed ones, which the U.S. indeed is. Finnish In-
dustry Investment on the other hand invests only in more stable businesses, and not 
early-stage startups. Therefore the more suitable choices are Tekes, ELY, TEM and Finn-
vera. Their funding options can be seen below in the table 5. 
 
Table 5. Funding options of various Team Finland organizations. 
 
Entity Entity type Product Funding 
Type 
Total pro-
ject size 
(1000 €) 
Own 
equity 
Tekes Innovation 
Funding 
agency 
Young Innovative 
Companies funding 
Grant + loan 1 667 25 % 
Tekes Innovation 
Funding 
agency 
Planning for global 
growth 
Grant <100 25 % 
or 50 
% 
Finnvera Financial insti-
tution 
Loan Loan N/A N/A 
Finnvera Financial insti-
tution 
Guarantee Guarantee N/A N/A 
Finnvera Financial insti-
tution 
Export guarantee Insurance for 
export trad-
ing 
N/A N/A 
ELY Government 
bureau 
Business develop-
ment funding 
Grant 50 % 50 % 
TEM Ministry Internationalization 
funding 
Grant 50 % 50 % 
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Out of these options, Witrafi is not eligible for the guarantees given out by Finnvera. 
Mainly because of the nature of the operations Witrafi would carry out; they would not 
necessarily be direct exports. 
 
Finnvera’s loans on the other hand, are a very suitable option for Witrafi if this kind of fi-
nancing is required. Their site states that they charge interest by a combination of refer-
ence (viitekorko) and margin rates, in addition to a delivery fee for funding granted. Witrafi 
has an already established relationship with Finnvera, with three loans given and two paid 
back. It is likely that Finnvera is one likely funding choice for Witrafi, because of the low 
interest rates and Finnvera’s friendliness towards internationalization projects.  
 
Tekes is also a previous funder of Witrafi. Having participated in two projects to date, the 
last one still ongoing. If the current project ends well, then Witrafi is poised in a position 
where it could apply for more Tekes-funding with continuously favorable results from pre-
vious projects, and have a high likelihood of succeeding in applying for the next funding. 
 
The smaller of Tekes’ two internationalization-headed programs is the “Planning for 
global growth” program. It can yield up to 50 000 € as the Tekes-funded 75 % of the pro-
ject, whereas the rest 25 % has to come from the company itself. This is a very cost-effec-
tive and risk-averse way to probe into internationalization due to the cost for the company 
being minimal. 
 
The funding is of the so-called de minimis-type. It has a restriction for the amount availa-
ble to companies, 200 000 € per 3 consecutive accounting periods. Witrafi has exhausted 
this limit, and only in 2017 would they be applicable to more. Therefore this funding option 
is unavailable to the company. 
 
The funding for young innovative companies, or YIC funding, on the other hand does not 
have this restriction. The size of those projects are larger as well: up to 500 000 € grant 
and 750 000 € loan. The funding is meant for “rapid business development” (TEKES on 
their website). Internationalization is a natural part of this development, while development 
in other areas are also expected by Tekes. Due to Witrafi’s previous relationship with 
Tekes, venturing into the YIC funding is a natural step for them. They have also previously 
embarked on two projects of the R&D-type funding with Tekes, and once they are suc-
cessfully completed, they point Witrafi towards the YIC funding. For starters, Witrafi would 
have to acquire at least 107 000 € to match the 25 % funding requirement of funding in 
the first phase, which is 250 000 € from Tekes, 75 % of the project. Total project size 
would then be 357 000 €. Witrafi is not yet profitable, so 50 % of this would likely be spent 
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on wages and other employment expenses of the existing employees. Another 25 % 
would go into other R&D expenses and possible new personnel. The resulting 25 %, how-
ever, may be used towards internationalization, possibly even fully. This comes to around 
90 000 €, and could include travelling internationally to trade fairs, conventions and other 
events for networking and hunting for local partners.  
 
ELY-keskus offers its business development funding to companies seeking to internation-
alize, and the 50 % of the project it pays for with their grant is a good start to international-
ization. This funding however is also restricted with de minimis-rules, therefore, as with 
the “planning for global growth funding”, it is inaccessible to Witrafi for now. 
 
Finnish industrial investment funds companies with a steadfast internationalization 
plan, but generally not startups. They concentrate on more stable businesses. While the 
investment size is 0.5-10 million €, something Witrafi is looking for, Witrafi is not in the 
stage of its life where the more risk-averse Finnish industrial investment would invest in 
them. After the internationalization planned and when steady cash flow from it can be 
achieved, they may be a more feasible option, and planning to satisfy their requirements 
could be a goal to reach as the company matures. 
 
The Ministry of Employment and Economy funds projects strictly in conjunction with 
other companies. The modus operandi is to gather at least 4 companies interested in an 
internationalization project, find a consultancy agency for the companies to work with, and 
fund the collective project. It is difficult to say how much the funding would be, as it differs 
case by case. There is also usually an intermediary that handles the project’s budgeting, 
payments and negotiations, so the other participating companies don’t need to. When 
Witrafi participated in such a project of internationalization into France, they paid 40 % of 
the costs (10 000 €) and TEM 60 % (15 000 €). Now the grant percentage is 50 %, and 50 
% has to come from the company itself. It is however difficult to plan the project ahead, 
the project to France was one year in duration, but the intensity of the project is not high. If 
there is a program targeted towards the U.S. during the time Witrafi plans to execute their 
internationalization, then it is highly recommended to take this option as it is not restricted 
by de minimis regulations and can yield excellent results due to expert help in the center 
of this funding scheme. Among other fundable expenses are trips abroad aiming to meet 
foreign business partners or visit a conference, to give examples. Such a trip to the U.S. 
could be planned by Witrafi through first using a consultancy agency to find suitable 
events and partners along with a market study, and then visit the U.S. for meetings and 
networking. 
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6.5 Trade Supporting Institutions and service providers  
Trade Supporting Institutions (TSI) operate much in the same way as trade promotion or-
ganizations, introduced in key concepts, do. The difference being that TPOs are official 
government funded agencies whereas the term TSI covers also independent business as-
sociations and institutions. Although TSIs often charge for services by requiring a mem-
bership, their independence from government can be a good thing for the quality of ser-
vices. (DMI Associates for WTO 2006, 5) 
6.5.1 AmCham Finland 
Amcham Finland is a non-governmental, non-profit B2B network based in Helsinki. Am-
cham is entirely funded by membership fees, which guarantees its financial independ-
ence. Amcham supports the business development and growth of its membership organi-
zations. It offers a range of business services and programs, provides networking opportu-
nities and works to maintain favorable market conditions by engaging with decision mak-
ers. Recently Amcham Finland opened an office in New York, further improving its net-
work in the United States. Amcham has approximately 375 membership companies of all 
sizes from start-ups to multinationals and although independent, it works together with a 
network of some 40 Amchams around the world. (Klyszeiko interview) 
 
Amcham encourages its member organizations to get to know each other which increases 
the effectiveness of networking. Also, Amcham plays an active role in business match-
making by for example publishing articles about its members via social media platforms. 
Such promotion can lead to surprising partnership opportunities as Amcham reaches busi-
ness decision makers directly. (Klyszeiko interview) 
 
The authors interviewed Mr. Mike Klyszeiko who is the founder and director of 
LaunchpadUSA program in Amcham. LaunchpadUSA supports the U.S. market entry of 
Finnish companies by providing expert assistance in all stages of internationalization. The 
program assists its members in breaking into the market, supports in scaling of the busi-
ness and guides through the process of establishing market presence. The cost of Am-
cham membership for Witrafi would be 3,500 euros annually, which although for Witrafi a 
considerable sum of money, could offer more sustainable access to the U.S. market.  
 
LaunchpadUSA is always running meaning there is no program length. Mr. Klyszeiko 
stressed that internationalization is a lengthy process and that time constrained programs 
can offer less value. Amcham has worked with a number of Finnish companies that have 
successfully completed the market entry, thus they have knowledge about what works and 
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what does not. According to Mr. Klyszeiko, Launchpad helps in “laying the foundation” for 
the market entry. They can give advice on market conditions, visa requirements, risks and 
sales and marketing (Amcham). In addition to the expert advice and market entry plan-
ning, the program can offer targeted networking in all fields of business.  
 
One of the more concrete benefits Launchpad can offer to participants is access to a vir-
tual offices. Virtual offices are a low cost, low risk way of increasing market presence and 
credibility in the U.S. The arrangement provides a firm with U.S. mailing address and tele-
phone number and gives the appearance that a firm has presence in the location of the 
office, although no actual office space exists. In Amcham’s case, the program participants 
also have (a limited) access to actual office space where meetings can be scheduled. For 
Witrafi it is a downside that Amcham Finland’s U.S. operations are based in East Coast. 
6.5.2 Other trade promotion agencies 
Traditional Chambers of Commerce (CoC) are of limited help for Witrafi in internationaliza-
tion. Nevertheless they are a source of international trade information and provide some 
services that Witrafi may need at some point in time. The Finnish Chamber of Commerce 
(FinnCham) is the national level CoC in Finland whereas Helsinki Region CoC would be 
the contact point for Witrafi. The annual membership fee of Helsinki CoC is 198 euros and 
joining would make Witrafi eligible for discounts on CoC services, including granting and 
confirmation of trade documents, and on CoC training events and seminars. (Kauppaka-
mari.fi, 2016) 
 
U.S. Commercial Service (USCS) is the American counterpart agency for Finpro. The 
Finnish section operates out of U.S. Embassy Helsinki and although they work mainly with 
the U.S. companies and their subsidiaries, they also organize events, participate in trade 
fairs and work to maintain good U.S. - Finnish business relations. USCS can offer little to 
Finnish start-ups but if Witrafi was to receive an invitation to one of their events, participa-
tion can be strongly encouraged.  USCS does work with Finnish companies too, but those 
are big FDI investors or established corporations, (Finnair, Wärtsilä, Vaisala, Nokia etc.) 
with large U.S. divisions. 
 
Finnish American Chamber of Commerce (FACC) is the representative of Finnish CoC in 
the United States and it operates in many regions across the country. FACC’s New York 
and Florida branches are “most active”, some of the other branches no-longer seem to up-
date their websites. For Witrafi FACC is of little to no value, but if need to contact arises, 
Amcham represents FACC in Finland. 
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6.5.3 Legal advice 
Hiring of a good lawyer or a law-firm is one of the first steps a Finnish company should do 
when entering the U.S. market (Laitinen 2007, 34). Before or right after entering into the 
U.S., Witrafi is likely to need legal advice in:  
 
− Immigration issues 
− Non-disclosure agreements 
− Contract negotiations 
− Due-diligence of prospective U.S. partners 
− Financial instrument usage (i.e. using debt-equity financing) 
− Intellectual property right issues  
− and in incorporation process of U.S. subsidiary  
 
Later, legal services might be needed in various scenarios such as; tax advice, transfer 
pricing, dispute settlements and in hiring of new employees and company representatives.  
  
According to the interviews conducted by authors, it is of utmost importance that the se-
lection process of legal professional(s) is done properly. The selected lawyer or law-firm 
should have experience in international trade, know the business environment of the loca-
tion and be familiar with the industry and state-level regulations. It is also worth remem-
bering that law-firms often have wide contact networks and good business understanding. 
Depending on the closeness of relationship, the client may be able to utilize law-firm’s ex-
pertise also in other business issues.  
 
Amcham’s Klyszeiko stressed in the interview that saving money on the legal advice is not 
wise. He pointed out that even if incorporation can be done remotely and inexpensively by 
using internet agents, the results of such services are often bad and end up being more 
expensive in the end. According to Bureau of Labor Statistics, the median hourly wage of 
legal occupations in San Francisco area was $67 in 2014, whereas the hourly billing rate 
of legal services for businesses in the area was between $293 and $408 in 2015 (Up-
Counsel). It is however difficult to draw conclusions from statistics. Many law-firms charge 
less from start-ups in hope of developing longer-term customer relationship. Research in-
dicated that many law-firms also provide couple hours’ worth of free counselling for start-
ups. Finpro’s Suomela noted in an interview that some law-firms may offer to exchange 
legal services for equity, but he did not say whether such deal is advisable or not.  
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Giving specific advice on possible candidates in this thesis is not reasonable, but both the 
Amcham and Team Finland can give references of those law-firms and lawyers that have 
successfully worked with Finnish companies in the past. In case Witrafi was to join Am-
cham LaunchpadUSA-program it would be entitled to one hour of free legal advice. Like-
wise many other start-up programs include legal counselling.  
6.5.4 Banking, Accounting & Consulting 
The services of banks, consultants and accounting firms are not a primary concern for 
Witrafi in internationalization, but it is likely that some of their services need to be used in 
the process. Thus selected aspects of said services are covered. 
 
The use of banking services is not necessarily required until there is a longer term com-
mitment to establish a local presence and there is cash-flow needs from Witrafi’s Finnish 
account to the U.S. or need for U.S. credit. The use of bank loans for the purpose of fi-
nancing the internationalization is demarcated out of this research because they were 
deemed unsuitable for start-up funding. In banking services California Governor’s Office 
(2012, 28) recommends using a bank that has affiliation with a bank in the home country 
of service user’s as this can ease the international transactions. Also, prior to opening a 
bank account in California Witrafi would have to register to conduct business in the state, 
register fictitious business name and acquire employer identification number (2012, 28). 
However it is worthwhile considering using any of Silicon Valley’s number of local banks 
(e.g. Silicon Valley Bank) that have specialized in high-tech start-ups and have a lot of ex-
perience working with foreign start-ups relocating to the Valley. Additionally, Witrafi should 
consider factors such as access, fees and services provided before committing to be a 
customer of a certain bank. Similarly as in the selection of a law-firm, the hidden services 
such as potential new contacts should also be considered. 
 
The use for an accountant likewise is limited in the internationalization process. However 
in case Witrafi decides to incorporate a U.S. subsidiary it would have to consider consult-
ing an accountant. According to Rapo & Seulamo-Vargas (2010, 40) Finnish companies 
mostly outsource accounting and use accounting services for filing federal and state taxa-
tion and in handling of employee payroll and benefit issues. CostHelper estimates that the 
cost of accounting services for preparation of financial statements is $75-600. Laitinen 
(2007, 93) writes that contrary to Finland, the U.S. does not require annual auditing from 
corporations, but that some kind of financial statements need to be prepared for taxation 
purposes. Also noteworthy is that the U.S. follows GAAP standards for accounting, as op-
posed to globally used IFRS. When consulting a U.S. accountant Witrafi should be aware 
that there are certified public accountants (CPA) who are licensed by the state and non-
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CPA accountants in the market, only CPAs can prepare audited financial statements 
(CostHelper).  
 
When it comes to consultants, there are two different types that could be used in interna-
tionalization, management consultants and local consultants that represent the company 
(Rapo & Seulamo-Vargas 2010, 32). As discussed previously, in Silicon Valley Team Fin-
land and Finpro can’t offer firm specific consulting but they can recommend private con-
sulting firms. A Finnish consulting firm named Fintra (part of Soprano Group) is special-
ised in international expansion and continuum of Finpro’s closed consulting arm. The use 
of consultants has several disadvantages for a start-up. Firstly, they cost money that 
Witrafi does not necessarily have at the moment. Unfortunately it is impossible to give ex-
act figures as for how much the use of such services would cost as they are negotiable. 
Secondly, Klyszeiko (interview) discouraged the use of consultants in U.S. market entry, 
or at least over relying on such services, as according to him a firm would have to go to 
the target market in any case.  
6.6 Silicon Valley start-up ecosystem –partnering opportunities 
This chapter thoroughly examines what the participants of the Silicon Valley startup eco-
system concretely are. The entities themselves are described in conjunction to the oppor-
tunities they provide. Of course, the partners have been delimited to opportunities availa-
ble to pursue for a startup such as the case company. 
6.6.1 Investors 
The stage which Witrafi resides in its operations currently is a phase where during this 
year, they should gain increasingly more customers but also secure more funding to con-
tinue its R&D efforts on a scale it wishes to keep them. In the startup world, this next 
round could be designated as a Series A round. This is a financing round done after the 
pre-seed and seed investment rounds, and it is usually larger than the previous rounds. 
This round still carries a high level of risk for the investor, because rarely at this stage is 
the company profitable but it carries a promise only of immense profits. Of course, the risk 
is less than in previous rounds, but here the amount of financing too is larger. (In-
vestopedia 2016f). The financing is usually given through an offering of preferred stock, 
which in contrast to common stock, usually carries extra benefits for the investor in ques-
tion; these may for example include anti-dilution clauses. (Investopedia 2016b) With this 
round, the valuation of the company should also rise.  
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6.6.2 Incubator and accelerator programs 
Incubator and accelerator programs are start-up ecosystem organizations, classified as 
support services/systems in various theoretical models, such as “eight pillars” introduced 
in theoretical framework. Here they are first introduced and then discussed on a general 
level. Appendices provides a closer look to selected programs. 
 
What is an incubator program? 
The International Business Innovation Association (InBIA) defines business incubators as 
programs that nurture the development of entrepreneurial companies in their start-up pe-
riod. Incubators provide startups with business support services and resources that help 
them to survive the uncertainties of startup period. The goal is that ultimately the startup 
becomes self-sufficient. According to InBia there is over 1250 (2012) incubators in the 
United States alone, most (93%) operating as non-profit organizations. (InBia 2016)  
 
Albert and Gaynor (2006, 133) write that incubators are embedded to their social, cultural 
and economic environments which explains why incubators in different locations may spe-
cialize on certain business sectors. Incubators in Silicon Valley are likelier to focus on 
high-tech than traditional manufacturing. Still, according to InBIA 58 percent of the U.S. 
based incubators work with a mixed group of startups whereas only 37 percent have fo-
cused solely on technology startups. 
 
Incubators offer both tangible and intangible benefits for incubatees. The tangible benefits 
often include access to accommodation and support services whereas access to 
knowledge, heightened confidence, increased credibility and companionship are exam-
ples of intangible benefits (Albert & Gaynor 2006, 133). The term incubator is however so 
loosely defined that it is difficult to generalize what are the definite benefits. Virtual incuba-
tor programs for example do not provide accommodation, but they are nevertheless con-
sidered to be incubators. (InfoDev 2011, 21). 
 
Non-profit incubator programs such as those run by national development agencies and 
public research centers often have objectives such as; creating jobs, developing economy 
and executing key public policies e.g. supporting the growth of an industry. Additionally, 
non-profit incubators may wish to support commercialization of products and development 
of entrepreneurial spirit in their communities. Among other things, public incubators can 
offer credibility, seed capital and linkages to national and international programs to the in-
cubatees. (Albert & Gaynor 2006, 135) 
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Private incubators such as corporate entities may be motivated by profit or they may seek 
access to new technologies. Sometimes incubation programs are used as a tool to de-
velop entrepreneurial culture and innovative “drive” within organizer’s own organization. 
Private incubators too, contribute by helping incubatees in various ways; they can help in 
product and market testing, give IPR advice, offer financial resources and provide a route 
to commercial markets. (Albert & Gaynor 2006, 135) 
 
What is an accelerator program? 
Accelerators are programs that much like incubators, support startup companies in their 
early stages. Although many of the services offered by accelerators are same or similar 
with those of incubators’, some distinct features exist. Cohen (2013, 21) writes that incu-
bators tend to provide startups with time and room to grow whereas accelerators speed 
up the market interaction. The duration of programs is often cited as a major difference, 
accelerators are much shorter one to three months, compared to one to five years of incu-
bator programs (Dempwolf, Auer & D’Ippolito. 2014).  
 
Dempwolf & al. (2014, 20) have identified six different types of organizations that offer ac-
celerator programs; incubators, venture development organizations, universities, proof-of-
concept centers, corporations and innovation minded for-profit organizations (innovation 
accelerators). The objectives of all but innovation accelerators are mostly aligned with 
those of incubators’ (introduced previously). For research purposes only innovation accel-
erators are discussed in here.  
 
Innovation accelerators, also known as seed-accelerators, have a simple business model. 
First, they selectively accept a group of promising startups, mostly from the field of tech-
nology. The group of startups, known as cohorts, is then typically given a seed of $18,000 
- $25,000 each, in exchange for equity stake of usually between 4-8 percent (Dempwolf & 
al. 2014, 10). Cohen (2013, 22) suggests that the fact that accelerator invest their own 
capital to the startups can lead to a closer and stronger relationship than in the case of in-
cubators. The managers of accelerator programs also often have previous entrepreneurial 
and angel investor experience themselves, which can help them to understand the 
startups better (Cohen 2013, 22).  
 
Over the course of the accelerator program the group, which often develops a strong ca-
maraderie (Cohen, 2013, 22), is provided with services and mentoring geared towards 
fast development of product and business model. Upon completion of the program a pub-
lic “demo-day” or a pitching event may be held to find additional investors for the startups 
(InBIA). For the organizer the group of startups represents a portfolio which diversifies 
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risk. Even if some of the startups end up being failures, the organizers can expect a mini-
mum acceptable return on investment (Dempwolf & al. 2014, 15).  
 
In addition to the intense mentoring, the accelerators provide the participating startups 
with wide networks. Baird, Bowles & Lall (2013, 15) surveyed 52 programs and most had 
a formal partnerships with one or more of the following groups: corporations, universities, 
investors, foundations and governments. According to the same research 98% of the sur-
veyed programs offered access to potential investors and 66% provided post-program 
support at no cost. Cohen (2013, 21) however reminds that graduation from acceleration 
program does not guarantee success for a startup, rather it speeds up the business cycle, 
leading to a faster success or failure.  
Incubators and accelerators as a partnering opportunity 
San Francisco Bay Area is home to a large number of incubator and accelerator pro-
grams. Preliminary scanning of programs indicated that whether a program is called ‘incu-
bator’ or ‘accelerator’ is less important. Many of the programs use mixed names or deny 
being one or another altogether. Regardless of the name used, the programs’ value prop-
osition to start-ups is similar and clear, they help start-ups to achieve growth by providing 
support services and access to mentoring. Here both type of programs are discussed to-
gether and some of the differences are compared when appropriate. 
 
The word ‘acceleration’ of course means to speed up, and if somewhere, in Silicon Valley 
acceleration of start-up cycles is embraced. It is also linked to the lean start-up methodol-
ogy introduced in theoretical framework. Alfredo Coppola,  the co-CEO of U.S. Market Ac-
cess Centre, said in a presentation that their program was developed based on two ques-
tions they asked from a group of already successful foreign entrepreneurs in Silicon Val-
ley: “How much of your own money did you spend before the first big deal?” and “How 
long did it take?” According to Coppola they found out that average amount was between 
$250 000 - $300 000 and the average time needed was 18 months or more. (Coppola, 
2014) Thus, accelerating that cycle to last for only three to six months (average length of 
accelerator programs) can save start-ups a lot of money and can be considered to be a 
tempting value proposition.  
 
For this research five Bay Area accelerator/incubator programs were analyzed (appen-
dices) and several other programs scanned to determine whether Witrafi’s participation in 
such programs is recommendable or not. The assessment of programs is based on sec-
ondary sources, and for that reason there is some cause for concern about validity. If 
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Witrafi at some point decides to apply to one of the programs, it is advisable to consult 
someone who has previously participated in program in question. 
 
First, all reviewed programs advertise that they are in business of helping start-ups to 
seamlessly join the Silicon Valley ecosystem. They promise access to contact network 
consisting of investors (VCs, funds & angels), other entrepreneurs (alumni) and Silicon 
Valley corporations (tech scouts). Those contacts are something that Witrafi needs, but 
does not currently have. In the theoretical framework it was established that because 
start-ups need trust, but don’t fulfil the conditions of trust, they need to rely on third-party 
recommendations and referrals. Because accelerator programs are A) well-known in Sili-
con Valley and B) draconian in selecting who can join (getting to participate is an accom-
plishment), participation in such program could potentially solve two major internationali-
zation hindrances for Witrafi; 1) access to potential partners and 2) lack of trust. 
 
Another observed selling argument for all of the programs is that they promise to guide 
the participating start-ups through the validation of business models and promise help in 
creating scalable business. This argument is of course based on the previously discussed 
idea that start-ups typically have to revisit their business model numerous times before 
getting it right. The importance of this selling argument depends a lot on what stage the 
start-up is (maturity) and how experienced the founders are. Figure 18 shows how the 
benefits of participation change as the start-up matures. More experienced founders with 
a start-up at a later developmental stage are less likely to need help in validation but ben-
efit from the networking. 
 
One could argue that if a foreign start-up has reference sales in foreign location, it has a 
validated business model and thus does not need the help of accelerator programs. That 
is however not necessarily true, and many marketing professionals would point out that 
depending on the market, product differentiation is needed. Regardless, Amcham’s 
Klyszeiko (interview) suggested that sales references are important to increase credibility 
in the U.S. market entry. In any case, Witrafi will need at least some feedback to know 
whether it needs to re-validate or not, and all of the analyzed programs could improve 
Witrafi’s access to customers who are needed in validation.  
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Figure 18. Benefits of Start-up accelerator programs and relationship between founder ex-
perience and start-up stage. (TechCrunch November 2015) 
 
Participation in accelerator program provides other benefits as well, and for an interna-
tional start-up many of the benefits are elevated. Start-ups, wherever they operate, are 
surrounded by uncertainty and some of it is caused by the environment. When a start-up 
enters into a foreign market the amount of perceived environmental uncertainty increases. 
All of the reviewed accelerator programs had prior experience in working with international 
start-ups and some programs were clearly targeted towards them. Having that experience 
is important because otherwise the programs could not know what kind of challenges the 
international start-ups face. Many of the reviewed programs actively promoted their “inter-
nationalization support services”, such as legal advice in immigration and incorporating is-
sues. Additionally all programs mentioned that they can give advice on the housing mar-
ket and help with other practical issues of setting up the business.  
 
One of the key benefits of accelerator and incubator programs is that start-ups have a 
guaranteed access to mentors. Mentors are a feature of all programs whether incubator or 
seed-accelerator. In a 2015 TechCrunch article Frank Vallese named mentors as the most 
important benefit of accelerator programs. Vallese writes that even though mentors often 
are very successful in their own business field they are not financially compensated by the 
programs but rather want to give back to the community by sharing what they have 
learned. He emphasizes that to benefit from mentoring the start-ups have to ask a lot of 
right questions and be active in seeking advice. It is difficult to evaluate the tangible bene-
fits of mentoring, in addition to the previously mentioned ones, but Startup Genome (figure 
19) found that having “helpful” mentors is linked to start-up’s success in raising funding.  
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Figure 19. Mentor’s role in securing funding. Startup Genome Report (2012a, 45) 
What are the costs, pros & cons? 
When comparing the different programs the biggest differences are found in terms and 
conditions of participation. Seed-accelerator programs such as popular Y Combinator and 
500.co invest seed capital for return of an equity stake from start-ups, and additionally of-
ten charge a participation fee. Other type of programs may take an equity stake but do not 
provide any funding. Y Combinator and 500.co are known for industry leading standards, 
Y Combinator invests $120,000 for equity stake of 7% and 500.co invests $125,000 for 
equity stake of 5% but there is a participation fee of $25,000 which is deducted. The 
spread in participation terms and conditions is wide, and occasionally they are not at all 
transparent. 
 
For Witrafi joining a seed-accelerator would be possible stage wise.  Many accelerators 
are stage agnostic and Witrafi has not raised Series A funding, which if it had, would com-
plicate things. However the question is would it make sense to give away an equity stake? 
The funding alone should not be seen as main motivation. Y Combinator’s Paul Graham 
(2007) writes that the question can be answered with a simple equation 1/(1-n), where n 
represents the equity to be given. For example Y Combinator takes 7% of equity, 1/(1-
0,07) = 1,07526. Thus according to Graham it makes sense to give away 7% if the start-
up believes it benefits more than 7,526% from the investor, in this case from accelerator 
program. The equation is of course simplification of complicated things but it can be useful 
starting point for cost-benefit analysis introduced in theoretical framework. Giving out eq-
uity is also a way to guarantee that the program is incentivized to help as much as it can 
because it benefits more if the valuation of start-up increases. 
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Table 6 shows the cost of participation in the programs that were analyzed. Founders-
Space and US MAC are not seed-accelerators but more like hybrid programs, they do not 
disclose how much it costs for a start-up to join. FoundersSpace does take an equity 
stake of 6% or less, the exact amount is negotiable, but they do not provide funding. US 
MAC on the other hand, does not take equity at all but there is no mention of other costs 
on the website. 
 
For seed-accelerators it is a standard practice to use either direct investment or converti-
ble note to structure their investments, but the cost of participation is always certain per-
centage of equity and a tuition fee. All three seed-accelerators that were analyzed use 
convertible note in offering funding to the start-ups. In case of Alchemist Accelerator it is 
optional whether the start-up accepts the funding or not, but it can be used to cover the 
participation fees. SV Catalyst uses “either direct investment or convertible note” and 
Plug-and-Play accelerator uses different methods in different programs. 
 
Convertible note is a form of short-term debt financing used mostly in early stage seed in-
vestments. By using “note” the investor loans the start-up a certain amount to be con-
verted into equity at a later financing round. The benefit for investor is that by structuring 
the investment as a note, the valuation of investment is postponed and determined at a 
later investment round. Depending the clauses of the note such as discount, valuation 
cap, interest and maturity, the investor usually benefits from the use of note when the val-
uation is determined. (Seedinvest) 
 
Table 6. The cost of accelerator programs. 
 Founders 
Space (i+a 
US MAC 
(i+a 
Plug and 
Play (s-a 
Alchemist (s-a SV Cata-
lyst 
(s-a 
Cost of pro-
gram 
n.a. n.a *12,000– 
18,000 € 
1,000€/month/founder 
 
8,000 – 
12,000$ 
/month 
Equity stake < 6%, can 
be negoti-
ated 
- +/- 5% +/- 5 % +/- 5% 
Seed fund-
ing (conv. 
note)  
- - 10,000 – 
150,000$ 
Avg. 28,000$ after tu-
ition fee deducted 
100,000$ 
i+a: both incubator and accelerator, s-a: seed-accelerator 
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* Secondary source (Tekes 2016k) 
 
Witrafi should be aware that at least seed-accelerator programs often want to have a right 
to participate in further investment rounds. Also, the use of convertible notes has some 
disadvantages such as the complex clauses and the categorization as debt. Y Combinator 
for example no longer uses convertible notes, instead it uses something similar it calls 
“SAFE” or simple agreement for future equity which it calls fairer for both parties. (Y Com-
binator 2016) Additionally Witrafi should take into account that the programs require that 
there is minimum of two founders who participate, which would increase the costs interna-
tionalization. On the other hand, it is possible to apply for Tekes internationalization fund-
ing to cover at least some of the costs of the participation in incubator and accelerator pro-
grams. 
 
Joining a program could improve Witrafi’s chances in the U.S. market entry. It could ad-
vance the development of Witrafi’s business model and also speed up the access to cus-
tomers. Joining would most certainly provide access to a network of investors and corpo-
rate early adopters. Most programs have a demo day, a sort of pitching competition, 
where start-ups have a chance to present their business model to potential investors and 
clients. On top of that, the better known programs are big brands in Silicon Valley and 
have very strong alumni networks that embrace the “what can I do for you” culture. 
 
However, participation has also several downsides in addition to costs. There has been 
some criticism that many of the programs are essentially “start-up 101s”, or “pitching 
coaches” and can offer little value to the more experienced founders. The programs are 
also good at advertising and saying things like “we do things differently”, but apart from 
the top ranking programs, there is little evidence to back those claims. Furthermore, the 
programs have highly competitive application processes and getting accepted to the top 
programs is close to impossible. Moreover, the program needs to be a good fit to the ap-
plying start-up’s industry so that the mentors and possible contacts are useful.  
 
Ian Chaston has additionally criticized start-up ‘training schemes’ for justifying their pro-
gram benefits with the high number of start-up failures. He believes that nothing good 
comes out of advertising with the statistics, on the contrary it can reduce people’s self-
confidence. Also, he points out that the high number of start-up failures is often wrongly 
linked with business failure when in reality the high number can be partly explained with 
the founder simply deciding to enter employment, retire or sell the business. (Chaston, 
2010, 58) 
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6.6.3 Co-working spaces 
Co-working space is a membership-based communal workspace used by people from dif-
ferent organizations (Spreitzer, Bacevice & Garret 2015). Isenberg (2015) classifies co-
working spaces as a support factor of start-up ecosystem. For start-ups co-working 
spaces are a cost effective way to solve office space issues, and also provides them with 
many direct and indirect benefits. Co-working space tenants often have complimentary of-
fice supplies and access to rooms where they can organize meetings. One of the biggest 
pull-factors of co-working spaces is the other co-workers. Having a group of likeminded 
individuals and/or organizations sharing a space can lead to new contacts and both formal 
and informal partnering opportunities.  
 
Spinuzzi (2012) who studied co-working spaces in Austin, Texas found out that the defini-
tion of co-working space varies depending from who it is asked. According to him from 
proprietors’ point of view it makes sense to differentiate, but he was able to identify two 
types of co-workers. Those who wanted to work in parallel and those who wanted to work 
cooperatively. Parallel co-workers wanted to interact with other co-workers socially and 
build neighbourly relation, but the motivation for co-working was to have a professional 
setting for meeting customers. Cooperative co-workers on the other hand wanted to es-
tablish a working trust with other co-workers that could potentially lead to formal partner-
ing opportunities. Cooperative co-workers were more often freelancer and entrepreneurial 
type and meeting clients was less important for them. (Spinuzzi 2012, 17) 
 
The Bay Area is a location of multiple co-working facilities some of which are introduced 
below. It needs to be said that many others had to be left out due to space constraints. 
Many Bay Area co-working spaces are exclusively targeted towards tech start-ups, free-
lancers and other small businesses. The bigger co-working spaces actively organize 
events, invite lecturers and offer other additional perks to their members. Witrafi could use 
co-working spaces in internationalization as an alternative to incubator and accelerator 
programs, although it must be stressed that co-working spaces have different rules and 
the services are not as extensive. Also, using co-working space does not guarantee ac-
cess to investors and corporate customers. Strauss (2013) however writes in Forbes arti-
cle that co-working spaces too, are compelling network venues for lawyers, accountants, 
and advisors. 
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RocketSpace 
RocketSpace is a highly rated co-working space for tech start-ups. RocketSpace campus 
is located in downtown San Francisco which is not an ideal location for Witrafi. Neverthe-
less, RocketSpace is so highly rated that the location might be worth a sacrifice. The 
alumni network includes start-ups such as Supercell, Spotify and Uber. RocketSpace ad-
vertises that they have 85 corporate partners that are looking for new start-ups to work 
with and on average 1.5 start-ups/month co-working there secure funding. The site also 
regularly hosts events and training sessions for members. 
 
Finnish AppGyver joined RocketSpace and in featured article on Tekes website their CEO 
praises the amenities and services provided by RocketSpace. According to AppGyver 
RocketSpace employees and founders “know everyone” and are willing to introduce Ap-
pGyver to new contacts, which AppGyver CEO Marko Lehtimäki has found to be particu-
larly valuable. The same article mentions that there are approximately 130 start-ups in 
RocketSpace. (Tekes 2016h) 
 
Membership options (require applying): 
− Private office space for teams of 2+: 1,050$/month 
− Dedicated desk for 1+ person teams: 850$/month 
− Drop in Desk for one: 300$/month 
 
(RocketSpace 2016) 
 
WeWork 
WeWork is a co-working space service provider with a country wide network of office 
buildings. In the Bay Area WeWork has five offices in San Francisco. The biggest benefit 
of joining WeWork is that their membership plans give access to offices in many cities 
from New York to San Francisco and there is a wide variety of plans from which to 
choose. Like in the case of RocketSpace, the location is not ideal for Witrafi, but on the 
other hand Witrafi could benefit from the access to working space in other location than in 
Bay Area.  
 
Finnish company Audiodraft has been a member in WeWork and was featured on Tekes 
website. According to the article Audiodraft has been using WeWork offices as a base for 
creating sales and networks in the Bay Area. The website article notes that WeWork’s 
San Francisco offices have been criticized for lack of events but the access to multiple lo-
cations receives praise. (Tekes 2016i) 
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Membership options: 
- Commons Starter $45/month, a day of workspace or 1 hour of conference room, 
access to 28 locations. Possibility for additional workspace for fee 
 
- Commons Unlimited $350/month, unlimited access to workspace and 2 hours of 
conference room, access to 28 locations, business address with mailing service 
 
- Dedicated Desk $450/month, personal desk for team, 12 hours of conference 
room, 24/7 access, all locations, business address with mail service 
 
- Dedicated Office $700-950/month/person in San Francisco, all amenities (WeWork 
2016) 
 
Nordic Innovation House 
Nordic Innovation House is a co-working space and resource center for Nordic start-ups 
located in Palo Alto. It is co-funded by Nordic Governments and trade promotion organiza-
tions, for example Team Finland is involved in it. For Witrafi Nordic Innovation House 
would offer many advantages over some other co-working spaces but on the other hand, 
it is comparatively small in size which can mean less events and other amenities.  
 
Bernascoli, Dibiaggio & Ferrary (2006, 108-109) researched how social links of French 
ethnic community work in Silicon Valley and found that they have an economic impact. 
Barnascoli &al. found that the non-economic informal links gave French start-ups almost 
automatically access to French investors operating in Silicon Valley. This was possible be-
cause the way how venture capitalists work, they need someone who they deem reliable 
to recommend the start-ups to them, and informal ethnic networks are a natural way of do-
ing that. (Bernascoli & al. 2006, 109) 
 
Bernascoli & al. also found that the activities and gatherings of ethnic social networks are 
a way to obtain advice and circulate information for start-ups. However the effectiveness 
of ethnic networks is directly linked to network theory’s points about complementing one 
another and developing acceptable positions relative to others in the network. Nordic In-
novation House is an interesting concept because any one Nordic country probably does 
not have a sufficient enough number of network actors and skills in Silicon Valley, but by 
combining the forces Nordic Innovation House can increase the effectiveness of network.  
 
Witrafi fulfills the conditions of joining Nordic Innovation House, as it is a Nordic start-up 
and operates in tech-industry. According to the website the cost of desk is $1000/month 
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(25% less for SMEs), so the price is a tad more expensive than what other co-working 
spaces charge, but on the other hand, in addition to the co-working space and good loca-
tion Witrafi gains access to potentially invaluable social network.  
6.6.4 Virtual offices 
The concept of virtual office was first mentioned in 5.4.1 where Amcham was introduced. 
The authors learned from both Klyszeiko and Suomela interviews that several Finnish 
start-ups have used virtual offices in the U.S. market entry. Investopedia defines virtual of-
fice as a business location that only exists in cyber-space. Virtual Office service providers 
offer “tenants” a real physical address and telephone answering services to give potential 
customers the appearance that a company has a market presence in certain location. 
Some service providers can also rent “real” conference room space where business meet-
ings can be organized. (Investopedia 2016e) 
 
For Witrafi a virtual office could be a cheap way to establish some market presence and 
increase potential U.S. partners’ confidence in Witrafi. According to Suomela (interview) 
virtual offices are useful only to a certain extent because in the U.S. gaining trust in busi-
ness relationships may take two to three meetings and meetings are often requested on a 
short notice. Use of virtual office may thus lead to false ideas if the “tenant” can’t respond 
to meeting requests. Additionally, Klyszeiko (interview) pointed out that the location of vir-
tual office is important. He told the author anecdotally that some Finnish start-ups have 
previously had virtual office address in bad areas of Bay Area which hurt their business. 
 
Silicon Valley and the Bay Area have numerous virtual office service providers and many 
of the co-working spaces such as Nordic Innovation House (NIH) also offer virtual office 
services. The price range varies but most of the simple plans including mailing services 
start from around $100/month. Telephone answering increases the costs and Regus for 
example charges $229 per month for telephone answering service. NIH charges $1320 
annually for virtual office and The Office of Silicon Valley offers plans starting from 
$100/month plus $50 set-up fee.  
6.6.5 Corporate venturing, programs and competitions 
In theoretical framework and in 5.1.3 where Silicon Valley environment was discussed, the 
concepts of corporate venturing was introduced and it was also mentioned that Silicon 
Valley is known for its many success stories. For Witrafi the existing success stories are 
not only role models, but also potential partners. Many successful entrepreneurs become 
investors and mentors after their exit and as was introduced in the theoretical framework, 
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successful start-ups can start acquiring and investing into other start-ups once they have 
sufficient funds to do so.  
 
CB Insights (2015b, 3) which publishes an annual global report about exits of private tech 
companies reported that in 2014 the number of tech exits grew by 58% when compared to 
previous year. Most of the exits (2,886) were through mergers & acquisitions and only 79 
through initial public offerings (2015b, 3). Bulk (73%) of the tech companies had not raised 
institutional funding prior to the exit (2015b, 7) and 44% of those that had, exited in early 
stages after seed or Series A (2015b, 14). When it comes to valuation at the exit time CB 
Insights (2015b, 6) found that although the number of unicorn (valued at over $1 billion) 
exits nearly doubled, they still represented less than 1,1% of total number of exits, 
whereas most exits were by considerably smaller firms (< $200 million).  
 
Although the figures presented in the report are not limited to Silicon Valley, the report 
does mention that the U.S. leads in the number of exits (2015b, 8) and that in the U.S. 
California sees more exits than the next five markets combined (2015b, 10). When these 
numbers are added to the fact that a number of Finnish companies has found exit in Sili-
con Valley (p.53 of this report) and that by sectors internet (~50%) and mobile & telecom-
munications (~20%) are leading in tech exits (CB insights 2015b, 11), an exit seems like 
one plausible outcome of internationalization for Witrafi. 
 
It is well known that corporations such as Alphabet Inc. (the parent of Google), Apple, 
IBM, Cisco, HP, Facebook and many others are active in corporate venturing and monitor 
start-ups they could invested in or buy. According to Dolbec in Ernst&Young Globalizing 
Venture Capital report (2011, 40) the importance of Silicon Valley as a corporate venturing 
location can be seen in the fact that three stages of corporate venturing can be recog-
nized; 1) the corporation begins by investing in someone else’s VC fund, 2) the corpora-
tion establishes an office in Silicon Valley and sends some of its employees there, 3) the 
corporation hires Silicon Valley people to manage the office.  
 
The benefits of corporate venturing for corporations are clear, on one hand “tech scouting” 
gives them access to new technologies and talent while on the other, it is a pre-emptive 
strategy to avoid competition. For start-ups corporate venturing is a tempting opportunity 
because it gives them access to distribution channels, access to both financial and tech-
nological support as well as access to resources otherwise unavailable. Achieving growth 
is a common goal for both parties. (Barrow & al. 2005, 223) 
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For Witrafi partnering with a suitable larger company from a relevant business field could 
provide access to infrastructure and depending on the depth of the relationship, funding or 
even an exit. In internationalization Witrafi could use corporate venturing in couple of 
ways. Corporate based venture capital funds are one option, but in addition the corporate 
venture arms of large companies organize competitions and have their own accelerator 
programs. The larger companies also have so called “tech scouts” that attend start-up 
meetings and other start-up gatherings, such as previously discussed incubator and ac-
celerator programs. 
 
In much the same way as with other investors, accessing “corporate ventures” can be dif-
ficult in competitive environment such as Silicon Valley. As is case with many other part-
nering opportunities tech scouts often want referrals and the start-up needs to be recom-
mended by someone who they trust. Meyer & Crane (2014, 330) propose that in addition 
to different events, University MBA-programs might be a good place from where a start-up 
could look for useful contacts. Meyer & Crane also point out that when working with corpo-
rate ventures start-up should be careful with Non-disclosure agreements and other con-
tracts, as some may try to use them for their own advantage. 
 
Corporate backed start-up competitions are not entirely new for Witrafi as it has previously 
participated in Verizon’s Powerful Answers 2014 competition in San Francisco where it 
succeeded well (Siitonen interview). However that competition as of now has not led to 
Witrafi’s internationalization. Attending conferences and tech exhibitions has been tradi-
tionally a way for businesses to make new contacts, but Klyszeiko (interview) said that 
they are becoming less and less important in the U.S. as a business networking venues. 
Corporate accelerator programs are similar to seed-accelerators and joining one could be 
beneficial. However, Witrafi should carefully analyze the rules of program before joining. 
Corporate-Accelerator DB has a global list of different corporate accelerators, from 
Witrafi’s field of business at least Cisco Systems has an accelerator program in San Jose.  
6.6.6 Informal networks 
The authors have previously introduced alternative ways how and where to find prospec-
tive partners in the Bay Area. Likewise the importance of informal networks and mentors 
has been stressed both in the theoretical framework as well as in discussion. However, in 
case Witrafi is unable to hire U.S. employees, who could provide Witrafi with their own in-
formal networks, and decides against joining incubator or accelerator program it has to be 
more active in networking.  There are several ways how to go about it. 
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In Silicon Valley ecosystem there is an abundance of experienced serial entrepreneurs 
and other professionals who are willing to share their knowledge. Finding suitable con-
tacts might take time and effort but for Witrafi a natural place to start is the ethnic social 
links as was stated while discussing Nordic Innovation House. In today’s digital era a good 
place to start the search is LinkedIn and other similar social network sites. However, be-
cause in Silicon Valley email and other electronic contacts are not preferred means of 
communication, knowledge of where to go can increase the efficiency of networking. In 
addition to co-working spaces, Team Finland, conferences and competitions there are 
some organizations and individuals that could be beneficial for Witrafi (in networking) 
when entering the U.S. market. 
 
Witrafi should start the networking already in Finland so that enough contacts exist prior to 
the market entry efforts. In Finland the annual Slush conference is the biggest start-up 
gathering and attracts visitors from around the world. Start-up Sauna of Aalto Entrepre-
neurial Society is very active in organizing presentations and other similar events year 
round and also has contacts in the Bay Area. By attending different events Witrafi could 
increase the probability of meeting well-known Silicon Valley Finns such as Mårten 
Mickos, who has publicly spoken about the importance of helping fellow entrepreneurs 
(HS 2015), and Pekka Pärnänen.  
 
Meetup Silicon Valley is another useful networking channel. It lists Silicon Valley related 
meetups around the world and of course in Silicon Valley. One of the meetings it lists is 
Silicon Viking’s Helsinki meetup. (Meetup 2016). Silicon Vikings is a Silicon Valley based 
+30,000 strong network of Nordic/Baltic start-up ecosystem actors. The purpose of the 
network is to build a borderless community and share the best practices to support Nordic 
and Baltic entrepreneurs. Silicon Vikings organizes events, shares resources and con-
nects the different ecosystem actors together. For Witrafi Silicon Vikings is one possible 
source of resources for internationalization. (Silicon Vikings 2016) 
6.7 What are the costs attached to best partnering opportunities? 
Based on expert interviews and previously introduced research authors determined that 
there exists alternative ways how Witrafi could approach U.S. market entry. For that rea-
son different scenarios are introduced using the previously identified collaborative options. 
Authors would like to point out that the scenarios and the budgeting presented are short-
term, as per the research demarcation. Also, some of the costs presented in scenarios 
that demand more commitment are non-recurring in nature, meaning that if the budgeting 
was to continue for a longer time period some of the costs would settle. 
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6.7.1 Pragmatic 
The pragmatic approach, when applied to a view towards internationalization is very much 
in accordance to the definition of the word, which is to be practical as opposed to idealistic 
(Merriam-Webster 2016). In Witrafi’s case this would mean to not use available resources 
towards a US expansion. There is no separate budget for this option, and could be re-
duced to a yearly excursion to the Silicon Valley for example as a maximum. Witrafi con-
tinues to follow Team Finland events and attend them if they have time and wish to make 
the effort. Witrafi should keep its eyes open however, and if a clear opportunity arises 
through e.g. Team Finland activities or similar (Witrafi is in the MaaS program of Team 
Finland), then Witrafi can move to a more resource-intense scenario.   
 
This is the lightest option when considering company resources, and there are a few good 
sides to this approach. No special budgeting should be applied in this scenario, as its ac-
tivities are a part of normal company operations. It does take the least time, effort and fi-
nance to exercise. It is also the least risky; however, considering a possible reward of e.g. 
Series A financing, the opportunity cost of this approach is extremely high, as the rewards 
are also the smallest, and it would be nearly impossible to lure venture capital investments 
to the company with this low-intensity approach to internationalization. The common 
phrase “nothing ventured, nothing gained” describes this approach quite well in one sen-
tence. 
6.7.2 Serendipity (internationalization by chance) 
This approach can be described as internationalizing by chance; by definition, Serendipity 
is “luck that takes the form of finding valuable or pleasant things that are not looked for”, 
as described by the Merriam-Webster dictionary (2016). However, certain steps may be 
taken in order to make that chance more likely. This option requires more resources than 
the previous option, as is the first approach with a budget.  
 
While it may be difficult to differentiate between the Pragmatic approach and Serendipity 
approach, Pragmatic becomes Serendipity for example in the event of Witrafi applying for 
a US startup competition and getting accepted in it, if a stakeholder from the US, for ex-
ample an investor reaches out to them and it is decided that they should pursue the lead. 
All things considered, Serendipity entails more efforts in applying for competitions, and at-
tending more events with the clear goal of searching for internationalization partners. 
Witrafi is, and has been in this approach for a while, and pursued some lucky strikes; in 
2014, they were accepted into the top 10 finalists in the Verizon Powerful Answers 
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Awards. They have also attended various trade fairs abroad, searching for customers and 
partners. 
 
Team Finland is a marketplace for serendipity. They offer many different kinds of opportu-
nities: sales, investments and networking, just as examples. Witrafi should join their 
events for possible leads, in addition to other such events as well. They should also apply 
to accelerator programs and competitions where getting in is a prize entailing possible 
funding and advice. Getting accepted to one is a great chance to gain publicity and other 
benefits through the program or competition itself. If Witrafi visits an expo or conference, 
they should seek out partners and opportunities to pursue; indeed, these events might 
also take place in the Silicon Valley. 
 
This approach would also include trips to Silicon Valley: one to three trips annually. Their 
purpose would be to network, vet the market and gain advice from the best experts in the 
startup world. Hence, this approach requires some budgeting, which relies heavily on the 
amount of trips taken. The trips would likely last one to two weeks, and they would be 
booked full of meetings and events. Witrafi has embarked on such trips in 2014 (in con-
junction with the Verizon competition) and in 2015, when they were a part of Haaga-Helia 
UAS delegation for the internationalization of Startup School, while running their own 
agenda in parallel. Both trips had a clear purpose beforehand, and a full schedule in the 
Bay Area filled up with meetings and networking. These trips are very useful, but connec-
tions made then are difficult to keep up. Keeping up appearances would require repetitive 
meetings, and other than the main purpose of the trip, be it a competition or other set pur-
pose, is in every case the main accomplishment. For keeping up the connections, multiple 
trips or a longer stay would be required, and this would mean moving into the next ap-
proach. For the same aim, in this approach, consideration should be placed on whether it 
would be beneficial to start with a virtual office in the US. It would highly increase the 
chance of credibility towards arising US opportunities, and also serve as a headquarters 
for the trips themselves. While there, Witrafi should look into incubators and meet Venture 
Capitalists. If these don’t suite Witrafi’s purpose otherwise, then they certainly will provide 
extremely valuable feedback for them. 
 
This approach one to multiple trips to Silicon Valley. The following is a description of pos-
sible costs related to such a trip. It should be noted that during the course of a year 1-3 
trips could be scheduled. The costs stipulated in table 5 are for a delegation of two per-
sons from Witrafi, staying from Saturday till Sunday (8 nights). Other cost items are rent-
ing the vehicle, daily allowance and general expenses. Expenses are left rather large, as 
the trip might be for example because of a conference, in which case tickets need to be 
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purchased. It also includes gas, lunches, dinners etc. that the company might have to pay 
for while promoting themselves. In addition to marketing materials, samples or anything to 
that effect. These costs may differ between trips, therefore a large amount is stated. For 
example, the ESTA-documentation required for travel into the USA is a one-time cost, 
valid for three years.  
 
As this approach requires funding, mainly for the trips abroad, there should be a budget in 
place. It is quite volatile depending on how many trips should be done, but sets itself in 
certain boundaries; which if exceeded, would likely be due to moving to the next most in-
tensive approach. Benchmarking for estimated costs in table 7 were gathered from 
Momondo (2016), Hotels.com (2016), rentalcars.com (2016) and Veronmaksajat (2016): 
 
Table 7. Costs of visiting Silicon Valley on business. 
Item Cost 
Vehicle rent 300 
Hotel 1500 
Flights 2000 
Expenses 2000 
Daily allowance 1072 
Total 6872 
 
The budget is quite light, as mainly business trips would be included. Such efforts fit well 
with nearly all suitable internationalization funding schemes for Witrafi. In question would 
be Tekes YIC, TEM, ELY and Finnvera funding. It is also likely that these funding options 
would not be used solely for expansion into the Silicon Valley, because all these funding 
amounts greatly exceed the costs of the Serendipity approach. In other words, Silicon Val-
ley would be a destination among others for Witrafi’s budding internationalization; other 
alternatives may be pursued less or more intensely. 
6.7.3 Incremental 
In the Incremental approach considerably more effort is made into expanding to the Sili-
con Valley than is made in the Serendipity approach. Still, what is chased is a chance; in 
this approach, hard work is placed upon uncovering and securing that, be it an investor or 
other partner, for example. However, the efforts are quite similar by type, their effective-
ness is bolstered through more resources being allocated to them. 
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In addition to continuing attendance of Team Finland events, Witrafi is recommended to 
join Amcham Finland, the prime networking organization for Finnish companies seeking to 
enter the US market in general. They have recently opened an office in New York, further 
aiding their purpose. With these two networking organizations working for them, Witrafi 
should be able to greatly increase the amount of opportunities presented to them. 
 
In the approach, more presence in Silicon Valley is required. This is the main differentiator 
of the Incremental approach versus the Serendipity approach, in addition to paying for 
services from Amcham, which already shows commitment towards internationalization. 
Witrafi needs headquarters for the visits, and a US phone number and address to main-
tain credibility in the region. A great place for Witrafi’s Silicon Valley office (a virtual office) 
is the Nordic Innovation House, right next to the Team Finland office and in the middle of 
Palo Alto, the place to be for any startup. While on-site and elsewhere, investigation 
should be carried out to legal implications of Witrafi entering the market. A lawyer is 
needed when pursuing investments and many other benefits of the American market, so 
as to not make poor deals and add an outsider to vet the opportunities and their implica-
tions. Time-wise, there would be around 1-3 visits, each lasting around 2 weeks to 1 
month (time between visits around 1 month). The duration is needed to continue started 
business relationships and gather all the knowledge and meet all the relevant parties 
Witrafi can. In business in the Silicon Valley, after the first meeting, a follow-up should be 
scheduled as soon as possible. In the serendipity approach, such meetings are not possi-
ble. 
 
In addition to the budgeting in the serendipity approach, this approach would add naturally 
more costs through extended stays, but also the Visa process comes into question. Lodg-
ing is likely to be provided by AirBnB. Below in table 8 is a budget for two one-month trips. 
 
 
Table 8. Expenses for incremental scenario. 
Expenses  
Virtual office 1200 
TOTAL BUILDINGS/REAL ESTATE $ 1200 
administrative expenses  
Legal and Accounting Fees 3000 
Salaries and Wages 6000 
Office Supplies 500 
TOTAL ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES $ 9500 
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advertising/promotional expenses  
Advertising 1000 
Printing 1000 
Lodging 4000 
Vehicle 2250 
Flights 4000 
Meals & Entertainment 1000 
Other expenses 1500 
TOTAL ADVERTISING/PROMOTIONAL 
EXPENSES $ 14750 
  
2 visit total 25450 
 
This is a more effective approach for entering Silicon Valley than serendipity. It costs 
more, but the chance of for example an investment and in any case the broadening of 
Witrafi’s knowledge base is bolstered through a still small, but increasingly meaningful 
step into internationalization. At least one visit for one month is recommended to probe 
the full potential of Silicon Valley. Estimated costs for this venture is 12,725 €. The addi-
tional trips would be useful in the case that Witrafi gains good results on the first trip and 
chooses to pursue business opportunities in the Silicon Valley further.  
6.7.4 Accelerator program scenario 
Based on the research and data collection authors believe that for Witrafi joining Silicon 
Valley based incubator or accelerator program could be one possible option in internation-
alization. Compared to previously introduced scenarios this scenario would require more 
resources and a higher level of commitment from Witrafi’s part because the programs 
generally require that at least two founders attend. Additionally the program length is usu-
ally from three to six months, although shorter programs exist as well. On the other hand, 
the higher level of commitment could lead to faster, more controlled market entry and 
could provide Witrafi with the means to develop networks otherwise difficult to attain.  
 
The funding for this scenario would likely come from three sources; Tekes, Witrafi (other) 
and seed provided by the program to be participated. A start-up planning to attend incuba-
tor or accelerator program is qualified to apply for Tekes funding for “planning international 
growth”, which if approved, means that Tekes covers up to 75% of the costs of participa-
tion or maximum of 50,000€. However, Tekes requires that the applying start-up has 
equivalent of 50% of required funding from other sources and it pays 60% of the grant up 
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front and the rest later. To qualify to begin with the applicant has to strictly follow Tekes 
guidelines and reporting procedures. 
 
It is difficult to estimate the size of funding offered by the program as each program has 
their own practices. The authors are hesitant to use any one program as an example be-
cause 1) the probability of getting accepted to the first or second choice is low and 2) the 
terms & conditions vary so much between the programs that using one to represent all 
would diminish the usefulness of this budgeting exercise. However, in this scenario seed 
accelerator is used as a reference for discussion because incubators and corporate accel-
erators have similar costs but don’t offer funding. Authors would like to point out that alt-
hough seed accelerators may provide seed up to $120,000, the average lies somewhere 
between $18,000 and $25,000. For this scenario it is presumed that Witrafi would receive 
a net of $25,000 or when converted to euros (using 1$ = 0.9€ exchange rate) approxi-
mately 22,727€. A detailed analysis of different program benefits has been previously in-
troduced hence this scenario focuses on costs. Table 9 presents the sources and use of 
funds statement. 
 
The program fee is a single digit in equity, which is not included in budgeting, the issue 
was likewise discussed previously. Some programs such as Blackbox.vc do have other 
type of tuition fee models, but the industry standard is to pay participation in equity. The 
extent of this scenario is three months which is typical length of seed accelerator pro-
grams. Even if the program was to be shorter, the purpose is to look what are the costs for 
Witrafi to send two employees for three months to the Bay Area program. This scenario 
presumes that the program provides Witrafi with co-working space, as is common prac-
tice, so there is no fixed office rent costs included. Also, incorporating a U.S. subsidiary is 
seen as a pre-condition for this scenario. 
 
Witrafi would have to pay for employee housing during the program as the programs 
themselves don’t provide housing. Some programs do offer advice on the housing market 
and might be able to provide contacts and access to better deals than what the market 
can offer. In the environment analysis it was mentioned that housing market is one of the 
biggest issues in the Bay Area. Affordable housing options are non-existent and the gen-
eral rule is that you get less, for higher price than elsewhere. For this scenario different 
websites were compared and it seems that housing for two with a simple setup and a rea-
sonable location would cost Witrafi around 2,100 €/month including fees, when Airbnb or 
equivalent is used.   
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Table 9. The sources and use of funds statement for seed-accelerator scenario.  
 
 
Transportation is one of the major expenses in the Bay Area. Witrafi would have to be as 
mobile as possible and Kriman (email interview) proposed buying a used vehicle for trans-
portation purposes. For that reason 5,000€ is budgeted for capital equipment. It was de-
termined that for three month period Witrafi would not need to buy any major equipment, 
and the existing laptops and other equipment can be used. Regardless 500€ was budg-
eted to cover possible extraordinary expenses. 
 
Sources	and	use	of	funds 3	months	(€)
Funding
Tekes		grant	(max) 50,000																																			
60%	of	Tekes	grant 30,000																																			
Seed	from	program 22,727																																			
Total	funds	available	in	the	beginning 52,727																																		
Total	funds	required 57,210																																			
Witrafi's	portion/other 4,483																																				
Expenses
Office	space -																																									
Other -																																									
TOTAL	BUILDINGS/REAL	ESTATE	€ -																																								
Capital	equipment	list
Equipment	and	technology 500																																								
Other 5,000																																					
TOTAL	CAPITAL	EQUIPMENT	€ 5,500																																				
Administrative	and	general	expenses
Corporate	Fees,	Permits	and	Taxes 150																																								
Employee	housing	and	Utility	Deposits 6,300																																					
Legal	and	Accounting	Fees 4,600																																					
Insurance 800																																								
Salaries	and	Wages 12,000																																			
Payroll	Taxes 2,640																																					
Benefits 3,600																																					
Office	Supplies 100																																								
Other	(consulting,	visas) 3,320																																					
TOTAL	ADMINISTRATIVE	EXPENSES	€ 33,510																																		
Advertising/promotional	expenses
Advertising -																																									
Website	Development -																																									
Printing,	promotional	materials 500																																								
Travel 5,500																																					
Meals	&	Entertainment 6,200																																					
Other/Additional	expenses 6,000																																					
TOTAL	PROMOTIONAL	EXPENSES	€ 18,200																																		
TOTAL	EXPENSES	€ 57,210																																		
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Significant cost for this scenario would come from legal fees and incorporation of U.S. 
subsidiary. The U.S. subsidiary would likely be “inactive” in the beginning with no-income 
and employees but some administrative expenses such as registering to do business in 
California would still have to be paid. Although it is not expensive to incorporate Delaware 
Corporation, it can be done for as little as $500, using a good lawyer increases that cost to 
couple of thousands. Similarly an accountant may be needed in the set-up process. The 
legal fees portion of expenses is reduced by the fact that Witrafi would not hire any new 
employees during the three month period and it is presumed that no major contracts 
would be signed. The estimated figure of 4,600€ comes from costs of incorporating, ac-
countant fees and less than five hours of professional legal counselling. It is presumed 
that the program Witrafi attends provides some advice on simpler legal matters. 
 
The insurance portion of expenses covers the costs of insuring the vehicle and travel and 
expatriate insurances for two employees for three months. For this scenario Witrafi would 
not have to buy any significant property so the cost of insurance is lower. Also, in case 
Witrafi decides that normal travel insurance is adequate, the insurance expenses drop by 
approximately 200€. The expatriate insurance however provides wider coverage, and be-
cause in the U.S. healthcare costs and liability issues are more complicated than in Fin-
land, it might be worth taking the more expensive option. According to a quote from a 
Finnish insurance company, the cost of expatriate insurance is around 150€ for a three 
month period. 
 
The salaries portion assumes that the two employees attending will be paid a net of 
2,000€ a month. The payroll taxes were calculated using a calculator from palkka.fi and 
are the minimum employer side costs. The actual figure is likely higher, but for Witrafi it 
should be easy to calculate the actual cost using the existing salaries as a reference. The 
benefits part assumes that Witrafi offers both employees 500€ monthly relocation allow-
ance plus 100€ per month to cover mobile-phone plan.  
 
Witrafi will not need to purchase any significant office supplies for the period of three 
months, but 100€ allocated can be used to cover other similar costs such as postage 
costs. The category “other” includes the costs of acquiring B1-visas for both employees 
and €1000 to be used for other business consultations per month. However it is assumed 
that Witrafi saves significantly in consultation costs by attending the program. 
 
Promotional expenses form the last category of expenses. It is expected that in this sce-
nario Witrafi will concentrate on attending the program and business meetings, so tradi-
  
121 
tional marketing expenses such as advertising are lower. 500€ is allocated to cover print-
ing and some basic promotional material expenses. Travel portion of expenses could 
have been included together with “general” expenses, but it is seen as including the travel 
to and from different events. The authors assume that Witrafi can purchase return flights 
for two from Helsinki to San Francisco for around €1,600, which is significantly higher than 
low-season but somewhat lower than the flights cost during more popular traveling sea-
son. The traveling expenses also include the costs of vehicle usage based on American 
Automotive Associations estimations and the use of public transportation such as cabs 
and Uber from a period of three months.  
 
Meals and entertainment expenses allocate 400€ a week for business dinners/other simi-
lar activities and 1,000€ for entertainment for three months for two employees. The last 
promotional expense category is “other” expenses where 6,000€ is allocated for expenses 
of attending business conferences, start-up gatherings and other networking events. This 
assumes that one employee uses a maximum of 1,000€ per month for such events, which 
can be low figure considering that conference fees can be anything between 400-1500€ 
per employee. It is however assumed that the program where Witrafi is participating or-
ganizes similar events at no additional cost.  
 
The authors estimate that the total costs for two employees to attend a Bay Area program 
for a period of three is around 57,410€. This estimation is lower than what one author of 
this research has heard previously. While visiting Silicon Valley in 2015 a figure of 
$25,000 for two per month was given, which would mean approximately 68,000€ when 
converted. However, the scenario presented here is based on assumption that Witrafi 
would significantly benefit from attending an accelerator program. When assessing 
whether this type of scenario is feasible, Witrafi also has to take into account the loss of 
equity. Although this scenario is based on period of three months, it also presumed that at 
least one person from Witrafi would stay in the Bay Area after the conclusion of program, 
B1 visa is valid for six months and can be extended. After the program Witrafi would have 
to start paying for co-working space and the need for consultation would increase together 
with other expenses. When it comes to funding, the scenario seems feasible assuming 
that Tekes grants funding and the program provides seed funding. 
6.7.5 Hierarchical entry 
In addition to the previous scenarios Witrafi has the option of using hierarchical entry 
mode in the market entry. Hierarchical entry as introduced in theoretical framework can be 
thought either as an extension of exporting or forward vertical FDI, depending on the level 
of commitment. The hierarchical entry is popular among start-ups due to its flexibility and 
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the maximum amount of control it provides. However the disadvantage is that more re-
sources are needed and the start-up has to endure higher uncertainty as it cannot rely on 
networks and support services provided by program as in previous scenario. 
 
Assuming that when using this scenario Witrafi does not have wide existing networks in 
Silicon Valley, it would have to commit more resources to finding potential investors, part-
ners and early adopters to test and fund its business model and expansion. However this 
scenario does not require that a team of two or more employees is sent. Witrafi could start 
by sending a company representative to do networking, raise funding and search part-
ners. Suomela (interview) reminded that sending an employee abroad is not effortless, as 
Witrafi would first have to select who to send and that depends on many factors such as 
family and life situation. Siitonen (interview) noted that Witrafi would also have to hire a 
new employee to take care of the work of that person who travels. Incorporating a U.S. 
subsidiary is not mandatory in the beginning, Klyszeiko (interview) suggested only incor-
porating when absolutely necessary. In the longer term it is needed and hence included in 
the costs of this scenario. The costs of this scenario are calculated only for the first three 
months, after which Witrafi should have a better idea whether to commit further resources 
for market entry or to retreat. It is optimistic to think that three months would lead to rapid 
internationalization, although some degree of advancement is possible. Referring to Siito-
nen’s visit to Silicon Valley in October 2015 (appendices), three months was quoted as a 
minimum time needed. 
 
The funding of this scenario is more complicated than for seed-accelerator scenario. 
Witrafi would be eligible for Tekes grant similarly to other scenarios because this scenario 
would fulfil the conditions of “internationalization planning”, but on the other hand the costs 
are not significantly lower than in seed-accelerator scenario and there is no financial sup-
port by a program. This would mean that Witrafi has to find alternative ways how to fi-
nance the portion of costs that Tekes grant does not cover. However in hierarchical entry 
Witrafi would not have to give out equity to a program in the beginning which could be a 
significant saving longer-term in case Witrafi’s valuation increases. It is worth mentioning 
that to stay competitive in Silicon Valley Witrafi might nevertheless have to give out equity 
when hiring U.S. employees.  
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Table 10. The sources and use of funds statement for hierarchical entry scenario. 
 
 
Witrafi would save money by having only one employee traveling but on the other hand it 
would have to pay for office space, still purchase a vehicle for transportation and the 
housing would cost the same regardless. Also, there might be a loss in opportunity as only 
one employee travels. Although the initial costs of this scenario are unlikely differ consid-
erably from the previous scenario, in the worst case, the longer term costs can be signifi-
cantly higher. While discussing the different accelerator type programs it was mentioned 
that Coppola (2014) found that some foreign start-ups had spent more than $250,000 be-
Sources	and	use	of	funds 3	months	(€)
Funding
Tekes	grant	(max) 50,000											
60%	of	Tekes	grant 30,000											
Total	funds	available 30,000
Total	funds	required 49,080											
Needed	from	Witrafi/other	sources 19,080										
Expenses
Office	space 2,250													
Other 1,500													
TOTAL	BUILDINGS/REAL	ESTATE	€ 3,750												
Capital	equipment	list
Equipment	and	technology 500																
Other 5,000													
TOTAL	CAPITAL	EQUIPMENT	€ 5,500												
Administrative	and	general	expenses
Corporate	Fees,	Permits	and	Taxes 150																
Employee	housing	and	Utility	Deposits 6,300													
Legal	and	Accounting	Fees 5,600													
Insurance 600																
Salaries	and	Wages 6,000													
Payroll	Taxes 1,320													
Benefits 1,800													
Office	Supplies 300																
Other,	incl.	consulting 4,660													
TOTAL	ADMINISTRATIVE	EXPENSES	€ 26,730										
Advertising/promotional	expenses
Advertising -																	
Website	Development -																	
Printing/promotional	materials 1,500													
Travel 2,500													
Meals	&	Entertainment 3,100													
Other/Additional	 6,000													
TOTAL	PROMOTIONAL	EXPENSES	€ 13,100										
TOTAL	EXPENSES	€ 49,080										
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fore any success in similar conditions as this scenario. Coppola’s figure is somewhat com-
patible with the number ($170,000) heard by Siitonen while visiting Silicon Valley in 2015 
(appendices).  
 
In this scenario Witrafi would rent a desk/office space from co-working space service pro-
vider such as Nordic Innovation House, which would cost 750€ for a month. The incorpo-
rating costs would be similar as in previous scenario, but it is likely that more legal advice 
is needed to compensate the portion of advice given by program in previous scenario, so 
1000€ more is allocated. Likewise the category of other general expenses is inflated by 
1500€, excluding the cost of B1 visa from additional employee. In this scenario Witrafi 
could try to utilize Team Finland services more than in previous scenario but as was ana-
lysed, the resources of Team Finland are limited in Silicon Valley. 
 
Compared to accelerator program scenario the total promotional expenses are only 
5,100€ lower because Witrafi would have to increase spending to find and access the 
partnering opportunities provided by the program. A significant loss are the access to cor-
porate partners and demo day.   
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7 Discussion 
In this chapter, the authors go through previous findings to provide recommendations for 
the case company and others like it. The main findings discuss what kinds of methods of 
internationalization there are for startups such as the case company, and how to fund 
such endeavours. The positive and negative implications are also discussed, in addition to 
how the study was conducted. Recommendations for further studies and limitations of this 
study are also discussed. 
7.1 Key findings 
The operating environment in Silicon Valley is highly competitive, which cannot be empha-
sized enough, and can be clearly seen from the environmental analyses in this research. 
This applies to everything: labor, funding, customer acquisition etc. It is highly likely that 
there are tough competitors in the area, no matter the industry or idea pursued by a 
startup. Careful consideration must be placed on whether the area is even worth the push, 
whether the startup actually has the resources to operate there and if the business logic or 
idea is viable there. Unless absolutely sure, the startup should not venture so far across 
the world, despite all the good reasons to go there. 
 
As has been established, Witrafi has passed the phase where they would be viable to an-
gel investments. They have also exhausted the amount of ‘de minimis’ funding for the time 
being, however, this may change in the near future, at least in 2018 when some of their 
‘de minimis’ funding has cycled deeming them eligible for more. 
 
The found Finnish public funding alternatives are extensive, as was also supported by 
previous publications, such as “Ohjelmistoyritysten rahoitusopas” (guide for funding a soft-
ware company) by Ahokas, M. (2012). The theory on public funding schemes is not very 
extensive, mainly due to large regional fluctuations and innovation funding being often cat-
egorized as a kind of subsidy. Many of them are directly or in part geared towards interna-
tionalization. This is because of two main realizations made by the government: they are 
aware that Finland must export increasingly more, and that we are competitive to a high 
extent in mainly innovations in various industries. Manufacturing itself has become highly 
expensive compared to other regions of the world. This trend can be clearly seen in the 
Finnish economy. Witrafi has also been able to successfully raise funding from several 
public outlets before, and as the successful relationship continues, Witrafi should be able 
to raise further funding as well. 
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Most suitable funding alternatives are Tekes YIC funding, planning for global growth fund-
ing, TEM funding and Finnvera funding. These options are the most suitable ones namely 
because they are not constrained by the ‘de minimis’ restrictions. They are also suitable 
for reasons of naming internationalization directly as recommended parts of the project in 
question (to which the funding is allocated). They are thus extremely suitable options for 
any of the named methods of internationalization, that is, the ones requiring additional 
funding (from serendipity to hierarchical entry, excluding the pragmatic approach because 
that option does not require funding). While it can be said that such amounts of funding 
are comparatively large for a country, for Finland they are a necessity to uphold competi-
tive advantage as a nation. It can be argued, though, that this public intervention in inno-
vation funding highly taints the types of innovations funded, and the types of companies 
founded. 
 
These three options are all beneficial to startups, but Tekes YIC is the most useful in 
many respects. It is cost-effective, because out of project costs Tekes will reimburse 70 
%, whereas TEM will only reimburse 50 % and Finnvera loans are loans, having to be 
paid back in the future. Tekes YIC is also heavily related to the startups development 
phases, and urges the company to keep a certain pace through reaching certain mile-
stones. Planning for global growth in its non-de minimis form would give 50 % of costs as 
a grant.  
 
The abundance of startup funding in the United States, and its concentration to Silicon 
Valley is staggering. Compared to the Nordics, seed rounds are about 17 % larger, Series 
A rounds are 23 % larger and Series B rounds are 123 % larger. The sheer volume of 
funding is also amazing, with 49.3 Billion USD worth of venture deals done in the US (of 
which 24.2 Billion worth in the Silicon Valley) versus deals in the Nordics amounting to 
only 846.4 USD. This is why many startups look into entering that region, hence the com-
petition for the funding is extreme as well, which is again suggested by the PESTEL re-
sults. It is definitely worth it actually raising a funding round in Silicon Valley versus the 
Nordics, but unless the startup is well connected or well known, it might prove to be diffi-
cult and costly. It must however be noted that several parking-related startups have re-
ceived funding in Silicon Valley, some to high extents and in any case funding that has 
been at least in seven figures. 
 
The costs of doing this raising of funding may also prove excessive, if it requires pro-
longed time in Silicon Valley, a notoriously expensive place to reside in. This is clearly 
shown in the different internationalization options, especially the Hierarchical method, the 
Accelerator-based method and Incremental method. The Accelerator method may prove 
  
127 
extremely costly, if the chosen accelerator takes a stake of equity and the startup suc-
ceeds highly. That renders the stake given to the accelerator potentially highly valuable, 
and should be counted into the costs of the startup making such a move (otherwise the 
original owners would still own the stake). Also if the program is paid, and the acceleration 
does not provide sufficient results, it may prove to be a costly detour. 
 
Major findings are presented through the proposed scenarios. The pragmatic approach 
entails next to no funding or effort, giving meager results. The serendipity approach has 
been pursued by Witrafi for a while now. It has been somewhat beneficial, through net-
working especially and getting to know Silicon Valley first hand, but concrete benefits, af-
ter two trips have not stretched really further than this. The opportunities do not come to 
the company, the company must come to them. Therefore events and other happenings 
to search out these opportunities should be pursued. Opportunities may come from net-
working with the right person, or by attending innovation competitions, for example. Team 
Finland events should be attended, ones which would serve this purpose. These are well 
known methods for startups to reach the relevant audience with their message. One to 
three trips in total should be made, with the purpose of networking, meeting possible part-
ner companies and investors, in addition to attending a possible conference or competi-
tion. These are basic elements of working in a startup, just applied internationally. The 
trips costs are quite low, around 6000-7000 euro per trip, because of their business-trip 
nature.  
 
Starting from the incremental approach, internationalization becomes much more hands-
on in Silicon Valley. These entail more presence on-site. This is a key factor emphasized 
by the expert interviews: presence is needed to secure meetings and their follow ups. 
Without presence, follow-up meetings are impossible and what traction may be gained on 
a short trip will quickly deplete afterwards, when the presence shifts back to Finland. For 
presence purposes, a virtual office would be established in Silicon Valley, to show that the 
company has an office there and is available through it. To further support this, actual 
physical presence would also be added. This includes 1-3 stays in Silicon Valley, duration 
of at least two weeks to a month. It also significantly raises costs through living expenses 
there, which are among the highest in the world. The incremental approach would also 
bring into question using another trade-supporting agency, Amcham Finland. They are 
greatly able to help Finnish companies enter the US market, as it is their organizational 
purpose. Therefore, a one month stay would cost 12 000-13000 euro. Financing could be 
easily integrated into a larger internationalization project or Tekes-project. While this dou-
bles the cost of the serendipity approach, it brings a significantly higher presence and 
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credibility for the company. Opportunities there are much easier to pursue through the 
added presence and help from Amcham. 
 
Joining an accelerator program has been isolated as its own method, due to its total im-
mersion into the program, which usually lasts from three to six months. These programs 
promise to provide everything needed to start up business in Silicon Valley. Through their 
extensive networks and available resources (financial and non-financial, such as various 
consulting services) they are able to considerably streamline a startups market entry and 
growth. The marketed benefits must be criticized somewhat however, as the accelerators 
are businesses as well, and geared towards making a profit. They will look for their own 
benefit, which hopefully is their customers (attending startup) as well. Care must be taken 
into which program to apply for. This can be confusing, as there are several seemingly 
similar accelerators.  
 
Two employees would attend the accelerator, which would greatly influence the costs 
through living expenses, having to be paid by the company. Accelerator programs often 
take a portion of equity (in the single digit percentages), which can become a large portion 
of cost in the future, when the startup becomes valuable. Another significant addition to 
the commitment level of being in the US is incorporating there, which must be done for 
several reasons, including being able to provide the equity stake to the accelerator, but 
also for being able to more effectively manage operations there, and yet again increase 
credibility in the eyes of stakeholders. This options costs amount to 50 000- 60 000 $, the 
higher expenses mainly due to salary expenses, but also for acquiring a vehicle for 
transport (a necessity in America) and incorporating the company in Delaware. It has to 
be noted that financing this option would come partially from the accelerator as well: usu-
ally a sum of 25 000 $ is invested by the accelerator to the participating company. Other 
financing can come from e.g. Tekes through the Planning for global growth-program. For 
continuing the relationships established during the accelerator program, the case com-
pany should keep at least one member of staff in Silicon Valley; therefore towards the end 
of the program a B1 visa should be acquired, assuming the person in question would re-
quire one (Witrafi also has one US national on their payroll). This type of market entry 
holds large promise for the company, and potential for an efficient entry to Silicon Valley 
through the resources of the accelerator. 
 
Hierarchical entry takes entry to Silicon Valley even further, and if this option is chosen it 
should be very clear that it will be of benefit to the company. This option provides the high-
est level of control for the company, as it is pursued (according to desired level of commit-
ment) through forward vertical FDI or exporting. This option is popular among SME’s and 
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startups alike as it is flexible, for example due to the absence of a set, intense accelerator 
program. This is double-edged sword: it demands more resources, and with more control, 
comes more responsibility for the company itself in addition to uncertainty of the future. A 
disadvantage is also that more resources are required and the start-up has to endure 
higher uncertainty as it cannot rely on networks and support services provided by the pro-
gram as in previous scenario. Basically the benefits of working through an accelerator are 
taken away, and the startup has to fair on their own, through their much less extensive 
network and resources; thus having to spend more finances on e.g. consultation and more 
time taken in executing the same objectives. Of course, if the startup is able to obtain suf-
ficient local networks through a local business partner, or some other entity proficient in 
Silicon Valley, then the knowledge/network gap may be effectively closed.  
 
Contrary to the previous option, and according to expert interviews, incorporation is not 
absolutely required. If possible, it should be postponed as far as possible due to the extra 
costs and administration needs, but may shortly become a necessary step to take. One 
employee should stay on-site permanently, and this requires additional planning as it is a 
great resource commitment, and quite likely someone should be hired to replace them in 
Finland. According to expert interviews, and research, startups may use up to 250 000 $ 
in becoming successful in Silicon Valley, which is a significant sum to invest in such an 
endeavor. For the initial three month period, authors estimate that about 50 000 $ are re-
quired to fund this option, slightly lower than the accelerator option mainly due to less pro-
motional expenses allocated. This expense category may be highly volatile however, as 
holding for example a launch event would inflate the costs greatly. While in the accelerator 
option office space is provided through the program, here Witrafi would have to source 
their own office, costing around 750 $ per month.  Funding would most likely come 
through Tekes and either YIC funding or planning for global growth funding, however con-
trary to the previous option, the case company would have to supply more funding itself as 
there is no accelerator program to partially fund the project.  
7.2 Recommendations 
The objective of this research is not to provide a concrete method for the case company to 
internationalize into the Silicon Valley, but rather give various alternatives into how this 
could commence. These have been outlined in the previous chapter. 
 
Out of domestic funding options, it is clear that the best alternative is Tekes YIC funding, 
as its “grant level” is the highest, with 70 % of project costs paid by Tekes. The other alter-
natives would deplete the company’s resources at a faster rate. The program is rather dif-
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ficult to get into, but when the case company fits the requirements it is certainly recom-
mended to join, as it opens up possibilities for different kinds of internationalization alter-
natives through the funding. The planning for global growth option is also viable, if the fo-
cus of Witrafi’s next project is only on internationalization. 
 
How to internationalize is not always an easy decision, nor can it be foreseen in all cases. 
Startups operate largely through taking chances (however calculated or not they may be). 
Because a large part of success is networking and using these networks, the chances are 
also largely based on them. You never know who you’ll meet, or who your next business 
partner is. Startups are in search for these continuously. This is why the authors have 
identified several internationalization methods that can play out according to what the fu-
ture holds at the time the internationalization into Silicon Valley is started. It should be 
noted that this cannot happen at a too early stage, because it may deplete resources too 
quickly and lead to financial problems especially in the event that the internationalization 
is not successful. A startup may however stay in the Serendipity and Pragmatic options for 
a long time without consuming too much resources. 
 
Hence the identified scenarios are recommendations in itself, and the most suitable one 
should be chosen according to the company’s level of commitment. The case company 
can be identified to have been in the Serendipity phase for a while now, whereas the prag-
matic phase has been superseded shortly after founding the company because opportuni-
ties should be searched at all times. If the case company truly wishes to pursue interna-
tionalization to Silicon Valley however, methods starting from Incremental to Hierarchical 
should be chosen, because all of them provide more or less constant presence in Silicon 
Valley. The method will in any case change, if while operating in the Serendipity approach 
a chance is taken into keeping a more intense presence in the Silicon Valley. This is a key 
factor by outside stakeholders to identify the case company as being serious about com-
ing to Silicon Valley. The incremental approach may provide some value for money, but it 
is only suitable for pursuing a certain thing, such as gaining funding or starting a strategic 
partnership, but time allocated to that option will likely not provide for a broad set of ef-
forts. The most benefits come from attending accelerators and pursuing hierarchical entry. 
They could constitute as a total immersion into Silicon Valley, and would bring a bolstered 
network, possible investments and partners in all relevant areas for startups, such as 
funding, partnerships and most importantly sales. Here, the end of the program, the 
‘Demo Day’ (as they are often called) plays a large part, because the audience in these 
days are always filled with investors, possible partners and clients; naturally in addition to 
the demo being something actually concrete on US soil, a big traction factor. 
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In short, the case company should identify the desired results based on its current situa-
tion when starting to enter Silicon Valley. In any case, the company should make its posi-
tion such that it could be accepted to the Tekes YIC funding program, as it would finan-
cially permit pursuing any of these identified internationalization methods. 
7.3 Limitations, ethical view and further research 
Some of the limitations of this research have been discussion in previous chapters, most 
notably in chapter five. The biggest limitation of this research is the case it concerns. The 
results should not be generalized because the research is written the case company in 
mind. The authors have attempted to use only high-quality source materials but in some 
parts have had to rely on interpretation of data that may not be accurate as a result of be-
ing analyzed incorrectly. The authors acknowledge that they have limited experience in 
conducting research of this scale and also had limited interview skills. (USC Libraries 
2016) 
 
Authors have tried to mitigate the limitations by adhering Haaga-Helia guidelines for thesis 
writing. Furthermore a critical approach to own biases has been implemented. The au-
thors have followed ethical guidelines of research and care was taken to explain to the in-
terviewees what the purpose of their interviews is. This research does not include any 
confidential material. 
 
For the commissioning company it is necessary to understand that the demarcation of 
case sets some limitations on the results. By no means do the authors propose that other 
options for internationalization do not exist as well, nor does this research suggest 
whether U.S. market entry is recommendable or not. For further research authors propose 
at least a closer inspection of case company’s internal capabilities and existing networks. 
Furthermore a detailed market research of a target market and preparation of internation-
alization plan can be recommended. 
7.4 Project management 
This research project started in October 2015, the thesis plan was submitted in 19th of Oc-
tober and was approved shortly after. This research has two authors which has impacted 
the project management both positively and negatively. Both of the authors have aca-
demic and professional interests from the area under study, and it was evident from early 
on that the research would be conducted properly with the best of authors’ abilities and in 
accordance with Haaga-Helia guidelines and best practices. 
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Authors kept regular contact throughout the project via Skype, mobile-phone, Trello and 
Facebook and a proper face-to-face meeting was organized approximately every other 
week, excluding the holidays. Time management wise the completion of this research 
took longer than anticipated. A major reason for the delay was the difficulty to find a suita-
ble theoretical framework for the case. From the original thesis plan very few theories re-
main in the final version. Also, the ambiguity of start-ups and their operative environment 
together with limitations set by case company challenged the authors on several occa-
sions. Initially authors wished to complete the project by the end of February so the pro-
ject completion has been delayed by over a month.  
 
Towards the end of the research authors realized that the research could continue on and 
on, which was a sign that authors had forgotten the demarcation. Corrective action was 
taken and although certain amount of text had to be discarded the authors reacted to this 
as a part of the learning process. In the end, authors feel that the resulting research fulfills 
the requirements of Haaga-Helia Bachelor’s Thesis as well as provides in-depth insights 
for the case company. Authors are quite satisfied with the quality of the research, although 
in some parts compromises had to be done. Taking into account the starting point and 
uniqueness of the case, the research can be said to have been successful. 
7.4.1 Work division 
The authors decided not to complicate the research with the work division. The work was 
divided based partly on the authors’ prior work experience and partly on the fact that Siito-
nen had access to and better understanding of the case company. Interviews were con-
ducted by Matilainen with the exception of Kriman’s email interview. 
 
- Siitonen wrote abstract, 1.0, and 1.4; Matilainen the following sub-chapters, key 
concepts were divided 
- Matilainen wrote chapters 2 & 5 entirely whereas Siitonen chapters 3 & 4  
- From chapter 6.1. Matilainen wrote most as the context introduced in chapter 2. 
- 6.2. was divided (table) 
- 6.4 was divided so that Siitonen concentrated on funding and Matilainen services 
- 6.5. was written by Matilainen 
- 6.6. was written by Matilainen 
- 6.7. was divided, Siitonen wrote the first three scenarios, Matilainen the last two 
- Chapter 7 was divided (table) 
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Table 11. Work division. 
Chapter Niki Sampsa 
1 
1.1,1.2.,1.3., 1.5. (key concepts divided) Abstract, 1.0., 1.4 (key con-
cepts) 
2 Entirely - 
3 - Entirely 
4 - Entirely 
5 Entirely - 
6 
6.1., 6.1.1, 6.12., 6.1.3.  
6.2.1, 6.2.2 
- 
6.4. Team Finland was divided (services) 
6.5. incl. sub-chapters 
6.6. excl. 6.6.1 
6.7.4, 6.7.5 
6.0, 6.1.4. 
6.2, 6.2.3, 6.2.4 
6.3 
6.4. TF was divided, (funding) 
- 
6.6.1 
6.7.0, 6.7.1., 6.7.2, 6.7.3 
7 7.3., 7.4. 7.0.,7.1. 7.2. 
 
7.5 Personal learning and self-assessment 
Here the authors asses their personal learning experience and time management. 
7.5.1 Niki Matilainen 
The research process has been challenging yet very rewarding. I am confident in saying 
that I learned a lot more than 15 credits worth. At times it has been frustrating that the 
concepts used in discussion are ambiguous and much of the entrepreneurial activities are 
based on “hype” due to the environment being so uncertain. The research turned out to be 
something completely different than I anticipated. At first we approached the research 
from the point of view learned in Haaga-Helia courses, and I anticipated that we would 
use a lot more budgeting and concentrate on international trade participants such as logis-
tics providers. However, soon after the first version of theoretical framework it was appar-
ent that start-ups operate in a very different environment and that I personally had a lim-
ited understanding of start-up operations. Thus I had to re-write most of my part of theo-
retical framework. I am glad that I did, because I learned a lot and feel that the part now 
corresponds better with the case context. 
 
My time-management was poor in the beginning but improved towards the end. I believe I 
had spent over 400 hours researching by the beginning of January, which served as a sort 
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of a wake-up call for me. It was exciting and enlightening to conduct the interviews with 
Suomela and Klyszeiko and I am thankful for them for their time. It was only weeks after 
the interviews when I understood how much knowledge they were able to provide me 
with. I had no motivation problems as internationalization genuinely interests me. Occa-
sionally I had trouble relating to the challenges faced by start-ups, and there seemed to be 
very few concrete options available. At those times I was able to rely on co-author Siito-
nen for support. 
 
In the end, I feel that we as authors were able to demonstrate that the chosen research 
approach is the correct one for this unique case. Although we don’t give concrete recom-
mendations I feel that the research provides the case company and other stake-holders 
with valuable insights when it comes to the U.S. market entry and start-up internationaliza-
tion. Personally I feel that the research process has given me some answers as to how I 
want to continue my professional growth and where my biggest strengths and weak-
nesses are. 
7.5.2 Sampsa Siitonen 
Sampsa Siitonen 
While operating as the CEO of the case company, I have had first-hand experience of Sili-
con Valley on 2 occasions, by attending Verizon Powerful Answers Awards in 2014 as a 
finalist and in 2015 as being part of a Haaga-Helia team researching the area for the HH 
Startup Schools internationalization purposes. In the first option, Witrafi pitched for a main 
prize of 1 million $, but we did not win it. This was however a very interesting experience, 
and provided me the first touch into Silicon Valley. In the other, we were meeting relevant 
stakeholders for Startup School, but could also introduce our own agenda there to some 
of the same entities, such as coworking spaces and incubators, thus forming a larger net-
work still. On both occasions I also met with several potential partners and investors. 
 
That being said, while I did have some experience of especially the now identified Seren-
dipity approach, I was largely unaware of the several other considerations to be made in 
the options regarding a higher grade of immersion into the Valley. Professionally I am now 
aware of these methods and what they entail, having academically studied these issues 
and the accompanying theory. Most importantly I can better separate myself via academic 
methods from the largesse of hype prevalent within the startup community. I am much 
better equipped now to study target markets in general as well, and should be able to ap-
ply this knowledge in my professional life. For me, this research was the best opportunity 
to learn such things, and being able to hedge from making mistakes in the future.  
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If some negative aspects should be noted, it should definitely include time management: 
this study was prolonged on my part extremely due to various Witrafi-related issues 
abound during the making of this research. This has probably and regrettably affected the 
workflow of my co-author, Niki Matilainen. However, it can be said that in these times Mr. 
Matilainen was still able to push me to complete my work. 
 
Finally, I conclude that this was a very rewarding and different project for me. While it is 
difficult to estimate the amount of work done, and personally I do not value working itself 
but results gained, this research reached its goal through major effort by both authors. 
Startups are agile beasts, therefore our findings fit Witrafi perfectly, as we can choose a 
most suitable option based on our current wants and need at the point of internationaliza-
tion. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Assessment of selected incubator and accelerator programs 
In order to assess the different startup ecosystem organizations such as incubator and ac-
celerator programs, it is necessary to start by discussing the determinants of a good (part-
nering) opportunity. To begin with it is important to remember what are the needs of 
Witrafi (i.e. capital, internationalization, networks), versus what the different organizations 
can provide for Witrafi.  
 
Some partnering opportunities may currently be of reach for Witrafi, but can open up in 
case Witrafi decides to incorporate in the United States or receives funding from other 
sources. Conditions such as the start-up having to operate in a certain industry exist 
which rules out some opportunities altogether. Additionally, programs often have highly 
competitive selection processes, according to Fortune article (Shoot, B. 2014) one popular 
incubator averages an application per minute. On top of that, although incubators and ac-
celerators can be a faster way to the U.S. market, participation is rarely free. Seed accel-
erator programs require an equity stake in return for their services, which may be unat-
tractive option for Witrafi. Non-profit programs too, have different types of fee structures to 
cover the costs. (InBIA) 
 
The task of naming and assessing all candidate programs would be outright impossible as 
there are so many of them. Thus only few example programs are introduced and used as 
a reference for further discussion. Some of the more popular accelerator programs such 
as the well-known 500 startups, Y Combinator and TechStars were left out from in-depth 
analysis as they are hardly the most realistic programs for Witrafi. 
 
InBIA has combined a list of questions that entrepreneurs should ask when they are 
screening for incubators. The list of questions below is a slightly simplified version of In-
BIA’s list and was used as a reference for analysis. The selected incubator & accelerator 
programs were selected based on their reputation, industry focus and international experi-
ence. 
 
What is the track record? 
− How old is the program?  
− Does the program have any successful graduates that have succeeded inde-
pendently? 
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Graduation policy 
− What is the program’s graduation policy? How does exit from the program hap-
pen? 
− What are the rules of the program? 
− How long does the program last on average?  
 
Qualifications of the staff 
− Who are the managing staff and how long have they been with the program? 
− How involved is the staff on site? 
− Have they been successful entrepreneurs themselves? 
− Do they develop the program according to the best practices? (InBIA) 
 
Founders Space (incubator+accelerator) 
Founders Space is a top ranked (Forbes & Inc. magazines) program offering both incuba-
tor and accelerator services in San Francisco. Founders Space is a relatively new organi-
zation, it started operating in 2010 and had its accelerator program started in 2014. So far 
the program has not produced ‘unicorns’ like Uber, but it has a good reputation among in-
ternational startups (Hendricks 2015). According to Founders Space they have worked 
with hundreds of startups and majority have been able to raise capital, although no guar-
antees are made. 
 
Founders Space accelerator+incubator program starts with intense 2-4 week phase after 
which the pace calms down. After the first phase there is a demo day and the intensive 
phase ends, the startups are free to use Founders Space services and attend events for 
up to 12 months. The program is a generalist when it comes to accepted startups, but the 
selection process is competitive and only accepts 5-20 startups per quarter. The cost of 
program is less than most other accelerators charge and depends on the startup’s devel-
opment stage. Typically Founders Space charges 5% or less in equity, and startups have 
the option of paying a fee if they don’t want to give out equity. 1% is minimum charged.  
 
Founders Space is founded and managed by Steve Hoffman and Naomi Kokubo. The 
couple has extensive entrepreneurial experience, Hoffman is also an active angel investor 
himself. The program mentors come from various business backgrounds and the program 
boasts an extensive investor network. The mentoring is most intense during the first 2-4 
weeks of the program and startups are entitled to one or two days of one-on-one mentor-
ing. Founders Space’s approach to accelerator program is a bit different from the tradi-
tional programs as the intensive phase is shorter but the program length can be much 
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longer depending on startup’s needs. Founders Space also has a 3 month online incuba-
tor program which is complimentary to the program participants. 
 
For Witrafi Founders Space could be an option because it has a proven record of working 
with international startups and is also ranked highly among all programs. Founders Space 
can be less expensive option and its program length is flexible yet it still offers all the nec-
essary benefits such as networking and free co-working space. On the negative side the 
program may not be able to provide industry specific advice for Witrafi and at least some 
of the mentoring services seem to be aimed at startups that are in earlier stages than 
Witrafi. Also, the location of the program is in San Francisco, and for Witrafi location 
nearer to the Valley would arguably be more beneficial. 
(FoundersSpace 2016) 
 
Plug and Play Tech Center (PnP) (Seed-accelerator)  
Plug and Play Tech Center, located in Sunnyvale, Silicon Valley is one of the biggest tech 
campuses and business accelerators in the world. PnP was founded in 2006 and today 
provides several accelerator programs, seed funding, office space, data centers and re-
lated services to startups of all stages. PnP’s CEO is Saeed Amidi, a well-known entrepre-
neur and angel investors. He is joined by extensive group of managers and advisors. Over 
the years PnP has worked with or invested in a number of world famous tech startups 
such as Dropbox and PayPal. Currently PnP campus hosts some 350 startups. (Angel.co) 
 
From Witrafi’s line of business PnP has industry specific Internet-of-Things program which 
could help Witrafi in internationalization and open doors to a network of investors and 
partnering opportunities. The IoT program runs twice a year and lasts for 12 weeks. The 
participants have access to all the usual accelerator services and potentially to funding. 
The program accepts 25-30 startups from around 2000 applicants, so the selection pro-
cess is highly competitive. The cost of program is not easily available but according to 
Tekes PnP accelerator programs cost between 12000-18000 euros. What sets PnP’s pro-
gram apart from many other programs is that its accelerator programs have formal links to 
major corporations such as Mercedes, Bosch and Fujitsu. The corporate partners co-se-
lect the participating startups and are involved in the mentoring. (Angel.co) 
 
Of course, for a startup being able to join PnP’s program is statistically improbable and for 
Witrafi the cost may be too high. PnP does not publish the terms of its programs but 5% 
equity for seed funding is quoted in various sources. However, PnP is not only interesting 
option because of its accelerator programs, but also because of its other services. Finnish 
company Transfluent participated in “Tekes New Innovative Enterprises”-program and 
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later expanded to Silicon Valley where it rented office space from PnP. According to 
Transfluent CEO the cost of rent is reasonable 650$/month and the terms are favorable. 
He also suggests that the location of PnP’s campus is better for many B2B startups than 
the co-working spaces located in San Francisco. (Tekes 2016 Case Transfluent) 
 
Alchemist accelerator (seed-accelerator) 
Alchemist accelerator was established in 2012 as a first accelerator that specialises 
strictly on B2B and B2B2C start-ups. For that reason it is known as an enterprise acceler-
ator and heavy emphasis is given to relationship development between start-ups and cor-
porate customers, market validation and sales. Alchemist is backed by corporations such 
as Cisco Systems, Siemens and Salesforce. The program has produced some successful 
graduates, and more than half have gone to raise over a million dollars, three have been 
acquired so far.  
 
Alchemist has an Internet-of-Things program which is suitable for Witrafi. The program 
has a competitive selection process, 12 start-ups are selected for the program which lasts 
for 6 months. The cost of program amounts “a single digit common equity”, on average 
5%. There is also a tuition fee, which however can be paid with a convertible note pro-
vided by the program. The average cash investment given to the start-ups is 36,000$. The 
participants can choose which services they want to use, everything but demo day is op-
tional. The program offers all the regular accelerator services such as mentoring, 
roundtables and social events. The program also organizes one-on-ones with prospective 
customers and investors and provides customer targeted mentoring. The start-ups have 
access to co-working spaces located in San Francisco, Palo Alto and Menlo Park subject 
to availability.  
 
Alchemist is led by a team of professionals with executive level experience. The program 
is ranked fifth best in the U.S. by seedrankings (2014). Based on reviews found from the 
internet the participating start-ups have been very satisfied with the program. For Witrafi 
Alchemist could provide perhaps the best tangible connections to corporations and more 
technical advice and market validation than some of the other accelerators. On the nega-
tive side, the program does not seem to be as intensive as some of the others and a lot 
depends on the start-ups’ own effort. The length of six months ties the start-ups for a 
longer period of time and the program also has stricter terms than other programs. The 
program also requires that the start-ups incorporate in the U.S. though they are willing to 
pay the fees and help with the process. Some of the other requirements of the program 
are likewise stricter but at least the program is transparent about its terms.  
(Alchemist Accelerator 2016) 
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U.S. Market Access (US MAC) (incubator+accelerator) 
US Market Access Center is a non-profit technology accelerator based in Silicon Valley. 
The program first started in 1995 and has since worked with over 1,400 companies want-
ing to do business in the United States. When the organization was founded it collabo-
rated with the city of San Jose and the local university, but the relationship has later been 
terminated. As of now US MAC gets its funding from foreign seed funds and governments. 
The current program which is called “Go Global Silicon Valley” has been running for four 
years and according to US MAC over 80 graduates are currently doing business in the 
Valley.  
 
US MAC’s program is somewhat different from the other accelerators as it is foreign 
funded. There is no applying form in the website and the selection is done in overseas 
events together by the program and foreign partners. As of now, US MAC does not seem 
to be active in Finland, although their materials do mention that they have worked with 
Finnish startups previously. In recent years the program has invested in Baltic and Asian 
countries. According to one of the founders the program works with 60-70 startups at any 
given time. The program does not normally take equity from startups, but the cost struc-
ture of the program is not transparent.  
 
US MAC’s accelerator program is a three step program. First phase is called “Think Big” 
and it is a 2-3 day program conducted in foreign locations. The program calls the phase 
“boot camp” and apparently the first phase determines whether a startup is invited to the 
second phase. The second phase lasts for 8 weeks, of which the first 6 weeks take place 
in foreign location and last 2 weeks in Silicon Valley. The second phase is used to further 
develop and validate the business model and includes customer meetings and mentoring. 
The third step is called “Scale Fast” and is conducted entirely in Silicon Valley. This phase 
lasts for three months and focuses on signing actual customers, partners and investors. 
The program provides startups with legal help and necessary support services. In the third 
step companies have access to co-working office space, the program collaborates with 
RocketSpace and SiliconValleyPad.  
 
US MAC’s program is a comprehensive accelerator program for international startups. It is 
led by two co-CEOs Chris Burry and Alfredo Coppola. Burry has entrepreneurial experi-
ence while Coppola comes from management consulting sector. About third of the pro-
gram mentors are business angels, third have corporate background and the rest are en-
trepreneurs. The program is longest running tech accelerator in Silicon Valley and the fact 
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that it works with governments creates credibility. The track record of program is good, es-
pecially with foreign startups. For Witrafi it might be difficult to join the program as it 
doesn’t seem to be actively working with Finnish government agencies. Another downside 
is that the program is not specialized and the costs are not transparent. However, the pro-
gram’s website mentions other services such as virtual office and inquiring about the ser-
vices is always possible. (US Market Access 2016) 
 
Silicon Valley Catalyst (seed-accelerator) 
Silicon Valley Catalyst is a new accelerator that combines Nordic resources with Silicon 
Valley experience. The program was jointly launched by Norway’s StartupLab, Valley 
based MAD-partners and venture capital fund Garage Technology Ventures in June 2015. 
For a Finnish based startup Catalyst accelerator is interesting because Pekka Pärnänen, 
founder and CEO of MAD-Partners is involved in the program. Mr. Pärnänen is a former 
head of Finpro’s Silicon Valley function and has extensive experience from business de-
velopment and tech fields. He is one of the best known Finnish persons living in the Sili-
con Valley.  
 
Because Catalyst is such a new program there is no graduates yet and other than what 
the website there is very little information available. Garage alone has had accelerator 
programs previously, but the new program is separate from those. The credibility of pro-
gram is based solely on the team behind it but that is not necessarily a deal breaker, con-
sidering that the team is so experienced. Garage for example is headed by well-known 
Silicon Valley personalities, including Guy Kawasaki and Bill Reichert. StartupLab on the 
other hand is Norway’s leading incubator program. 
 
The Catalyst lasts for three to six months and the program follows a customized pattern, 
meaning that it has predetermined modules but mentoring is tailored for the needs of each 
startup. The program offers business development, validation, customer acquisition and 
scaling. The StartupLab invests 100,000$ through standard convertible note and each 
startup is required to grant “a few percent” of equity to Garage. In addition the cost of par-
ticipation is 8000$ to 12000$ a month and office space is organized from Nordic Innova-
tion House for a nominal fee. The program does not disclose how many applicants it has 
received or how competitive the selection process is, but the requirements can be found 
from the program website.  
 
Catalyst is an interesting program, and it claims to be more customized than other accel-
erator programs. On the positive side, the program organizers have a good reputation and 
are experienced in technology field. Having the Nordic dimension could be beneficial as 
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there is lesser cultural barriers involved. On the negative side, the program seems to be 
somewhat costlier than other programs and there is no proven record as of yet. (Garage 
Silicon Valley Catalyst 2016) 
 
Appendix 2. Interview with Suomela, H. Finpro. 
Most of the transcript is written by author based on phone conversation with Suomela 
(26.1. 16:00-16:50), some parts are also from the email correspondence few days prior. 
 
The current government program has named “advancing SME internationalization” 
as one of its key projects (kärkihanke). What does that mean in practice? 
In practice the fact that Finnish government has made advancing SME internationalization 
a key priority does not show in any way. It does however indicate that the government has 
realized the importance of it and feels positive about it. For Team Finland employees and 
customers alike it means also that the funding position of Team Finland is stable and 
guaranteed until foreseeable future. 
 
Team Finland’s thematic priorities are likewise less visible in daily work, but they more or 
less guide the selection of current and future Team Finland growth programs. Growth pro-
grams aim to activate and inspire the firms operating in certain sectors and provide coun-
selling and guidance. Also, TF hosts growth program participants in conferences, exhibi-
tions and trade delegations. 
 
How many (approx.) Finnish startups exist in the Silicon Valley? (email) 
 In the past, when companies started their U.S. quest they moved some person to U.S. (or 
hired someone) and set up an office. It was easy to count how many companies were in 
U.S. with those kinds of setups. Nowadays the companies set up a virtual office deal with 
some local co-working place and one of the founders or execs are visiting in Silicon Valley 
(or U.S.) every now and then. On their web site one can find a U.S. address and a phone 
number but those could be very well just virtual offices (read: enhanced P.O. Boxes) 
 
But in short there are more than 30 startups from Finland in Silicon Valley currently which 
have people more or less permanently and an office address there. The number of com-
panies just with virtual office are even more numerous. Also it depends a little how one 
defines startup. 
 
Have those startups collaborated with Team Finland or used some of TF services? 
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A number of them yes (have either used TF services in the past or received advice or 
guidance from TF team), but in some cases the amount of services / guidance / advice 
has been minimal. (email) 
 
How can Team Finland help Finnish SMEs in internationalization? What are the ben-
efits? 
Finpro’s resources in Silicon Valley are limited and all firms are entitled to have equal 
time. Finpro is in process of hiring a second consultant to Silicon Valley. Also, many more 
services are provided in Finland.  
 
In Silicon Valley Finpro does not conduct research for the firms or provide firm specific 
consultation, but if needed they can recommend private consultants (paid services). 
Finpro has excellent local knowledge of Silicon Valley and can offer a wide network of 
contacts and references. Mr. Suomela has worked with so many different firms that he 
has developed understanding of what works and what doesn’t (best practices). He can 
also “connect the dots”, saving new firms the time of creating networks from the ground.  
 
How much do the services cost? 
Team Finland salaries are paid by Finnish government (Ministry of Economy and Employ-
ment) so the services are free of charge (excluding certain growth program membership 
costs). Of course indirectly paid via corporate taxes. 
 
How important is it to have a physical presence in Silicon Valley in order to achieve 
the benefits the location can offer? 
Very important. Permanent on-location presence increases credibility considerably. In the 
U.S. business environment it is not possible to say: “I am going back to Finland next 
week, talk to you later”, because often times second and third meetings are needed to 
create trust. Continuity is important! Also, often things move forward faster when a meet-
ing can be agreed right away. 
 
In some cases virtual office can be enough to assert that the firm is serious and commit-
ted. “Shows that the firm is available”, but even then it might be difficult to send an em-
ployee to foreign location in short notice. 
 
Suomela recommended B1-visa to begin with, it is valid for 6 months and can be ex-
tended. Other visas require more time, resources and lawyers’ help. Typical acquiring pro-
cess lasts for 4 months. 
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How important is networking in the U.S. business environment? 
Very important. Email is not sufficient for business decisions. Personal relationships are 
needed, even phone operators won’t connect unless correct person can be named.  
 
What are some of the most common challenges Finnish companies face in the U.S. 
market? 
Depends.  (I can explain more over the phone) 
 
In general: Business model changes, ecosystem differences, underestimating time 
needed, time zone differences (/remoteness to Finnish HQ) 
 
Can you give any ball-park figures how much would the expansion cost? 
Depends.   
 
Other issues such as start-up ecosystem were discussed but the author was unable to 
write everything down while conversing on the phone. 
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Appendix 3. Interview with Klyszeiko, M. Amcham Finland. 
Parts of the transcript from Skype interview with Klyszeiko 27.1.2016 10:00-10:45. 
 
What does Amcham do? What is your role in the organization? 
Amcham Finland is a non-governmental, non-profit business-to-business network with of-
fices in Helsinki and New York. Amcham supports the business development and growth 
of its membership organization (~375). It provides a wide range of business services, net-
working opportunities and programs with the aim of improving the market conditions. 
 
Mike Klyszeiko is the founder and director of LaunchpadUSA program in Amcham. The 
program supports the growth and development of Finnish SMEs wanting to do business in 
the U.S. It helps the membership organizations to break into the market, helps in scaling 
of the business and gives guidance through the process of establishing the market pres-
ence.  
 
Who are you working with? What kind of networks does Amcham have in the U.S.? 
Amcham membership organizations come in all sizes from a startup to big multinational 
corporations. The recent founding of New York office has improved Amcham’s connec-
tions in the U.S. even more, and Amcham can offer networks from all fields of expertise 
whether it be legal advice, HR, banking, business development, investors or customers.  
Amcham connects the membership organizations with each other, so even a 
small SME can partner up with a big corporations e.g. Kesko or Pfizer. Amcham also of-
fers visibility to the smaller companies through its social media accounts by writing articles 
about its membership organizations. The increased visibility can improve business signifi-
cantly, as an article has a reach of thousands of Vice President level decision makers. 
 
Why is it important for a Finnish company to network before entering the U.S. mar-
ket? 
Networking is very crucial aspect of doing business in the U.S. Having the right kind of 
networks, introduced at the right time can make a difference between success and failure. 
Mr. Klyszeiko discourages hiring outside consultants and emphasizes that for companies 
it is important to go to the U.S. themselves. Klyszeiko said that Finnish business networks 
in the U.S. are far-behind when compared to countries such as Sweden and Israel. He 
also said that immediate accessibility is needed and that Finnish companies need to adapt 
to the U.S. business culture. 
Klyszeiko says that attending conferences, exhibitions etc. are becoming less important 
networking venues. 
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How can Amcham help Finnish SMEs to enter the U.S. market? What are the bene-
fits and what does it cost? 
(In addition to the services discussed earlier) Amcham helps in “laying the foundation” for 
successful entry. Amcham provides targeted networking and advice. The annual member-
ship fee is 3,500€ which gives access to the services and programs. Amcham has no lim-
its in program lengths (many others have 12 week programs etc) and encourages mem-
bership organizations to actively stay in contact with them. Mr. Klyszeiko said in the inter-
view that he sees internationalization as a longer process and that is also why he doesn’t 
see the value in short-programs. 
 
Mr. Klyszeiko said that government funded delegations and programs are often old-fash-
ioned and ineffective especially when it comes to U.S. business environment, but also that 
they might make more sense in some other countries such as China.  
Klyszeiko used Amcham’s collaboration with Idean (a successful Finnish company in 
U.S.) as an example of the benefits Amcham can offer.  
 
Is there any rule for timing of internationalization? 
There isn’t necessarily any time constraint, it depends on the case. Klyszeiko personally 
thinks that it is better if the company has established sales in the domestic market. Those 
sales can be used as a reference in the U.S. market and help in determining 1. Segmen-
tation, 2. Size of the customer companies and 3. Best locations.  
 
Is it worthwhile to incorporate and what would it cost? 
Klyszeiko discourages needless incorporating but acknowledges that in certain situations 
it is necessary. As a rule, a firm needs to incorporate an U.S. entity only when there is a 
clear business need; a firm wants to invest into the U.S. or attract VC, needs visas for em-
ployees, hire local employees, wants to rent premises or needs to open a bank account. 
Klyszeiko said that a common way is to first establish a virtual office, which does not re-
quire U.S. inc. Amcham can offer virtual offices from attractive location in New York. Am-
cham Virtual office offers U.S. mail address, phone numbers and limited usage of prem-
ises for meetings. Attractive location is important for credibility: Klyszeiko told how some 
years ago a number of Finnish startups had virtual offices in very bad location in Silicon 
Valley and it hurt their business. Also, a U.S. businessman is not going to call +358 num-
ber. 
According to Klyszeiko a lot can be done with visa-waiver and normal B1 visa. For exam-
ple meetings and “road shows” are possible as is general market development.  
(We didn’t discuss costs, although it is quite clear that it is not expensive to incorporate) 
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Are American companies open to co-operate and work with Finnish companies?  
They are. Finnish American trade relations are good and Finnish companies have de-
pendable reputation. The other way around American companies sometimes “talk big” but 
are less dependable. Klyszeiko says there is no real liability of foreignness, it is the prod-
uct/service that matters. However he advises companies to “look local, sound local”. Web-
site and marketing materials have to be written in perfect English to increase credibility.  
 
Other issues were discussed as well. The transcript presented covers the questions that 
were prepared beforehand. 
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Appendix 4. Interview with Siitonen, S. Witrafi 
Available upon request from the authors. 
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Appendix 5. Interview with Kriman, A.  
Available upon request from the authors. 
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Appendix 6. Notes of Siitonen, S. visit to Silicon Valley  
Available upon request from the authors. 
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